We do not report in detail on war crimes
because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not
directly affect the military operations we are assessing and
forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict
and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we
do not describe them in these reports.
A variety of
Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new
transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups,
have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the
Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these
extrajudicial killings.
Iran reportedly
asked the United States during nuclear talks in Rome on April 19 to
negotiate an interim deal, which is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment
that Iran may calculate an interim deal would delay or prevent snapback
sanctions or a strike.[1] Axios reported that Iran said it may
not be possible to reach a final deal by US President Donald Trump’s
proposed 60-day deadline. Trump reportedly set a 60-day deadline to
reach a new nuclear agreement and previously warned that ‘there will be a
bombing’ if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[2] US Special
Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly told Iranian Foreign
Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi that he wants to focus on reaching a
comprehensive deal within 60 days, but the two parties could reach an
interim deal if both sides agree they need more time.[3] Axios
previously reported on April 10 that Iran may propose that Iran and the
United States first negotiate an “interim deal” prior to beginning
negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear agreement.[4] CTP-ISW previously
assessed that Iran may calculate that an interim deal with the United
States could delay or prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions by
European JCPOA signatories or a potential US or Israeli strike on
Iranian nuclear facilities.[5] Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, the
United Kingdom, China, France, Russia and Germany) reached an interim
deal in 2013 that froze elements of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange
for temporary sanctions relief prior to further negotiations that led to
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.[6] Iran agreed
to yield its 20 percent enriched uranium stockpile, refrain from
operating any inactive centrifuges, halt the production and installation
of new centrifuges, cease construction of the Arak heavy water reactor,
and accept new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight
measures.[7] It is unclear what concessions Iran would be willing to
make for an interim deal in the current nuclear negotiations.
IAEA
Director General Raphael Grossi continued to hold meetings on ongoing
US-Iran nuclear talks. Grossi met with Witkoff on April 23 to discuss
nuclear negotiations.[8] Grossi separately met with the Iranian,
Russian, and Chinese permanent representatives to the UN on April 24 to
discuss the Iranian nuclear program.[9] Iran, Russia, and China continue
to present a unified position on US-Iran nuclear negotiations.
Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for possible US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.
Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General
Alireza Sabahi Fard and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh visited
two air defense sites responsible for protecting Iranian nuclear
facilities on April 24.[10] Sabahi Fard and Hajizadeh visited the
Khondab Air Defense Group site near the IR-40 Heavy Water Research
Reactor in Markazi Province to inspect military units and defense
capabilities at the site. The two commanders also inspected the Natanz
Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) air defense site in Esfahan Province.[11]
Sabahi
Fard previously inspected the Fordow air defense site near the Fordow
Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) on April 16.[12] These continued
inspections likely reflect a broader Iranian effort to assess and
reinforce air defense readiness around key nuclear facilities amid
concerns about potential US or Israeli strikes.[13]
Key Takeaways:
- Iran-US Nuclear Negotiations:
Iran reportedly asked the United States during nuclear talks in Rome on
April 19 to negotiate an interim deal, according to two unspecified
sources with knowledge of the issue who spoke to Axios. CTP-ISW
previously assessed that Iran may calculate that an interim deal with
the United States could delay or prevent the imposition of snapback
sanctions by European JCPOA signatories or a potential US or Israeli
strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. - Iranian Air Defense Inspections: Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for possible US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.
Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy
Imagery
indicates Iran is constructing a large trimaran-type warship at the
IRGC naval facility in Bandar-e Bahonar, Hormozgan Province.[14] An
OSINT analyst reported the vessel is approximately 77 meters long and
24–27 meters wide, significantly larger than the IRGC Navy’s existing
Shahid Soleimani-class missile corvettes.[15]
Syria
A
northern Syria-based, anti-SDF source reported on April 23 that the SDF
re-deployed to several of its positions in villages west of Tishreen
Dam.[16] The source reported that SDF units returned to
positions Mahshiyet al Sheikh, Hajj Hussein, and al Shash al Bubna, west
of the dam.[17] The SDF had previously withdrawn from these positions
on or before April 14, and the Syrian army’s 60th Division has deployed
to the area to remove unexploded ordnance.[18] The Syrian transitional
government has not yet asserted full control over Tishreen Dam,
however.[19] The SDF’s handover of Tishreen Dam to the Syrian government
is a critical step towards integrating the SDF into the Syrian state.
Possible SDF re-deployments to former positions west of the dam may
threaten the dam’s successful handover. CTP-ISW cannot corroborate the
report that claims that the SDF deployed west of the dam with other
sources, but new SDF deployments west of the dam would be notable given
the agreement to hand over the Tishreen Dam to the transitional
government.
Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani met with SDF
Commander Mazloum Abdi in Erbil on April 23 to discuss SDF integration
and the unification of Syrian Kurdish political parties.[20] The
two leaders discussed the necessity of “unity and harmony” between
Kurdish parties and forces in Syria.[21] This refers to the upcoming
Kurdish unity conference on April 26, in which several Kurdish political
parties will convene to present a unified Kurdish stance for future
negotiations with Damascus.[22] The Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the
Kurdish National Council (KNC) —two longtime rivals—will produce a
united position at the conference.[23] The PYD and KNC’s rare unity
follows significant pressure from Barzani’s party, the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP), to pressure the SDF to cooperate with minority
Syrian Kurdish political parties in negotiations with the Syrian
government.[24] The KDP has historically aligned itself with the KNC,
while the PYD dominates the SDF.
Foreign governments and
international institutions continue to lift sanctions and restrictions
on Syria, which will help improve the Syrian economy. The
United Kingdom lifted Assad-era sanctions on the Syrian interior and
defense ministries.[25] The United Kingdom also removed sanctions on
former regime intelligence agencies and former regime-affiliated Syrian
news outlets.[26] The Assad regime’s intelligence services no longer
exist.[27] The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank
officials also offered support to rebuild Syrian institutions during a
meeting with Syrian officials on April 23.[28] Several European
countries also announced a series of sanctions relief and economic
assistance programs for Syria during the 9th Brussels Donor Conference
in March.[29] These announcements to lift sanctions from Syria come as
the United States continues to debate offering partial sanctions relief
to Syria. The United States has listed a series of conditions for the
Syrian government to secure a partial sanctions relief, including the
removal of foreign fighters’ influence within state institutions and the
cessation of Palestinian activities in Syria.[30] International aid and
sanctions relief play a critical role in helping the transitional
government restore Syria’s public sector. Increased support from the
international community also boosts Shara’s legitimacy and international
image.
Forces affiliated with the transitional government conducted a search operation in al Rayan, Homs Province, on April 24.[31]
Footage circulated on Syrian media showed Syrian transitional
government forces arriving in al Rayan.[32] Syrian media claimed that
the forces in al Rayan were the Zubair bin al Awan Brigade, which the
transitional government had reflagged as General Security Service
forces.[33] Social media videos showed a uniformed fighter pointing his
weapon at the cameraman in a manner that suggested the fighter was
attempting to control the crowd.[34] Locals claimed that transitional
government forces ”attacked” civilians who attempted to leave their
homes and stole property.[35]
Search
operations targeting criminals or insurgents can often appear random to
local civilians, regardless of whether the search is conducted based on
valid intelligence or not. Aggressive behavior by the security forces
during these searches can increase tension between local communities and
government forces, which could undermine the credibility and
reliability of the transitional government over time. The government has
not acknowledged this operation, and it is unclear what it was
targeting.
Iraq
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
- Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent
Nothing significant to report.
Arabian Peninsula
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
- Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition to control all of Yemen
- Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip
US
Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 27 airstrikes
targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled
areas of Yemen on April 23.[36] CENTCOM conducted at least two
airstrikes targeting Houthi facilities in Sirwah District, Marib
Governorate, which is less than 50 km behind the frontlines in Marib
Governorate.[37] CENTCOM also conducted at least six
airstrikes targeting Houthi sites in al Tuhayta District, Hudaydah
Governorate, which is approximately 50 km behind the frontlines in
Hudaydah Governorate.[38] CENTCOM reportedly struck a site in a
residential area in northern Sanaa City, likely targeting Houthi
leadership.[39] CENTCOM has previously conducted airstrikes in
residential areas to target Houthi leaders.
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
- Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
- Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
- Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel
Nothing significant to report.
CTP-ISW
will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We
have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran’s nuclear
program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its
networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given
that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas’ military organization
and severed the group’s ability to resupply itself, we are now focused
on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah
and Hamas through Syria.
The Iran Update provides
insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It
also covers events and trends that affect the stability and
decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project
(CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the
Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional
events.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the
unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East
since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational
coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that
cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself
to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these
groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support
in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions.
Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian
direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited
influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand
strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling
American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state,
or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance
to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
[1] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/24/iran-us-interim-nuclear-deal
[2]
https://www.mako.co dot
il/news-diplomatic/2025_q2/Article-9c5624fb7461691026.htm ;
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-9-2025 ;
https://www.axios.com/2025/03/30/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-bombing
[3] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/24/iran-us-interim-nuclear-deal
[4] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/10/iran-nuclear-deal-us-interim-agreement
[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-11-2025
[6]
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2013/11/why-the-iranian-nuclear-agreement-is-a-good-deal?lang=en
;
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-in-geneva-raising-hopes-for-historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran/2013/11/23/53e7bfe6-5430-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html
[7]
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2013/11/why-the-iranian-nuclear-agreement-is-a-good-deal?lang=en
;
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-in-geneva-raising-hopes-for-historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran/2013/11/23/53e7bfe6-5430-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html
[8] https://www.axios.com/2025/04/24/iran-us-interim-nuclear-deal
[9] https://x.com/Amb_Ulyanov/status/1915349689852977180
[10] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1404020402656
[11] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1404020402656
[12] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/738881
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-7-2025 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-14-2025 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-16-2025 ;
[14] https://www.newsweek.com/satellite-images-iran-building-new-warship-2063059
[15] https://x.com/SprinterObserve/status/1914981125027467411
[16] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1915084286585164234
[17] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1915084286585164234
[18]
https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1911650518092439553;
https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1914733641667690810 ;
https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1912218465861054918
[19] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1913616747480928651 ; https://t.me/nahermedia/46838
[20] https://npasyria dot com/211345/
[21] https://npasyria dot com/211345/
[22] https://x.com/diaa_audi/status/1914600824644194307 ; https://npasyria dot com/208580/
[23] https://x.com/diaa_audi/status/1914600824644194307 ; https://npasyria dot com/208580/
[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-16-2025
[25]
https://www.reuters.com/world/uk-lifts-sanctions-against-syrias-defence-ministry-intelligence-agencies-2025-04-24/
;
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6809ea4d2a86d6dfb2b527a2/Notice_Syria_240425.pdf
[26] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6809ea4d2a86d6dfb2b527a2/Notice_Syria_240425.pdf
[27]
https://www.barrons.com/news/syria-s-new-intel-chief-vows-reforms-to-end-abuses-0925783f
; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1915340957756621028
[28]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/imf-help-syria-rebuild-institutions-re-enter-world-economy-georgieva-says-2025-04-24/
; https://www.worldbank.org/en/meetings/splash/spring ;
https://x.com/ousmanedione/status/1914799124420972659
[29] https://apnews.com/article/syria-europe-donors-sanctions-aid-conference-f62ed91a11dc33fe27f05265ed8abd36
[30]
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/17/syria-us-military-withdrawal-trump/
;
https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25/
[31]
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=679617344758456 ;
https://www.facebook.com/reel/1065615405621554 ;
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=4011486902432010 ;
https://x.com/meme_syr3/status/1915182107678183459
[32]
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=679617344758456 ;
https://www.facebook.com/reel/1065615405621554 ;
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=4011486902432010 ;
https://x.com/meme_syr3/status/1915182107678183459
[33]
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=679617344758456 ;
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=4011486902432010 ;
https://x.com/meme_syr3/status/1915182107678183459
[34] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1065615405621554
[35]
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=679617344758456 ;
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=4011486902432010 ;
https://x.com/meme_syr3/status/1915182107678183459
[36]
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915073131061948908 ;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915153052023063016 ;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915164293458182211 ;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915189172890988650 ;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915195959484567832 ;
https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1915199692956160189
[37] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1915199692956160189
[38] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1915199692956160189
[39] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1915195959484567832 ; https://x.com/VleckieHond/status/1915365282102628722