Iran Update, April 17, 2025 – Israel Foreign Threat Commission

We do not report in detail on war crimes
because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not
directly affect the military operations we are assessing and
forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict
and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we
do not describe them in these reports.

Senior Iranian
political and military officials, including Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei, met with Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman in Tehran on
April 17. Saudi Arabia may seek to reassure Iran about
its positions on a potential strike on Iran and a potential ground
offensive against the Houthis in Yemen.[1] Salman’s visit to
Iran follows recent statements by senior Iranian officials threatening
to attack any base “used by Americans” in a potential strike on Iran.[2]
These threats likely seek to discourage US partners in the Middle East,
including Saudi Arabia, from supporting an attack on Iran. Iran
previously threatened in October 2024 that it would attack Saudi energy
infrastructure if Saudi Arabia supported an Israeli attack on Iran.[3]
Salman may have sought to reassure Iranian officials that Saudi Arabia
would not support an attack on Iran.

Salman, accompanied by Saudi
Ambassador to Yemen Mohammed al Jaber, may have also sought to reassure
Iran that Saudi Arabia would not support a ground offensive against the
Houthis in Yemen.[4] Salman’s visit to Iran follows recent reports that
some Gulf countries and anti-Houthi factions in Yemen are exploring the
possibility of a Yemeni government ground offensive against the
Houthis.[5] Unspecified Saudi officials told Western media on April 14
that Saudi Arabia would not participate in a ground offensive.[6] Iran
views the Houthis as an integral part of the Axis of Resistance,
particularly since Israel has significantly degraded other key members
of the Axis of Resistance, including Hezbollah and Hamas.[7]

A Chinese government-linked satellite company provided intelligence to the Houthis, according to US officials speaking to the Financial Times
on April 17.[8] This intelligence could support Houthi attacks against
US vessels and commercial shipping, which demonstrates how the Houthis
are continuing to cooperate with US adversaries to disrupt global trade.
The US government raised concerns to the Chinese government about Chang
Guang Satellite Technology Co., Ltd. (CGSTL) providing satellite
intelligence to the Houthis.[9] The Chinese government reportedly
ignored these concerns. CGSTL has ties to the Chinese military through
China’s military-civilian “fusion” program, which aims to integrate
private sector work with military research and development, according to
research done by a Washington-based security consulting firm.[10]
CGSTL’s provision of satellite intelligence to the Houthis is part of
ongoing Chinese, Russian, and Iranian support to the Houthis.
Houthi-owned military communications and domestic surveillance companies
have reportedly imported Chinese-made communications equipment.[11]
Iran and Russia have provided targeting intelligence to the Houthis,
which aids Houthi attacks on international shipping.[12] The Yemeni
coast guard and Omani customs have previously seized shipments of
Chinese-made military equipment to the Houthis, such as hydrogen fuel
cells for powering missiles and drone propellers.[13] The Houthis
reportedly told China and Russia in March 2024 that the Houthis would
not target Chinese and Russian-flagged vessels transiting the Red Sea,
according to several sources with knowledge on Houthi leadership
discussions.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) deployed an
Israeli EL/M-2084 radar at the Emirati Bosaso military base on the coast
of the autonomous Puntland region of northern Somalia.[14] The
UAE reportedly replaced an older radar system with the new EL/M-2084,
which has a range of 256 nautical miles.[15] The UAE could use this
radar to detect various types of projectiles, including low-flying
drones and high-altitude ballistic missiles, over the Gulf of Aden.[16]
The UAE could also use the radar to detect Houthi attacks on
internationally-recognized Yemeni government targets, such as gas and
oil export terminals in southern Yemen that the Houthis have previously
targeted.[17] These energy export terminals are the
internationally-recognized Yemeni government’s economic lifeline.[18]

The
United States reportedly asked the Syrian transitional government in
mid-March to end Palestinian political and militia activity in Syria in
exchange for partial sanctions relief.[19] The Washington Post
reviewed a list of eight “confidence-building” conditions that US
Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Levant and Syria Natasha Franceschi
delivered to Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani in Brussels on
March 18.[20] The United States is considering extending an existing
sanctions exemption by two years and possibly issuing another sanctions
exemption if the Syrian transitional government fulfills these
conditions, according to six unspecified US and Syrian sources.[21] The
US Department of State and Department of the Treasury confirmed in early
April that they were considering further “waivers,
licenses, and assistance from foreign partners and allies” for
Syria.[22] The list of conditions includes counterterrorism cooperation
between the US and Syrian governments, the destruction of any remaining
chemical weapons stockpiles, the appointment of a liaison to assist
efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice, and the prevention of
foreign fighters’ appointments to “senior roles in Syria’s governing
structure.”[23] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Syrian President Ahmed
al Shara will likely oppose the condition to bar foreign fighters from
senior government positions given that this condition would require him
to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him.[24] The United
States also called on the Syrian government to “issue a formal public
declaration banning all Palestinian militias and political activities”
and to deport members of these Palestinian groups.[25] Shara is unlikely
to be willing or able to ban all Palestinian political activity in
Syria but could agree to expel Palestinian militias from Syria in
exchange for sanctions relief. The Iranian-led Axis of Resistance, which
includes Palestinian militias such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, has sought to destabilize the new Syrian government and weaken
the government’s control over Syria.[26] It is unclear how many
Palestinian militias currently operate in Syria given that the Syrian
government has largely expelled other Axis of Resistance militias, such
as Lebanese Hezbollah, from Syria since the fall of the Assad regime in
December 2024.[27]

Russian President Vladimir Putin has
continued to indicate that he seeks to develop stronger diplomatic and
political relations with the Syrian transitional government. Russian
President Vladimir Putin discussed Russian interests in Syria with
Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani in Moscow on April
17.[28] Putin emphasized that Russia supports Syrian sovereignty,
independence, and territorial integrity and discussed providing aid to
Syria with Thani.[29] Russia and the Syrian transitional government have
engaged in months-long talks over the future of Russian bases in Syria.
These talks have thus far not resulted in an agreement about Russian
basing rights in Syria. Russia appears to have begun an incentives-based
economic relationship with Syria and has delivered Syrian currency and
Russian oil to Syria.[30] Russia also reportedly seeks to re-negotiate
Russian investment contracts for phosphate mines and oil fields in the
central Syrian desert.[31] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia might
try to use these economic incentives to secure basing rights in
Syria.[32] Thani said during a joint press conference with Putin that he
and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara discussed Russo-Syrian relations
during Shara’s visit to Qatar on April 15 and that Shara is “determined
to continue this cooperation.”[33]

Syrian media reported that
Russian forces remain present at three military bases in Syria: Hmeimim
airbase in Latakia, the naval base at Tartus, and Russia’s former
helicopter base in Qamishli, Hasakah Province.[34] The Syrian government
and SDF likely permitted Russia to maintain limited forces at these
bases while negotiations have continued since December 2024. Russia’s
presence at Hmeimim and Tartus has generated significant attention given
their relevance to Russian strategic objectives in the Mediterranean
Sea, but Syrian media reported that a likely small contingent of Russian
forces also remain at Qamishli, which is located in SDF-held
territory.[35] A Kurdish source posted a video on April 17 that showed a
Russian An-72 transport aircraft on Qamishli’s airstrip.[36] Two
Russian-flagged vehicles approached the aircraft.[37] SDF Commander
Mazloum Abdi stated on April 14 that a Russian presence at Qamishli was
“not a concern” and that Shara appears to be considering allowing Russia
to maintain its force presence in Syria under a new agreement.[38]

Key Takeaways:

Saudi Defense Minister in Iran: Senior
Iranian political and military officials, including Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei, met with Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman in Tehran on
April 17. Salman may have sought to reassure Iranian officials that
Saudi Arabia would not support an attack on Iran. Salman, accompanied by
Saudi Ambassador to Yemen Mohammed al Jaber, may have also sought to
reassure Iran that Saudi Arabia would not support a ground offensive
against the Houthis in Yemen.
China-Houthi Cooperation: A Chinese government-linked satellite company provided intelligence to the Houthis, according to US officials speaking to the Financial Times
on April 17. This intelligence could support Houthi attacks against US
vessels and commercial shipping, which demonstrates how the Houthis are
continuing to cooperate with US adversaries to disrupt global trade.
US Sanctions Relief for Syria: The
United States reportedly asked the Syrian transitional government in
mid-March to end Palestinian political and militia activity in Syria in
exchange for partial sanctions relief. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara
is unlikely to be willing or able to ban all Palestinian political
activity in Syria but could agree to expel Palestinian militias from
Syria in exchange for sanctions relief. The Iranian-led Axis of
Resistance, which includes Palestinian militias such as Hamas and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, has sought to destabilize the new Syrian
government and weaken the government’s control over Syria.
Russian Cooperation with the Syrian Transitional Government: Russian
President Vladimir Putin has continued to indicate that he seeks to
develop stronger diplomatic and political relations with the Syrian
transitional government. Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed
Russian interests in Syria with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa
al Thani in Moscow on April 17. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia
might try to use economic incentives to secure basing rights in Syria.

Syria

Anti-Syrian
government social media accounts claimed on April 16 that General
Security Services (GSS) personnel intimidated villagers in rural Latakia
Province to give false testimonies to the commission investigating the
March 2025 violence on the Syrian coast.[39] GSS personnel
reportedly instructed al Mukhtariya residents to deny government
involvement in the early March civilian massacres and to blame pro-Assad
insurgents instead. The villagers reportedly disregarded these threats
and instead implicated the GSS for committing massacres in their
testimonies to the committee.[40] At least 40 civilians died in al
Mukhtariya during the pro-Assad insurgent uprising in early March.[41]
The residents reportedly fled al Mukhtariya after testifying before the
commission due to fear of GSS retaliation.[42] CTP-ISW cannot
independently verify the claims made by these anti-government social
media accounts, which regularly promote Assadist views. The commission
spokesperson, Yasser al Farhan, stated on March 25 that the commission
had completed its visits to all areas in Latakia Province that had
experienced violence and was expanding its investigation to other
provinces.[43] It is unclear whether the commission has returned to
Latakia Province since March 25 to conduct investigations. The reports
about GSS intimidation, if accurate, will erode public trust in the
commission and risk discrediting its findings as partial or compromised.
The committee must prevent any group from intimidating families in
order to avoid obscuring the commission’s findings.

GSS forces confiscated weapons and pursued wanted individuals in Maaraba, Daraa Province, on April 17.[44] Authorities
urged residents to surrender their weapons to the GSS via mosque
loudspeakers.[45] GSS forces seized several illegal vehicles, small
arms, and various types of ammunition.[46] Security forces have
confiscated weapons and military equipment in Busra al Sham, west of
Maaraba, and its surrounding countryside since the dissolution of the
Eighth Brigade on April 13.[47] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the
transitional government appears to be trying to reduce the Eighth
Brigade’s influence over security in southeastern Daraa.[48]

Syrian
President Ahmed al Shara and Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani met
with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi in Damascus on April
17.[49] Safadi and Shaibani agreed to form a council to
coordinate cooperation in various sectors, including the economy,
energy, transportation, and technology.[50] The council plans to hold
its first meeting in the coming weeks.[51] Syria and Jordan previously
agreed on January 7 to form several coordination committees.[52]
Shaibani also discussed strengthening security cooperation, particularly
in regard to regional counter-ISIS efforts and efforts to combat drug
and arms smuggling along the Syria-Jordan border.[53] Safadi reaffirmed
Jordan’s support for Syria’s reconstruction process and its overall
security.[54] Safadi emphasized that ongoing Israeli strikes and
activity in southern Syria violate the 1974 Disengagement Agreement and
increases regional tensions.[55]

Kurdish leaders have
continued to advocate for a decentralized governance system in Syria
amid Turkey’s rejection of federalism in Syria. Syrian
Democratic Council co-chairman Ali Rahmoun said on April 15 that Kurdish
parties have entered talks with the Syrian transitional government in
the hope of establishing a “form of self-administration or
decentralization.”[56] The Autonomous Administration of North and East
Syria (AANES) Foreign Relations co-chairwoman Ilham Ahmed advocated for a
“decentralized system” in Syria on April 17.[57] Ahmed also noted that
AANES is holding talks with Turkey, which AANES perceives will influence
its talks with Damascus.[58] Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said
on April 17 that Ankara could not accept a “federal structure in Syria,”
which suggests that the AANES-Turkey talks, in part, revolve around
decentralization.[59]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

The
secretary general of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al
Shuhada, Abu Alaa al Walai, threatened on April 16 to attack a Turkish
base in Ninewa Province, Iraq, if the Iraqi federal government does not
take “necessary action” against the base[60] Iranian-backed
Iraqi militias have historically attacked Zilkan base in Bashiqa, Ninewa
Province, and other Turkish positions in northern Iraq when they oppose
Turkish regional activities.[61] Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors
have recently expressed concern about Turkey’s regional influence,
particularly after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.[62] Multiple
Iraqi parliamentarians affiliated with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias
urged the Iraqi federal government on April 15 to investigate several
Sunni groups in Kirkuk and Ninewa provinces for their alleged ties to
Turkey, for example.[63]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

US
Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 30 airstrikes
targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled
areas of Yemen since April 16.[64] CENTCOM conducted at least
14 airstrikes targeting Houthi underground facilities and weapons depots
in Mount Nuqum, which is located on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa
City.[65] CENTCOM also conducted at least six other airstrikes in Sanaa
Governorate.[66] One of these airstrikes targeted a building in central
Sanaa City, reportedly killing an unspecified number of Houthi
fighters.[67] CENTCOM also conducted at least two airstrikes targeting
Houthi supply lines between Sanaa City and the Houthis’ eastern
front.[68] CENTCOM separately conducted at least 10 airstrikes in
Hudaydah Governorate, with seven targeting al Tuhayta axis on the
Houthis’ southwestern front.[69]

The
United States sanctioned the Sanaa-based International Bank of Yemen
(IBY) and three IBY officials on April 17 for financially supporting the
Houthis.[70] The US Department of the Treasury noted that the
sanctions are part of the US effort to stop the Houthis from attacking
commercial shipping in the Red Sea.[71] The Houthis recently imposed a
travel restriction on all government and private banking employees to
prevent them from leaving Houthi-controlled areas after Sanaa-based
banks announced that they would relocate to Yemeni government-controlled
Aden to avoid being subject to US sanctions.[72]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) arrested a Lebanese national and a
Palestinian with ties to Hamas on April 16 for their involvement in the
March 22 and 28 attempted rocket attacks targeting Israel.[73] A senior Lebanese security official told the Wall Street Journal on
April 16 that the LAF is searching for four other individuals who
participated in the attacks. These individuals are likely hiding in
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, according to the official.[74]
Hezbollah has denied involvement in both attacks.[75] Rocket attacks by
smaller, non-Hezbollah armed factions in southern Lebanon indicate that
Hezbollah is badly degraded in southern Lebanon and lacks command and
control there. Hezbollah has historically maintained de facto security
control over southern Lebanon and the smaller armed factions that
operate there, and it would likely be able to prevent attacks by
smaller, non-Hezbollah groups if it were not badly degraded.

CTP-ISW
will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We
have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran’s nuclear
program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its
networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given
that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas’ military organization
and severed the group’s ability to resupply itself, we are now focused
on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah
and Hamas through Syria.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian rial appreciated from 875,000 rials to one US dollar on April 16 to 856,000 rials to one US dollar on April 17.[76]

International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi met with
senior Iranian officials in Tehran on April 16 and 17 to discuss the
Iranian nuclear program and the US-Iran nuclear talks.[77] Grossi
stated that the IAEA is in contact with US negotiators to discuss how
the agency can serve as a bridge between Iran and the United States and
help achieve a positive outcome in the talks.[78] Iranian Foreign
Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that the IAEA can play an
important role in peacefully resolving the Iranian nuclear issue.[79]
Araghchi called on the IAEA “to take a clear stance” against recent
threats to the Iranian nuclear program.[80] Grossi told French media
before traveling to Iran on April 16 that Iran is “not far” from
possessing nuclear weapons.[81]

Iranian Foreign Affairs
Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in
Moscow on April 17 and delivered a message from Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei to Putin.[82] Araghchi stated that Khamenei’s message
addressed important regional and international developments as well as
bilateral issues.[83] Araghchi emphasized that Russo-Iranian relations
are stronger and more respectful than ever before and noted that the
recently-signed Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement elevated
the relationship between Iran and Russia to a strategic level.[84]
Araghchi emphasized the importance of close coordination with Russia and
China on the Iranian nuclear issue.[85] Iran, China, and Russia issued a
joint statement on March 14 that condemned US sanctions on Iran and
defended the Iranian nuclear program “as peaceful.”[86]

The
Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored
activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US
forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the
stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical
Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly
based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of
Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in
the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This
transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state
actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran
considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran
furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and
political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control
over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly
responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which
Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance
are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding
and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East,
destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and
supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones
of Iranian regional strategy.

[1]
https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/28160/ ;
https://x.com/modgovksa/status/1912915953899176257 ;
https://x.com/kbsalsaud/status/1912922231664967851 ;
https://x.com/modgovksa/status/1912924608422137952

[2]
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/03/31/iran-urged-to-strike-diego-garcia-base-immediately/
;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-wants-indirect-talks-with-us-warns-regional-countries-over-strikes-against-2025-04-06/

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-10-2024

[4] https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1912920912921264399

[5]

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-operation-us-support-975febe6?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1
;
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-16/red-sea-attacks-us-in-talks-with-yemen-forces-on-land-offensive-against-houthis

[6]

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-denies-reports-it-is-involved-talks-about-land-offensive-yemen-2025-04-16/
;
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-operation-us-support-975febe6

[7] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/735172 ; https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/irans-support-houthis-what-know

[8] https://www.ft.com/content/628b404b-2a24-4853-8f3c-9caad408ef8f

[9] https://www.ft.com/content/628b404b-2a24-4853-8f3c-9caad408ef8f

[10]

https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Space/2024-04-01%20Chang%20Guang%20Satellite%20Company%20overview.pdf

[11] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1912212572347965827; https://www.samsupplies dot com/

[12]

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-provided-targeting-data-for-houthi-assault-on-global-shipping-eabc2c2b
; https://lieber.westpoint.edu/targeting-iranian-spy-ships/

[13] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/c4eae92382c7456cae8c607af9d03794 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/13/us/politics/yemen-houthi-drones-report.html; https://www.sabanew dot net/story/ar/126709

[14]
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912585975353528395;
https://x.com/NewsNucleus/status/1911668170118553741;
https://x.com/clashreport/status/1911736511105544490

[15] https://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/02.surv/karte071.en.html; https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/1911734326703562752

[16]
https://www.garoweonline dot
com/en/news/puntland/somalia-uae-soldiers-secretly-land-in-puntland;
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/11/iai-elta-air-defense-radars/#:~:text=The%20ELM%2D2084%20MMR%20is,operational%20in%20armed%20forces%20worldwide.

[17] https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/october-2022/19004

[18]

https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/power-and-energy/yemens-energy-consumption#:~:text=Summary:%20Yemen%20relies%20on%20hydrocarbons,of%20its%20gross%20domestic%20product.

[19] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/17/syria-us-military-withdrawal-trump/

[20]

https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25/
;
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/17/syria-us-military-withdrawal-trump/

[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25/

[22]
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000196-3fce-dbb7-a7be-3ffecfe50000 ;
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2025/04/16/should-syria-get-sanctions-relief-00293691

[23]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-26-2025 ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25/

[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-26-2025

[25] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/17/syria-us-military-withdrawal-trump/

[26] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate041425

[27]

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-chief-says-group-lost-its-supply-route-through-syria-2024-12-14/
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-6-2024

[28] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76702; https://t.me/tass_agency/310941

[29] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76702

[30]
https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1890343048099303916;
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-ships-diesel-syria-tanker-under-us-sanctions-data-shows-2025-03-06

[31]

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/russia-is-chasing-a-deal-to-keep-its-military-bases-in-syria-f9f6ca6e?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1
; https://www.ft.com/content/30ddfdd0-b83e-11e9-96bd-8e884d3ea203

[32]

[33] https://x.com/AJEnglish/status/1912209627753930754; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76702

[34]
https://x.com/MHJournalist/status/1912815569453056500;
https://twitter.com/mdlkyb05018134/status/1912575362485092776;
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cyve9prq3qjo

[35]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LttBPlBsVLU;
https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1910474923497181676; https://www.majalla
dot
com/node/325004/سياسة/روسيا-في-شمال-شرقي-سوريا-نفوذ-صامت-لمكاسب-مستقبلية

[36] https://x.com/MHJournalist/status/1912815569453056500

[37] https://x.com/MHJournalist/status/1912815569453056500

[38] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/04/syrian-kurd-commander-aleppo-power-sharing-deal-could-be-model-nation

[39]
https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1912505074527482252 ;
https://x.com/Syriaviolations/status/1912525210558816352 ;
https://t.me/abohedar313syria/1555

[40]
https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1912505074527482252 ;
https://x.com/Syriaviolations/status/1912525210558816352 ;
https://t.me/abohedar313syria/1555

[41]
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/07/death-toll-rises-syrian-security-forces-struggle-quell-assad-loyalist-attacks
; https://snhr.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/R250305E.pdf

[42]
https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1912505074527482252 ;
https://x.com/Syriaviolations/status/1912525210558816352 ;
https://t.me/abohedar313syria/1555

[43] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1904487315671535684 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/53615

[44] https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1912829741142331845 ; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1912832246060380452

[45] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1912802184846024857

[46] https://x.com/HoranFreeMedia/status/1912828043598446769

[47] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-15-2025

[48] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-15-2025

[49] https://t.me/SyPresidency/819

[50] https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1912910692631433668

[51] https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1912910692631433668

[52] https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1876601493035635198

[53] https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1912910692631433668

[54] https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1912910692631433668

[55] https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1912910692631433668

[56]
https://www.alquds dot
co.uk/%d9%82%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%af%d9%8a-%d9%83%d8%b1%d8%af%d9%8a-%d9%84%d9%80%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d8%af%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b1%d8%a8%d9%8a-%d8%b3%d9%86%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%88%d8%b1-%d8%af%d9%85/

[57] npasyria dot com/210759/

[58] npasyria dot com/210759/

[59]
https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1912811994748530699 ; https://npasyria
dot com/210773/ ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/141307

[60] https://x.com/aboalaa_alwalae/status/1912619122908856435

[61] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/muqawamas-duel-turkey

[62]
https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-turkey-and-future-south-caucasus ;

https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-and-turkey-power-dynamics-south-caucasus
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-27-2025
; https://www.thenationalnews dot
com/news/mena/2025/04/07/iraqi-militias-considering-to-disarm-ahead-of-us-iran-talks-sources-say/

[63]
https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%82%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B6-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9—%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1

[64]

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912570652545933329;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912577338065269056;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912578049415004511;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912578192767955308;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912580841118593292;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912583228877123907;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912604171733262669; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1912630793781846218;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912650569262448643;

[65] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912577338065269056

[66] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912578049415004511;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912578192767955308;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912580841118593292;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912583228877123907;

[67] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912580841118593292; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1912585813944050120

[68] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912583228877123907; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912570652545933329

[69] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912604171733262669; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1912630793781846218;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912650569262448643

[70]
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0092 ;
https://www.state.gov/sanctioning-international-bank-of-yemen-for-supporting-the-houthis/

[71] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0092

[72]
https://aawsat dot
com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5126339-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%88%D9%83-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A1

[73]
https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1912540686370341218 ;
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-government-arrests-militants-asserting-its-authority-631a0ae9

[74] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-government-arrests-militants-asserting-its-authority-631a0ae9

[75] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/13306042 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9713

[76] https://www.bon-bast.com/

[77] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/27/3293321 ;

https://www.irna dot ir/news/85805972

[78] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85805972

[79] https://x.com/araghchi/status/1912715367908093966

[80] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/27/3293321

[81]

https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/04/16/rafael-grossi-iaea-director-without-us-any-agreement-on-iran-is-just-a-piece-of-paper_6740289_4.html

[82] https://x.com/IrnaEnglish/status/1912910121283297409

[83] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/28/3293553

[84] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/28/3293894

[85] https://www.reuters.com/world/iranian-minister-arrives-russia-with-message-khamenei-state-media-says-2025-04-17/

[86] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-14-2025 ;

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-iran-russia-kick-off-talks-beijing-over-irans-nuclear-issues-2025-03-14/

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