Ben Schmida, Avery Borens, Carolyn Moorman, Adham Fattah, Nidal Morrison, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, and Annika Ganzeveld
Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET
The
Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and
the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which
provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.
CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The
Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this
report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in
February 2025.
Click here
to see ISW-CTP’s interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran
since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes
day-by-day.
Syrian security forces told Emirati media
on August 16 that the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is preparing a
three-pronged offensive to seize Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces. This
report and others are likely part of an effort by Turkey and some
elements of the Syrian transitional government to coerce the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF) to surrender to the transitional government.[1] The Syrian
security sources told Emirati media that the MoD has assembled 50,000
troops near the city of Palmyra, Homs Province, to capture Deir ez Zor
and Raqqa provinces with support from local Arab tribes if the SDF
refuses to hand over these provinces to the transitional government by
October 2025.[2] A separate Syrian source said that the MoD is preparing
staging grounds for the offensive in Rusafa, Raqqa Province, and
Sukhnah, Homs Province, which are around 166 kilometers northeast and 70
kilometers northeast of Palmyra, respectively.[3]
It is unlikely
that the Syrian transitional government is preparing for a major
offensive at this time. Local Syrians would almost certainly observe and
publicize the movements of 50,000 personnel. The much smaller
mobilizations towards the Syrian coast in March 2025 and southwestern
Syria in July 2025 garnered significant media attention both within
Syria and in the West. Satellite imagery shows no prepared staging areas
in any of the locations mentioned by the sources. Some of the locations
make little military sense as staging areas, moreover. Sukhnah is a
less optimal staging area for a major offensive against the SDF compared
to other areas closer to the Euphrates River. Deir ez Zor City and its
surroundings have a significant amount of military infrastructure left
over from the Assad regime, including Deir ez Zor Airport, which would
be far more suitable than the remote desert town of Sukhnah.[4] Sukhnah
is also 135km by road from Deir ez Zor City, and any force staged in
Sukhnah would need to travel 135km to reach its point of departure.
Palmyra is even further to the west. Forces travelling from the staging
grounds to the point of departure would also have to travel to areas
frequently attacked by small ISIS cells. These cells could not stop a
large Syrian force, but they could disrupt the movement and make an
already challenging operation even more complex.
Rusafa presents a
more viable staging ground for the MoD than Sukhnah. MoD forces in
Rusafa would be positioned at the rear of SDF forces based in Deir Hafer
and could try to cut off the ground line of communication between Deir
Hafer and SDF-controlled Raqqa Province. Rusafa is located 26 kilometers
south of two hydroelectric dams controlled by the SDF. The MoD would
have to capture these towns in order to stage an assault to capture
Raqqa City. An unspecified source told Emirati media that
newly-integrated Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) units would
advance on SDF positions near Tishreen Dam, which is located northeast
of Deir Hafer.[5] This force would be canalized by the Tishreen Dam
crossing, the eastern side of which is surely guarded by SDF units.
Tishreen Dam is the only intact Euphrates River crossing between Lake
Assad and the Turkish border.
This report comes amid similar
reports in Turkish media that Turkey and the Syrian transitional
government are preparing for an offensive against the SDF. Turkish media
recently claimed on August 14 that a joint offensive by Turkey and the
Syrian government against the SDF is imminent.[6] These reports likely
seek to pressure the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state and
surrender its territory by threatening a military operation against it.
An
adviser to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced on
August 17 that US forces will withdraw from Ain al Asad Airbase and
Baghdad International Airport in September 2025.[7] A
spokesperson for the US Embassy in Baghdad separately told Iraqi media
on August 18 that the US-led international coalition’s mission in Iraq
will transition to a “more traditional bilateral security
partnership.”[8] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024
that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw
from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining forces would withdraw by
the end of 2026.[9] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly
threatened to attack US forces if the United States postpones its
military withdrawal from Iraq.[10]
Senior Lebanese
officials called on the United States to pressure Israel and Syria to
agree to the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah during US Special Envoy
Thomas Barrack’s visit to Beirut on August 18.[11] Lebanese
President Joseph Aoun told Barrack that Israel and Syria must commit to
the contents of the US proposal, which the Lebanese government approved
on August 7.[12] Aoun told Saudi media on August 17 that the US proposal
will not become effective until all relevant parties approve it.[13]
Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam separately told Barrack that the
United States must fulfill its responsibilities by pressuring Israel to
cease hostilities, withdraw from its five permanent positions in
southern Lebanon, and release Lebanese prisoners held in Israel.[14]
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri similarly called on Israel to commit to
the proposal during his meeting with Barrack.[15] Barrack told Lebanese
reporters following his meeting with Aoun that the United States has
discussed the potential for a long-term ceasefire with Israel but has
not shared the Hezbollah disarmament proposal with Israel.[16] Barrack
suggested that Israel would take unspecified steps in the coming
weeks.[17]
Barrack also reportedly told Aoun that Syria has not
responded to the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[18] The US proposal
includes provisions to increase joint Lebanese-Syrian border operations
and demarcate unspecified areas of the Lebanon-Syria border.[19]
Lebanese and Syrian officials signed an agreement in March 2025 to
demarcate the border and increase border security coordination.[20]
Lebanese officials have recently expressed willingness to discuss issues
with Syrian officials that have complicated relations between the two
countries, including the issue of imprisoned and displaced Syrians in
Lebanon.[21] The Syrian government has consistently called on the
Lebanese government to release Syrian prisoners and allow them to serve
their sentence in Syria, but Lebanese judicial officials have denied
these requests.[22]
Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed.[23] Israel
previously rejected Berri’s July 2025 demand that Israel halt all
airstrikes in Lebanon prior to the Lebanese government’s disarmament of
Hezbollah.[24] An unspecified Israeli official told Saudi media on
August 18 that Israel will “play its part” in the US proposal when
Lebanon takes unspecified “concrete steps.”[25] The Israel Defense
Forces (IDF) recently shifted to a “forward defense” posture on August 1
to maintain Israel’s “strategic superiority” in southern Lebanon and
prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting capabilities that could pose a
threat to northern Israeli towns.[26] Recent IDF operations, including
ground raids, airstrikes, and drone strikes, demonstrate this posture
shift.[27] The IDF had a similar objective in its campaign against
Hezbollah in late 2024 due to Israel’s concern about a potential
Hezbollah ground incursion into northern Israel.[28] The
Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement in November 2024 included an
addendum that ensures the Israeli right to self-defense against any
future threat that Hezbollah may pose.[29] The IDF has acted on this
addendum and has continued to operate against Hezbollah since November
2024, including via airstrikes and raids targeting Hezbollah
infrastructure.[30]
Hezbollah
would likely use any delay in the implementation of the US disarmament
plan to reconstitute its forces, increase its weapons stockpiles, and
bolster its domestic support base, which would increase Hezbollah’s
relative strength vis-à-vis the Lebanese government and thus make it
more challenging for the government to disarm Hezbollah.
Iranian officials and Axis-affiliated media recently reported that
Hezbollah began appointing new commanders to reconstitute its command
structure.[31] Hezbollah reportedly began prioritizing
domestic drone production in June 2025 to reduce its reliance on Iranian
weapons.[32] The IDF destroyed approximately 70 percent of the drones
of Hezbollah’s primary aerial unit, Unit 127, during the
Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024.[33] Hezbollah is also
restructuring its financial system to confront challenges to its ability
to pay salaries and provide services to Lebanese civilians.[34]
Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions
for the families of deceased fighters and compensation for individuals
who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among
Lebanese Shia.[35] These actions highlight how Hezbollah is actively
trying to reconstitute itself as a military organization and maintain
its domestic support base. Any delay in the implementation of the US
proposal would give Hezbollah more time to try to achieve these
objectives.
Key Takeaways
- Turkish Pressure Campaign: Syrian
security sources told Emirati media on August 16 that the Syrian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) is preparing a three-pronged offensive to
seize Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces. This report and others appear to
be an effort by Turkey and some elements of the Syrian transitional
government to coerce the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to surrender. - US Withdrawal from Iraq: An
adviser to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced on
August 17 that US forces will withdraw from Ain al Asad Airbase and
Baghdad International Airport in September 2025. A spokesperson for the
US Embassy in Baghdad separately told Iraqi media on August 18 that the
US-led international coalition’s mission in Iraq will transition to a
“more traditional bilateral security partnership.” - Hezbollah Disarmament: Senior
Lebanese officials called on the United States to pressure Israel and
Syria to agree to the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah during US Special
Envoy Thomas Barrack’s visit to Beirut on August 18. Israel has
maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah
is disarmed.
Iran
The
Iranian Reformist Front issued a statement on August 17 that called for
political reforms and foreign policy shifts, which highlights how
reformists in the Iranian regime may feel emboldened in the post-war
environment to call for change.[36] The statement warned that
Iran’s fragile economy and potential E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany) snapback sanctions could cause Iran to enter a deeper economic
crisis.[37] The Reformist Front outlined eleven demands, including
lifting restrictions on reformist leaders, freeing political prisoners,
excluding the armed forces from non-military fields, allowing free
elections, reforming women’s rights laws, lifting censorship, and
suspending uranium enrichment under International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) oversight in exchange for sanctions relief.[38] Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency
condemned the statement on August 18, criticizing the Reformist Front’s
call to suspend uranium enrichment and accusing reformists of pursuing
policies that weaken Iran in favor of Iran’s adversaries.[39] The
Reformist Front statement comes after former President Hassan Rouhani
urged the regime on August 13 to implement reforms, ease tensions with
the West, and limit the Iranian armed forces’ involvement in politics
and the economy.[40] Rouhani framed the post-war period as an
opportunity to restore public trust and recalibrate Iran’s
trajectory.[41] The emergence of reformist and moderate elements in the
Iranian regime likely reflects a political opening created by Supreme
Leader Ali Khamenei’s absence from the public view and the loss of
hardliner leadership during the Israel-Iran War.[42]
Iranian
security forces raided a house near Enghelab Square in central Tehran
on August 17, where unspecified individuals were reportedly constructing
drones for Mossad.[43] Iranian security forces seized several drones during the raid
[44] This incident highlights Iranian officials’ heightened concern
about Israeli infiltration following the Israel-Iran War.[45] Israel
clandestinely built a one-way attack drone base in Iran that it used to
strike Iranian ballistic missile launchers at the beginning of the
war.[46] This operation hindered Iran’s ability to immediately respond
to Israel.[47]
Iranian security forces continue to conduct
counterterrorism operations against Salafi-jihadi militant group Jaish
al Adl in Sistan and Baluchistan Province, southeastern Iran.[48] The Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Quds Operational Base
dismantled two Jaish al Adl cells in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on
August 17.[49] The Quds Operational Base stated that it killed six
fighters, detained an unspecified number of others, and seized 25
kilograms of explosives and other military equipment during an operation
in Chabahar.[50] The IRGC Ground Forces separately dismantled a safe
house and killed several armed militants in northern Sistan and
Baluchistan Province.[51] These operations came after Jaish al Adl
fighters shot at a vehicle in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on August
15, killing an Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officer and
wounding another.[52] Senior Iranian security officials have recently
met with Pakistani officials to discuss how to address Jaish al Adl
attacks.[53]
Iraq
The
Iraqi Accountability and Justice Commission is investigating Shia
Coordination Framework electoral candidates for alleged ties to the
Baath Party, according to leaked documents published in Iraqi media on
August 18.[54] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose
coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The
Accountability and Justice Commission is reportedly investigating
between 250 and 400 candidates. The candidates represent “most” Shia
Coordination Framework parties.[55] Iraqi media noted that the
individuals under investigation include a senior official of
Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada in Kirkuk
Province, Bassem Ghazi al Amerli. This report comes after State of Law
Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki emphasized on
August 8 the need for the Accountability and Justice Commission to take
action against Baathists.[56] Shia political parties have long
manipulated the Accountability and Justice Commission to target
political opponents.[57] The commission has barred several candidates in
recent months from competing in the November 2025 parliamentary
elections due to alleged Baathist ties.[58]
An
unidentified Iraqi official told Fox News on August 14 that US Treasury
Department officials pressured Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein in
March 2025 to prevent Iraq’s largest bank from engaging in financial
transactions with the Houthis.[59] The US officials called for
the Sanaa branch of Rafidain Bank to relocate to internationally
recognized Yemeni government-controlled territory. The Iraqi Embassy in
Washington, DC, denied the Fox News report and claimed that Rafidain
Bank has not operated in Sanaa since 2017.[60] The Fox News report comes
as Rafidain Bank signed a “professional partnership agreement” with
US-based financial consulting firm K2 Integrity on August 15 to combat
money laundering and terrorist financing.[61] The Iraqi federal
government has previously used Rafidain Bank to process and distribute
salaries to members of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces
(PMF).[62] Iraqi media reported in July 2025 that US pressure on
Rafidain Bank caused a multi-week delay in the distribution of PMF
salaries in June 2025.[63] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have
historically exploited loopholes within the Iraqi financial system to
commit fraud and obtain funds to support Iranian and militia operations,
including attacks on US forces and allies.[64]
Sunni Azm
Alliance head Muthanna al Samarrai discussed cooperation between
“political forces” with Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) head Masoud
Barzani on August 16.[65] Samarrai and Barzani’s meeting is
notable given that these parties allied following the 2021 Iraqi
parliamentary elections.[66] This meeting follows Samarrai’s request on
August 13 for the Iraqi electoral commission to disqualify former
Parliament Speaker and Progress Party head Mohammad al Halbousi from
competing in the upcoming elections.[67] Samarrai also discussed the
elections and “support for the executive parties” with Iraqi Prime
Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on August 15.[68]
Syria
The
General Security Service (GSS) arrested an MoD member whom the Syrian
National Inquiry Commission accused of involvement in the March 2025
coastal massacres.[69] This arrest marks the Syrian
transitional government’s first publicized arrest of an MoD member for
their involvement in the atrocities on the Syrian coast.[70] The Syrian
National Inquiry Commission referred 298 individuals to the Syrian
judiciary on July 22 for their attacks on Alawite civilians in
March.[71] The Syrian judiciary must prosecute, try, and punish the
individuals involved in atrocities against Alawites in order to be able
to rebuild minority trust in the government.
Arabian Peninsula
The
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Navy struck the Houthi-controlled Hezyaz
Power Station, south of Sanaa City, on August 16 in response to Houthi
drone and missile attacks targeting Israeli civilian and military
sites.[72] The IDF Navy struck a generator at one of the power
station’s three production units, damaging the unit, according to an
Israeli open-source analyst.[73] The IDF previously targeted the Hezyaz
Power Station in December 2024 and May 2025.[74]
The
Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting Ben Gurion Airport in
Israel on August 17 in response to the Israeli attack on the Hezyaz
Power Station.[75] The IDF intercepted the missile outside
Israeli territory.[76] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and
ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their
campaign to enforce an economic “blockade” on Israel in October
2023.[77]
Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
See topline section.
[1] https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/08/16/syria-kurds-hts-sdf-turkey-us/
[2] https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/08/16/syria-kurds-hts-sdf-turkey-us/
[3] https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2025/08/16/syria-kurds-hts-sdf-turkey-us/
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-11-2024
[5] https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/08/16/syria-kurds-hts-sdf-turkey-us/
[6] https://www.turkiyegazetesi dot com.tr/gundem/isgalci-ypg-sabirlari-tasirdi-operasyon-icin-son-uyari-1138003
[7] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/170820254
[8]
https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7
; https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84
[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/
[10] https://t.me/centerkaf/5026 ; https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-iraq-militia-issues-trump-ultimatum-us-troops-2047594
[11]
https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/1957344935193059790 ;
https://x.com/nawafsalam/status/1957409055149899827 ;
https://t.me/almanarnews/220271
[12]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-envoy-says-israel-should-comply-with-lebanon-plan-disarm-militant-groups-2025-08-18/
; https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/1957344935193059790 ;
https://www.naharnet dot
com/stories/en/314756-aoun-tells-barrack-israel-and-syria-need-to-commit-to-declaration-paper
;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-plan-sees-hezbollah-disarmed-by-year-end-israeli-withdrawal-2025-08-07/
[13] https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/1957111439585333565
[14] https://x.com/nawafsalam/status/1957409055149899827
[15] https://t.me/almanarnews/220271
[16]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-envoy-says-israel-should-comply-with-lebanon-plan-disarm-militant-groups-2025-08-18/
;
https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-us-envoy-hezbollah-barrack-fe54aba5e9614b77b6b7b19438bae815
; https://ca.news.yahoo.com/u-envoy-israel-must-comply-153049688.html
[17] https://www.alhadath dot net/2025/08/18/اهتمام-اميركي-مزدوج-بلبنان-جدول-زمني-لسحب-السلاح-وتقليص-اليونيفيل-
[18] https://www.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/باراك-بعد-لقائه-عون–القرار-اللبناني-بشأن-نزع-السلاح-يتطلب-خ
[19] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-plan-sees-hezbollah-disarmed-by-year-end-israeli-withdrawal-2025-08-07/
[20] https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-syria-saudi-arabia-deal-demarcate-border-c9fde4946055a889326c330abb40c6a4
[21]
https://aawsat dot
com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5175986-سلام-لـالشرق-الأوسط-الدولة-اللبنانية-استعادت-قرار-الحرب-والسلم
; https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/1957113809174200480
[22] https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-syria-assad-hezbollah-border-detainees-3b9f93c92835a7c1d0e498ca7fac865a
[23] https://www.arabnews dot com/node/2603593/amp
[24]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-pressures-lebanon-issue-cabinet-decision-disarm-hezbollah-before-talks-2025-07-29/
[25] https://www.aljadeed dot tv/news/محليات/542174/العربية-عن-مصدر-سياسي-إسرائيلي-اسرائيل-ستقوم-بدورها-عندما-يتخذ-لبنان-خ
[26]
https://www.jns dot
org/hezbollahs-radwan-force-unfit-for-large-offensive/ ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-4-2025
[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-4-2025
[28]
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj9jwkppnd1o ;
https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/hezbollahs-radwan-force-planned-to-invade-israel-from-this-village-now-the-idf-controls-it/
[29]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/israels-victory-lebanon ;
https://t.me/moriahdoron/16929 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/16912
[30]
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/09/world/middleeast/israel-lebanon.html
; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gdvngp0eeo ;
https://x.com/idfonline/status/1950951341032927520 ;
https://x.com/idfonline/status/1948424979827274180
[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2025
[32] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/by11zol4mxl
[33] https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/article-827047 ; https://x.com/IDF/status/1861733354384617527
[34] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5174906-تراجع-الدعم-الخارجي-يرغم-حزب-الله-على-ترشيد-الإنفاق
[35] https://ict.org dot il/hezbollahs-financing-ecosystem-crime-families-as-a-case-study/
[36] https://hammihanonline dot ir/بخش-سیاست-18/46601-بیانیه-جبهه-اصلاحات-ایران-تنها-راه-نجات-کشور-تغییر-بازگشت-به-مردم-است
[37] https://hammihanonline dot ir/بخش-سیاست-18/46601-بیانیه-جبهه-اصلاحات-ایران-تنها-راه-نجات-کشور-تغییر-بازگشت-به-مردم-است
[38] https://hammihanonline dot ir/بخش-سیاست-18/46601-بیانیه-جبهه-اصلاحات-ایران-تنها-راه-نجات-کشور-تغییر-بازگشت-به-مردم-است
[39] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/27/3378737
[40] https://www.rouhanihassan dot com/Fa/News/116484 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-14-2025
[41] https://www.rouhanihassan dot com/Fa/News/116484 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-14-2025
[42] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-26-2025
[43] https://mehrnews dot com/news/6563970
[44] https://mehrnews dot com/news/6563970
[45] https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/16/middleeast/iran-mossad-paranoia-israel-spies-intl-latam
[46]
https://x.com/idfonline/status/1933441868211126675 ;
https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1933455569429357026 ;
https://x.com/chawshin_83/status/1933431758160011480 ;
https://www.axios.com/2025/06/13/how-israel-executed-strike-iran-nuclear
[47] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-edition-israeli-strikes-iran-june-13-2025
[48] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/26/3377860/
[49] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/26/3377860/
[50] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/26/3377860/)
[51] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/26/3377860/)
[52]
https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1956451382728269920 ;
https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/liveblog_entry/iranian-policeman-killed-in-clash-in-restive-southeast/
[53] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/767425/
[54] https://almadapaper dot net/411092/
[55] https://almadapaper dot net/411092/;
[56] https://aawsat dot com/node/5173233
[57]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-14-2024
;
https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2011/12/28/rivals-say-maliki-leading-iraq-to-civil-war
[58] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/854197
; https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/iraq/170820252
[59]
https://www.foxbusiness.com/fox-news-world/iraqi-state-bank-accused-processing-payments-houthi-terrorists-who-disrupt-red-sea-commerce ; https://cosmopolitantdaily.com/blogs/top-banks-in-iraq/#:~:text=Rafidain%20Bank%20remains%20the%20largest%20and%20most%20influential,role%20in%20managing%20government%20deposits%20and%20public-sector%20payrolls.
[60]
https://www.foxbusiness.com/fox-news-world/iraqi-state-bank-accused-processing-payments-houthi-terrorists-who-disrupt-red-sea-commerce
[61]
https://www.iraqiembassy dot
us/in-the-news/rafidain-bank-signs-professional-partnership-agreement-with-k2-integrity-in-washington
[62] https://aawsat dot com/node/5160266
[63] (https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/المالية-النيابية-ضغوط-مريكية-تعرقل-صرف-رواتب-الحشد-الشعبي)
[64]
https://www.facebook.com/cbi.iraq/posts/pfbid0b9PGHoCE4jsrP87RDSymB4cXejuwnm4UnpNdF7t789f1bbC6URXViV7FWnf8NbjNl?__cft__[0]=AZXqnC97zgV9_hzLwM-JSqwF22xlCgATZQT6svfIdeF9YNgeAYuopNCNR8XNxHd_QchfquzH5DnO_rfRLmHVLcrR9lwifFnVCsocDIk7sc_AgrCJz7YBkNpyAQZpyJ57fV8uI2vk7M0ESjOuTDa_f6yUAyHubDi-YyPKBFZ_Z90qgyoFENK7f63YM6TvqCgAnks&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
;
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-visa-mastercard-dollars-sanctions-militias-0ecea0b9?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAhr1uSTiruOYrGuIWjIIjbRuUW27PFcNXZmCHl0tZaWn1CO6YrhcdUEwk2In9o%3D&gaa_ts=683d80bd&gaa_sig=nk2zUi0FJs_UxUi7rcoM8CjVcuK5W1F4_XeluNzwSsh8gSxEsptAbOH99ab2F_wA-2Iel3qF-FLXKaB8FTIb2w%3D%3D
; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-2-2025
[65]
https://www.alsumaria dot
tv/news/politics/537389/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%84
[66] https://www.middleeasteye dot net/news/iraq-iran-pressure-sunni-kurdish-leaders-crack-sadr-alliance
[67]
https://www.alsumaria dot
tv/news/politics/536987/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%91%D9%85-%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7
[68] https://baghdadtoday dot news/280978-.html
[69] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1956703043811983835
[70] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1956725563160146216
[71]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-22-2025 ;
sana dot sy/?p=2251643 ;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kaZuGkdTQSM&ab_channel=SyriaTV%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7
[72] https://x.com/Almasirahbrk/status/1956923066627314100; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1956957836535054541;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1957108113548394896;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1957084123354300525;
https://x.com/BenTzionMacales/status/1957074975837258124; https://saba
dot ye/ar/news3536599.htm
[73] https://x.com/BenTzionMacales/status/1957074975837258124
[74]
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919742997958152521;
https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1869670576496775558;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1869572738962386975;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1869732085164097786;
[75] https://t.me/army21ye/3304
[76] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1957070052789719175
[77]
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/12/briefing-on-developments-related-to-houthi-attacks-on-israel.php
; https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-houthis-have-launched-40-missiles-320-drones-at-israel-since-start-of-war/