Iran Update, August 20, 2025 – Israel Foreign Threat Commission

Nidal Morrison, Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, Ria Reddy, Adham Fattah, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The
Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and
the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which
provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.
CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The
Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this
report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in
February 2025

Click here
to see ISW-CTP’s interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran
since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes
day-by-day.

Former Prime Minister and State
of Law Coalition leader Nouri al Maliki may be using the Accountability
and Justice Commission (AJC) to sideline political opponents ahead of
the November 2025 elections. Iraqi media reported on August 20
that the AJC has so far barred 33 candidates affiliated with Shia
Coordination Framework parties for alleged Baath party ties.[1] The Shia
Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties,
some of which Iran backs. The AJC reportedly barred eight members of
Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun Movement, seven Badr Organization
candidates, five members of Kataib Hezbollah’s Hoquq Movement, six
members of the Imam Ali Brigade’s Services Alliance, the head of Kataib
Sayyid al Suhahda in Kirkuk, one member of Prime Minister Mohammad Shia
al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development bloc, and three candidates
from Labor Minister Ahmed al Asadi’s Jund al Samaa bloc.[2] Asadi is
aligned with Sudani.[3] Shia political parties, but particularly Maliki,
previously used the AJC ahead of elections in 2010 to bar candidates
opposed to him, and could be weaponizing the commission again.[4] It is
highly unlikely that seven Badr Organization members, for example, have
real Baathist ties due to Badr’s history. Badr Organization is the
rebranded Badr Corps. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
(IRGC) founded the Badr Corps as an Iraqi Shia formation to fight Saddam
Hussein’s Iraqi Army during the Iran-Iraq War.[5] The AJC only excluded
three candidates aligned with Maliki for suspected Baath party ties,
according to leaked documents published by Iraqi media on August 13.[6]
Candidates from political parties and coalitions that are competing with
Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, meanwhile, constitute a
disproportionate number of those barred due to alleged Ba’ath party
links. This report comes after Maliki’s Dawa Party released a statement
on August 13 affirming its support for the Commission’s measures.[7]
Maliki also emphasized on August 8 the need for the AJC to take action
against Baathists.[8] Former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi, once a
member of Maliki’s former Dawa Party, criticized on August 20 the
weaponization of the AJC for political purposes.[9] Shia political
parties, particularly Maliki, have long manipulated the Accountability
and Justice Commission to target political opponents.[10]

The
Accountability and Justice Commission’s investigation and exclusion of
candidates tied to Shia Coordination Framework parties reflects ongoing
tensions among Shia parties within the Framework. Iraqi media reported
on August 19 that Shia Coordination Framework members are divided over
US pressure to dissolve the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[11]
Political sources close to the Shia Coordination Framework told Iraqi
media on August 6 that some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are “almost at
odds” with some elements of the Shia Coordination Framework.[12]
Division among the Shia Coordination Framework is notable ahead of the
elections because factional infighting between Iranian-backed groups
before the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections ultimately advantaged
other Iraqi parties over Iranian-backed parties in the elections.[13]

Key Takeaways

Iraqi Parliamentary Elections:
Former Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al Maliki
may be using the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) to
sideline political opponents ahead of the November 2025 elections. Iraqi
media reported that the AJC has so far barred 33 candidates affiliated
with the Shia Coordination Framework parties for alleged Baath party
ties.
Damage at Fordow: The New York Times
reported on August 20 that conclusive damage assessments of US strikes
on Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant require more time, which is consistent
with previous reporting. Several technical experts told the New York Times
that a precise damage assessment requires advanced computer
simulations, exact details of the bombs, and extensive knowledge of the
geology of Fordow.
US Counter-ISIS Operations: The
United States conducted an operation reportedly targeting senior Iraqi
ISIS leader Salah Noman in Atmeh, Idlib Province, on August 20. The US
ground operation in Atmeh occurs amid ongoing counter-ISIS efforts in
northern Syria near the Turkish border, including a recent ground
operation in al Bab in July 2025.

Iran

The New York Times
reported on August 20 that conclusive damage assessments of US strikes
on Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant require more time, which is consistent
with previous reporting.[14] The United States
dropped twelve 30,000lb GBU-57 bunker buster bombs on Fordow in June
2025, targeting ventilation shafts at the site that led to a centrifuge
cascade hall located at least 250 feet underground.[15] An unspecified
US Department of Defense official said that the United States aimed to
destroy the centrifuges with shock waves and other effects of the blasts
because the bombs would probably not make direct contact with the
centrifuge chamber itself.[16] International Atomic Energy Agency
Director Rafael Grossi previously stated that the Fordow centrifuges are
“no longer working” and emphasized that even small vibrations can
destroy them.[17] The US bombs would have generated a blast wave far
more significant than small vibrations. Several technical experts told
the New York Times that a precise damage assessment requires
advanced computer simulations, exact details of the bombs, and extensive
knowledge of the geology of Fordow.[18] Iranian officials have
emphasized that Iran cannot access the nuclear sites struck by US and
Israeli airstrikes yet, which also prevents conclusive battle damage
assessments.[19]

Several factors may have impacted the
effectiveness of the US strikes on Fordow. A US defense official
familiar with US decision-making said that the main targeted ventilation
shafts had bends near the shaft entrances, which means the path to the
underground facility through the shaft was not straight.[20] Several
geologists also stated that the geology of Fordow almost certainly had
an impact on the extent of damage. One expert said that Iran likely
built Fordow using volcanic tuff, which may have helped cushion the site
from the bombs due to its porosity.

Iran secured loans
against tankers transporting Iranian and Iranian allies’ oil exports to
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to circumvent Western sanctions
between 2019 and 2023, according to the Financial Times on August 20.[21] A
US-sanctioned Iranian broker set up one billion dollars’ worth of
mortgages in Switzerland against at least 34 oil tankers, according to
Panama Maritime Authority documents.[22] The United States has
sanctioned 20 of these 34 tankers.[23] The Iranian broker used these
mortgages as collateral, which allowed the broker to take ownership of
the tanker if the buyer did not complete the payment once the oil
arrived at its destination.[24] Buyers traditionally require official
bank documents to prove their credit to traders.[25] These mortgages
allow buyers to circumvent bank involvement in the process. Many banks
have increasingly refused to work on transactions related to Iran’s
illicit oil trade since the United States began to impose strict
sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports in 2019.[26] Iran’s illicit oil
export network has moved at least 130 million oil barrels worth $9.6
billion using mortgages to circumvent detection between 2019 and 2023.
This network transferred sanctioned Iranian oil as well as sanctioned
Russian and Venezuelan oil. The network exported the vast majority of
this oil to the PRC, according to a research group focused on illicit
networks.[27]

Iran’s use of mortgages on tankers to evade US
sanctions is only one of the many strategies that Iran employs to
obfuscate illicit Iranian and Russian oil trade to the PRC. Many
companies affiliated with Iranian oil tankers use fake addresses and
conduct ship-to-ship transfers.[28] The multi-national network
controlled by Senior Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani’s son,
Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, frequently changes vessel operators and
managers to obscure ownership, falsifies cargo information, and turns
off automatic identification systems (AIS) during loading. The United
States sanctioned Shamkhani on July 30.[29]

Iran is deepening its economic and military cooperation with Belarus.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Belarusian President
Alexander Lukashenko on August 20 in Minsk, Belarus, to discuss
opportunities to expand bilateral relations.[30] Pezeshkian stated that
Iran and Belarus share common interests and want to combat US and
European efforts to ”push unilateralism” in the region.[31] Pezeshkian
emphasized that both countries can cooperate to mitigate the effects of
international sanctions.[32] Iranian and Belarusian officials signed 12
memorandums of understanding (MoU) focused on increasing bilateral
trade, military-tech cooperation, and mutual investment during
Pezeshkian’s visit.[33] Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas
Araghchi stated on August 20 that Iran plans to sign a comprehensive
strategic partnership with Belarus.[34] Iran and Belarus have increased
defense and security cooperation over the past few years.[35] Iran
showcased military equipment at a Belarusian military exhibit in May
2025.[36] Iran has reportedly worked to establish a drone factory in
Belarus since May 2023 to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[37]

Iraq

See the topline section.

Syria

The
United States conducted an operation reportedly targeting an Iraqi
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leader in Atmeh, Idlib Province,
on August 20.[38] A Syrian security source and
Syrian residents told Reuters that local Syrian forces cordoned off the
neighborhood, but that only US forces participated in the raid.[39] A
US official confirmed to Reuters that the operation targeted a
“suspected high-value target.”[40] US Central Command (CENTCOM) has not
acknowledged the operation or its outcomes as of this writing. Syrian
state-owned outlet Al Ekhbariya reported that senior Iraqi ISIS leader
Salah Noman was killed during the operation, citing an unspecified
security source.[41] The source said that Noman was responsible for
activating ISIS cells in Syria.[42] The General Security Service (GSS)
had pursued Noman from Dana, in the Idlib countryside, to Atmeh.[43]
Noman is also known as Abd al Nayif al Jabouri and previously operated
with the Islamic State (IS) in Salah al Din Province, Iraq.[44]

The
US ground operation in Atmeh occurs amid ongoing counter-ISIS efforts
in northern Syria near the Turkish border. Syrian Interior Ministry
forces arrested nine members of an ISIS cell in Harem, near the Turkish
border, on August 7.[45] Syrian government forces also participated in a
recent US counter-ISIS ground operation that targeted and killed senior
ISIS leader Dhiya Zawba Muslih al Hardani in al Bab, Aleppo Province,
on July 25.[46]

Anti-government
Druze militia Liwa al Jabal announced on August 19 that it has joined a
“unified army” that is aligned with Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri, which
indicates that some anti-government forces in Suwayda Province seek to
form a more unified armed force to support Hijri’s new autonomous
project.[47] Liwa al Jabal is a prominent
Suwayda-based Druze militia that has an estimated 5,000 fighters.[48]
The faction’s August 19 statement claimed that the group’s recent
defense of Suwayda Province from ”dark militias supported by government
forces” has led the group to conclude that it must ”unify efforts and
close ranks” to defend Suwayda Province and Syria.[49] Liwa al Jabal
said that its new participation in this ”unified army” is ”under the
blessing” of Hijri, who is the most prominent anti-Damascus Druze leader
in Suwayda Province.[50] Hijri’s political movement declared an
autonomous Suwaydawi government on August 6.[51] Judges on the “Supreme
Legal Committee” within the new ”autonomous government” appointed an
executive body, security officials, and ministerial heads to govern
Suwayda instead of the Damascus-based transitional government.[52] Liwa
al Jabal’s announcement of its participation in a new Hijri-aligned
force suggests that Hijri or his political allies may be uniting
Suwayda’s anti-government militias under a single command or structure
to support the new autonomous government.

CTP-ISW has not observed
any other Druze militias discuss membership in a new force under
Hijri’s autonomous government, but Liwa al Jabal is not the only Druze
militia that has expressed its support for Hijri’s political
aspirations. A group of Druze militias have long opposed Shara’s
government, and several other militias, including Liwa al Jabal, have
turned against the government in recent months after government forces
committed abuses against Druze during the violence in Suwayda in July
2025. Liwa al Jabal, for example, participated in the December 2024
offensive on Damascus as a member of the Southern Operations Room and
emerged as an initial supporter of President Ahmed al Shara and the new
Syrian government soon after the fall of the regime.[53] A spokesperson
more recently wrote an op ed on August 9 in support of an alliance to
stand up to the “terrorist [Shara] government” and restore
“consideration” for minorities and moderate Sunnis, highlighting the
significant breakdown in trust between some Druze militias and the
transitional government.[54] The breakdown in trust is at least
partially motivated by political divisions (not just intercommunal
divisions). Another Southern Operations Room faction, the Eighth
Brigade, was subverted and suppressed by Shara’s government. It is
possible that Liwa al Jabal and others seek to avoid a similar fate. The
formalization of the alliance between anti-government Druze militias
under the term “unified army” would represent a significant hurdle to
the Syrian government’s efforts to work with Druze parties with the aim
of gradually incorporating Suwayda into state institutions.

Humanitarian
aid providers opened a new humanitarian corridor that leads into
northern Suwayda Province due to repeated attacks by Sunni tribal
fighters and unknown gunmen along the previous southern corridor.
Sunni tribal fighters have attacked civilians four times on the
outskirts of Suwayda Province since August 15.[55] Unknown gunmen
previously attacked a Syrian Red Crescent convoy headed toward the
corridor on August 8.[56] These attacks have prevented humanitarian
workers from distributing aid via the Busra al Sham corridor.[57]
Humanitarian organizations have since adapted by opening a new
humanitarian corridor that enters northern Suwayda Province near Busra
al Harir on August 19.[58] It is not clear if the government or
humanitarian agencies will reopen the Busra al Sham corridor.[59] The
General Security Services (GSS) lack the strength to guard the full
90-kilometer border of Suwayda Province and cannot reinforce their
positions in the event of an attack, according to a Syrian
journalist.[60]

The
attacks along the humanitarian corridor may suggest that tribal
fighters are attempting to disrupt Suwaydawis’ evacuations from Suwayda
Province, the provision of humanitarian aid to Suwayda, or both. Tribal
fighters reportedly feel neglected by the Syrian transitional government
because the government continues to send aid to Suwayda Province, but
has done little to address Sunni Bedouin displacement in Daraa
Province.[61] It remains unclear why the Sunni tribal fighters have
attacked civilian vehicles, however. The civilians subjected to these
attacks are not solely Druze, which suggests that the attacks are not
entirely motivated by intercommunal tensions.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Senior
Lebanese officials have continued diplomatic efforts to generate
support for the French-drafted resolution to extend the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)’s mandate.[62] UNIFIL,
which patrols Lebanon’s southern border with Israel, operates under an
annually renewed mandate that is set to expire on August 31, 2025.[63]
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is expected to vote on a
French-proposed resolution on August 25 to extend UNIFIL’s mandate until
August 31, 2026 (see graphic below).[64] Lebanese
President Joseph Aoun, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, and Prime
Minister Nawaf Salam each met with US Senator Markwayne Mullin and a
delegation of other unspecified US officials in Lebanon on August 20 and
discussed UNIFIL‘s role supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).[65]
The United States has reportedly opposed an automatic renewal of
UNIFIL’s mandate and raised concerns over the French resolution’s lack
of an explicit withdrawal date for UNIFIL.[66] Salam emphasized that
UNIFIL provides critical support to LAF efforts to assert state
authority over southern Lebanon.[67]UNIFIL’s presence and familiarity
with southern Lebanon may be needed to conduct a successful transfer of
authority in southern Lebanon.[68] Berri stated that Lebanon was
surprised by US opposition to UNIFIL’s mandate extension and questioned
how the United States ”can target its own efforts.”[69] Berri is
suggesting that US opposition to the resolution goes
against US sponsorship and leadership in the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire
monitoring committee, which contains UNIFIL forces in its structure and
tasks.[70]

Several other UNSC members, including Russia and the PRC, have opposed extending UNIFIL’s mandate. Unspecified
diplomatic sources told Lebanese media on August 20 that the PRC and
Russia informed Lebanon that they reject the proposed UNIFIL
resolution.[71] The PRC and Russia said that they will not oppose any
proposals to end UNIFIL’s mission in Lebanon, according to the
source.[72] The PRC and Russia have consistently expressed their
discontent with UNIFIL by abstaining from previous UNIFIL mandate
renewals.[73] The PRC and Russia’s opposition to UNIFIL is also
unsurprising given Russia and the PRC’s ongoing political support for
other members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, such as the Houthi
Movement.[74] The PRC and Russia both abstained from the July 15 vote on
UN Security Council Resolution 2787, which condemned the Houthi strikes
against international shipping as acts of terrorism, for example.[75]

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[2] https://almadapaper dot net/411281/

[3] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/280620256

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Malikis-Authoritarian-Regime-Web.pdf

[5] https://www.hudson.org/international-organizations/badr-organization-irans-oldest-proxy-iraq

[6]
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[7] https://almadapaper dot net/411281/

[8] https://aawsat dot com/node/5173233

[9] https://almadapaper dot net/411281/

[10]https://www.understandingwar.org/publications/commentaries/iraqi-parliament-passes-accountability-and-justice-law ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Malikis-Authoritarian-Regime-Web.pdf

[11] https://almadapaper dot net/411192/

[12] https://almadapaper dot net/410154/

[13] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iraq-crisis-elite-consensus-based-politics-turns-deadly

[14] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/08/20/world/middleeast/fordo-us-iran-nuclear-program-strike.html

[15]

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;
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/06/22/world/middleeast/us-iran-nuclear-sites.html
;
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/inside-story-b-2-mission-bomb-iran-nuclear-sites/

[16] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/08/20/world/middleeast/fordo-us-iran-nuclear-program-strike.html

[17] https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20250626-iran-nuclear-sites-suffered-enormous-damage-iaea-chief-tells-rfi

[18] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/08/20/world/middleeast/fordo-us-iran-nuclear-program-strike.html

[19]

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[20] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/08/20/world/middleeast/fordo-us-iran-nuclear-program-strike.html

[21] https://www.ft.com/content/19cebbc7-c6d7-4050-b80c-0b9f8d334d7a

[22] https://www.ft.com/content/19cebbc7-c6d7-4050-b80c-0b9f8d334d7a ; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2734

[23] https://www.ft.com/content/19cebbc7-c6d7-4050-b80c-0b9f8d334d7a

[24] https://www.ft.com/content/19cebbc7-c6d7-4050-b80c-0b9f8d334d7a

[25] https://www.ft.com/content/19cebbc7-c6d7-4050-b80c-0b9f8d334d7a

[26] https://www.ft.com/content/19cebbc7-c6d7-4050-b80c-0b9f8d334d7a

[27] https://www.ft.com/content/19cebbc7-c6d7-4050-b80c-0b9f8d334d7a

[28] https://www.ft.com/content/19cebbc7-c6d7-4050-b80c-0b9f8d334d7a

[29] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0215

[30] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/771585/

[31] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/771585/

[32] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/771585/

[33]
https://belta dot
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; https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/880973; https://belta dot
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[34] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/29/3380432

[35]
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https://english.alarabiya dot
net/News/world/2023/08/02/Iran-Belarus-seek-closer-military-collaboration-amid-tensions-with-West
; https://www.belarus dot
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[36] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/232141

[37] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-742605

[38] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-forces-conduct-raid-northern-syria-against-is-target-sources-say-2025-08-20/

[39] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-forces-conduct-raid-northern-syria-against-is-target-sources-say-2025-08-20/

[40] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-forces-conduct-raid-northern-syria-against-is-target-sources-say-2025-08-20/

[41] https://t.me/AlekhbariahSY/174986

[42] https://t.me/AlekhbariahSY/174986

[43] https://t.me/AlekhbariahSY/174986

[44] https://x.com/azelin/status/1958215899980366324

[45] https://t.me/syrianmoi/25281 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/25262 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1953391853262254523

[46] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1948736581809926442

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[48] https://www dot eremnews.com/news/arab-world/5ol3efs

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[51]
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[52] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid02pKQMa1Ao17sNE9HyQBxzwLrAwmWC5PwdScTnX8tHQqsHW8fWGyZ3J2dppPMQD3ZNl

[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-7-2025

[54] https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/guest-post-the-need-for-an-alliance

[55]
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net/770128/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%88%d9%84%d9%89-%d8%b9%d8%a8%d8%b1-%d9%85%d8%b9%d8%a8%d8%b1-%d8%a8%d8%b5%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d9%82%d8%a7%d9%81%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%ac%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%a9/

[59]
https://www.enabbaladi dot
net/770128/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%88%d9%84%d9%89-%d8%b9%d8%a8%d8%b1-%d9%85%d8%b9%d8%a8%d8%b1-%d8%a8%d8%b5%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d9%82%d8%a7%d9%81%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%ac%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%a9/

[60]
https://www.enabbaladi dot
net/769776/%d9%87%d8%ac%d9%88%d9%85-%d9%8a%d8%b3%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d9%81-%d9%85%d8%af%d9%86%d9%8a%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%b9%d9%86%d8%af-%d9%85%d8%b9%d8%a8%d8%b1-%d8%af%d8%b1%d8%b9%d8%a7-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%88%d9%8a/
; https://www.enabbaladi dot
net/769822/%d9%85%d8%b3%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%88%d9%86-%d9%8a%d8%ae%d8%aa%d8%b7%d9%81%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%ab%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a3%d8%b4%d8%ae%d8%a7%d8%b5-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b7%d8%b1%d9%8a/

[61] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1956355472123953600

[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-19-2025

[63] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-security-council-starts-talks-fate-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-2025-08-18/

[64]

https://apnews.com/article/un-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-israel-trump-f11b5b48425de7a7c5c91978319b9623
; https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/un-security-council-begins-debates-to-extend-unifil-mission-in-lebanon/

[65]
https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1Fr5MJ8QMc/?mibextid=wwXIfr ;
https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/1958184279780798549 ;
https://x.com/grandserail/status/1958183655412486260

[66] https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/trump-administration-end-peacekeeping-lebanon-europe-pushing-back-124718708

[67] https://x.com/grandserail/status/1958183655412486260

[68] https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-07/lebanon-33.php

[69]

https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1314311236718041&id=100044175322236&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=RYOlN0jksozbbjXB#
; https://www.naharnet dot
com/stories/en/314807-berri-meets-us-delegation-criticizes-us-move-to-end-unifil-s-mission

[70]

[71] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/855567/أميركا–يجب-إنهاء-عمل–اليونيفل–خلال-6-أشهر

[72] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/855567/أميركا–يجب-إنهاء-عمل–اليونيفل–خلال-6-أشهر

[73]

UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL): Vote on Mandate Renewal*

; https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15400.doc.htm

[74] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-23-2025

[75] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202507/1338477.shtml

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