Nidal Morrison, Ben Schmida, Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Adham Fattah, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET
The
Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and
the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which
provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.
CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The
Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this
report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in
February 2025.
Click here
to see ISW-CTP’s interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran
since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes
day-by-day.
Iraqi Popular Mobilization
Committee (PMC) Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh defended the Popular
Mobilization Authority Law against domestic critics during an interview
with Iraqi media on August 20.[1] This law, which Parliament
has yet to vote on, would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi
political and security spheres by formalizing key structures of the
Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) within the Iraqi
security apparatus.[2] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service
comprised of many militias, some of which report to Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani
instead of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani.[3] Fayyadh
denied Iranian-backed Iraqi militia involvement in the law’s creation
and added that the law has been in development for years with Iraqi
Ministry of Defense support.[4] CTP-ISW is unable to verify Fayyadh’s
claims about the militia’s role in the law’s creation. The Council of
Ministers, which is headed by Sudani and includes the Minister of
Defense, approved the law and submitted it to Parliament in February
2025, which implies Ministry of Defense involvement, however.[5]
Fayyadh also claimed that the political debate over the Popular
Mobilization Authority Law does not relate to the law’s “substance” but
rather to his leadership.[6] This law would elevate Fayyadh’s role as
head of the PMC to a cabinet-level position within the newly-created
Popular Mobilization Authority, which surely, in part, explains
Fayyadh’s support for the law.[7]
Fayyadh’s interview comes as US
political and economic pressure on the Iraqi government to curb Iranian
influence in Iraq has sparked debate on the future and potential
dissolution of the PMF.[8] The US State Department spokesperson
confirmed on August 12 that the United States opposes the Popular
Mobilization Authority law.[9] The law also faces domestic opposition
from Sunni and Kurdish parliamentarians, who walked out of a July 16
parliamentary session to protest the reading of the law.[10] A Shia
Coordination Framework parliamentarian told Iraqi media on August 18
that over 100 parliamentarians have signed a petition to vote on the law
in the next Parliament session, but added that no Sunni or Kurdish
parliamentarians have signed the petition.[11] The votes of these
parliamentarians and the support of the Iraqi voters they represent are
critical to passing the law.
Fayyadh attempted to portray the PMF
as a responsible actor to defend it from critics. He noted that the
Popular Mobilization Authority law would strengthen the separation
between the PMC and unspecified armed groups, in reference to
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that operate outside of the PMF.[12] The
PMC is formally responsible for ensuring that militias in the PMF
answer to the Iraqi federal government, but has failed to enforce this
requirement. Fayyadh added that the PMF maintains a “high level of
discipline,” which is false.[13] Some PMF groups have conducted attacks
without orders from any government chain of command.[14] Militias within
the PMF have explicitly rejected Iraqi government oversight.[15]
Fayyadh
also said that the PMF has no ”hostility towards any party,” which
ignores attacks that militias within the PMF have conducted targeting US
forces in Iraq and Syria and the attempted assassination of former
Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi by elements of a militia that is
part of the PMF.[16] Fayyadh said that the PMF provides security to
Iraqis, but he ignored the PMF’s efforts to commit sectarian cleansing
in Sunni areas.[17] The PMF has prevented the return of residents who
fled from al Awja, Salah al Din Province, in 2014 during the
anti-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fight, which is an act of
sectarian cleansing.[18] Fayyadh claimed that the PMF is in the process
of resolving the al Awja issue.[19]
Fayyadh also attempted to
obfuscate the relationship between the IRGC and the PMF. He described
the PMF as an “Iraqi force” with “no connection” to the IRGC, which is
false.[20] Militias that comprise PMF brigades conducted hundreds of
attacks that targeted US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023
to January 2024.[21] Those militias immediately stopped that campaign
following direct intervention by IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail
Ghaani.[22] Fayyadh himself has also advanced Iranian objectives in
Iraq. Fayyadh was part of a PMF ”crisis cell” formed in late 2019 to
suppress mass Iraqi protests with the IRGC’s support.[23] Then-IRGC Quds
Force Commander Qassem Soleimani supported this crisis cell.
Fayyadh
tried to justify the PMF’s continued role as a security force by
asserting that the PMF would adhere to orders to dissolve by the Shia
religious authority, despite having previously rejected such orders.[24]
Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, Iraq’s highest religious figure, said in
November 2024 that arms should be confined to the Iraqi state.[25] Some
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada,
denied that Sistani’s call was directed at the militias.[26]
The
continued survival of Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks, which
helped Assad’s economy, demonstrates the economic interests that
continue to animate internal conflict in Syria. These networks have the
potential to destabilize Syria, as demonstrated in violent flare-ups
throughout 2025.[27] Captagon and other smuggling networks long
helped sustain the Assad regime during the war. The regime profited 3
to 5 billion USD annually from the Captagon trade.[28] Many of these
networks continue to survive in Syria because, while Assad’s collapse
destroyed the regime, it did not destroy many of the disparate networks
that helped the regime survive for as long as it did. The transitional
government began a counter-narcotics campaign in January 2024 that has
naturally spurred a violent reaction from many of these networks.[29]
This campaign has reduced Captagon production by approximately 80%,
according to the Financial Times on August 21.[30]
The
Captagon trade and other Assad-era criminal enterprises are almost
certainly driving some—but not all—of the violence in Syria. Some of the
violence along the Syria-Lebanon border and in western Syria in early
2025 appeared to be part of efforts by smuggling networks to defend
their ratlines.[31] Not all of these criminal enterprises were allied
with Assad, of course. Local reporting suggests that three key
groups—the Bedouin Sunni tribes, Druze militias, and networks loyal to
the Assad regime—have competed for control of the smuggling networks in
southwestern Syria.[32] The divisions between the three groups are not
purely identity-based, but competition over economic interests can
rapidly take on an intercommunal bent as Bedouin Sunni fighters kill
Druze or vice versa. Many Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks
persist, however, in areas that have little to no transitional
government control, including within Suwayda Province, the
Kurdish-controlled northeast, the Syrian coast, and the Syria-Lebanon
border.[33] The Financial Times reported that Assad-linked
criminal networks and Bedouin tribes sustain the drug trade in Suwayda
Province by exploiting local poverty and the continued employment of
Assad-era border guards on the Jordanian border.[34]
Key Takeaways
- Captagon Networks in Syria: The
continued survival of Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks, which
helped Assad’s economy, demonstrates the economic interests that
continue to animate internal conflicts in Syria. These networks have the
potential to destabilize Syria, as demonstrated in violent flare-ups
throughout 2025. - Justifications for the PMF: Iraqi
Popular Mobilization Commission head Faleh al Fayyadh defended the
Popular Mobilization Authority Law against domestic critics during an
interview with Iraqi media on August 20. This law, which Parliament has
yet to vote on, would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi
political and security spheres by formalizing key structures of the
Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) within the Iraqi
security apparatus. - IAEA Inspections in Iran: Iran
continues to block International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to
its damaged nuclear facilities and highly enriched uranium (HEU)
stockpile after the 12-day war. Iran’s 409 kg HEU stockpile remains in
one or several unspecified locations, and Iran’s access to the stockpile
is unclear.
Iran
Iranian
Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani and
Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Majid Takht Ravanchi discussed Iranian
nuclear issues with Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs’
International Security Division Head Ambassador Gabriel Lüchinger in
Tehran on August 2.[35] Switzerland
traditionally facilitates diplomatic communication between Iran and the
United States because the United States does not maintain a diplomatic
presence in Iran.[36] An unspecified US official rejected an August 20
report from Hezbollah media claiming that Lüchinger conveyed a message
from US Special Envoy to the Middle East and lead nuclear negotiator
Steve Witkoff to the Iranian government.[37]
Iran
continues to block International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to
its damaged nuclear facilities and highly enriched uranium (HEU)
stockpile after the 12-day war. Iran’s 409 kg HEU stockpile remains in
one or several unspecified locations, and Iran’s access to the stockpile
is unclear. Unspecified diplomats told Bloomberg on August 21
that IAEA officials will confer with US officials next week after IAEA
inspectors failed to secure Iran’s approval to resume monitoring.[38]
The unspecified diplomats added that Iranian officials told IAEA Deputy
Director General Massimo Aparo during meetings in Tehran on August 12
that inspections could potentially occur at undamaged sites like Bushehr
while Iran‘s main nuclear-fuel complex would remain closed.[39] Iranian
Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on August 20 that the
SNSC will decide whether inspections can resume.[40] Araghchi emphasized
that Iran cannot cut cooperation entirely because activities like fuel
replacement at Bushehr require IAEA oversight.[41] Araghchi stressed
that any new cooperation must account for safety and security concerns
after the recent strikes, however.[42] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu previously told Israeli media on August 12 that Iran retains
about 400 kilograms of enriched uranium.[43] This amount is consistent
with the IAEA’s June estimate that Iran retains 408.6 kilograms of 60
percent enriched uranium, though Iran may not have physical access to
all of the uranium, which could be buried at Fordow or Esfahan.[44]
The
Iranian Artesh Navy conducted its first military exercise since the
Israel-Iran War in the northern Indian Ocean and Sea of Oman on August
21.[45] The Artesh Navy tested multiple
anti-ship cruise missiles, including the Nasir, Ghadir, and Ghadeer,[46]
during the exercise.[47] The ”Bavar-5,” which is an Iranian drone that
can be launched from naval vessels, reportedly destroyed a target after
traveling 400 kilometers.[48] The naval exercise also included surface
and subsurface vessels, aerial units, and electronic warfare units.[49]
The
United States imposed additional sanctions targeting Iranian oil trade
networks and their international facilitators on August 21.[50] The
US Treasury Department sanctioned Greek national Antonios Margaritis
and five Marshall Islands-registered companies in Margaritis’ shipping
network for facilitating the trade of Iranian oil products for “many
years.”[51] The US Treasury Department previously sanctioned three
shipping companies in Margaritis’ network in December 2024.[52] The
United States separately sanctioned six entities and eight affiliated
vessels outside of Margaritis’ network for transporting Iranian oil to
China and conducting ship-to-ship transfers with vessels already
sanctioned by the United States.[53]
Iraq
See topline section.
Syria
A
Syrian transitional government source denied any plans for a
humanitarian corridor across Syria’s borders, which represents an
implicit rejection of a humanitarian corridor between Suwayda City and Israel.[54]
The source stated that the Syrian transitional government will
coordinate the delivery of all humanitarian aid, including to areas
beyond Suwayda Province.[55] The United States is attempting to broker a
deal that would establish a humanitarian corridor between Suwayda City
and Israel to deliver aid to the Druze community there, according to US
and Israeli officials speaking to Axios on August 12.[56] An unspecified
source separately told Saudi media that Israel and Syria agree on “80
percent of the points” after talks between Israeli and Syrian officials
in Paris on August 19, which may indicate that both countries have
agreed to continue negotiations.[57] The source also said that
unspecified security arrangements between Israel and Syria regarding
southern Syria “are almost complete.”[58] Saudi media claimed that
Israel and Syria reached an agreement during the meeting in Paris on
August 19 to de-escalate tensions and for Israel to refrain from
interfering in internal Syrian affairs.[59] Saudi media added that
Israel and Syria agreed to continue to stabilize and monitor the July 18
ceasefire between the transitional government and Druze militias within
Suwayda Province.[60] An agreement between Israel and Syria was
reportedly reached to reactivate the 1974 disengagement treaty between
Israel and Syria.[61] Israel previously declared the disengagement
treaty void after the Assad regime collapsed in December 2024.[62]
Arabian Peninsula
Nothing significant to report.
Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Palestinian
leaders in the Burj al Barajneh refugee camp in Beirut and the al Bass
refugee camp in Tyre turned over the first collection of medium and
heavy weapons to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) on August 21.[63] Saudi
media reported on August 21 that the collected weapons belong to the
security unit of the Palestinian Authority (PA)-controlled embassy in
Lebanon.[64] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. The office
of Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam stated that this weapons handover
marks the start of a broader effort to disarm all armed groups in
Lebanon.[65] Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee Head Ambassador
Ramez Dimashqieh noted that the LAF will receive additional batches of
weapons from the Burj al Barajneh camp and other Palestinian camps in
the coming weeks.[66] Palestinian militias have long operated with
relative autonomy in the 12 Palestinian refugee camps throughout
Lebanon.[67]
Salam and PA President Mahmoud Abbas previously
agreed in May 2025 to disarm all Palestinian militias in Lebanon.[68]
Saudi media reported on August 21 that members of Abbas’s Fatah and the
Palestine Liberation Organization are handing over their weapons.[69]
Fatah is the dominant political party in the PA, which governs the West
Bank.[70]
Other Palestinian factions, like Hamas and the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), are unlikely to turn over their
weapons. These Palestinian groups are not beholden to Abbas. Hamas and
factions closely aligned to it have continued to reject any
disarmament.[71] An unspecified Hamas spokesperson, speaking on behalf
of ”the Palestinian factions in Lebanon,” stated on August 21 that this
weapons handover only applied to Fatah.[72] Hamas’ statement added that
the unspecified ”Palestinian factions in Lebanon” will keep their
weapons as long as Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip continue.[73]
Disagreements among Palestinian militias in Lebanon regarding the
mechanism to hand weapons over to the LAF have previously delayed the
Lebanese government’s attempts to disarm these groups.[74]
[1]
https://almadapaper dot net/411316/ ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces
[2]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2025
; https://www.rudaw dot
net/Library/Files/Uploaded%20Files/07/NewFolder/175%20175%20175%20(1).pdf
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces
[4] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/
[5] https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/iraq/250220253
[6]
https://almadapaper dot net/389291/ ; https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-10-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-19-2025
[8]
https://almadapaper dot net/389291/ ; https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-10-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA
[9] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-12-2025/
[10]
https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/140720255 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2025
[11] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/180820257
[12] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/
[13] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/
[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20-%20ISF%20PMF%20Orders%20of%20Battle_0_0.pdf
[15] https://t.me/abualaskary/137
[16]
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-and-anti-israel-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis
;
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-next-after-assassination-attempt-mustafa-al-kadhimi
[17] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/
[18]
https://www.bic-rhr.com/sites/default/files/inline-files/BIC%20March%202023_Wilson%20fache_Commentary.pdf
; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-18-2025
[19] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/
[20] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/
[21]
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-and-anti-israel-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis
; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate100424
[22]
https://www.shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AE%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%A7
[23] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1231
[24] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/
[25] https://shafaq dot com/en/Report/Ayatollah-Al-Sistani-s-seven-commandments-Lessons-from-the-past-for-Iraq-s-better-future
[26] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Exclusive-Al-Sistani-s-call-to-limit-arms-to-state-does-not-apply-to-Resistance-Groups
[27] https://www.ft.com/content/d81e3c6c-c157-4281-92ec-135d70b497cb
[28] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-the-assad-regime-made-billions-producing-and-exporting-party-drugs
[29] ttps://www.ft.com/content/d81e3c6c-c157-4281-92ec-135d70b497cb
[30] https://www.ft.com/content/d81e3c6c-c157-4281-92ec-135d70b497cb
[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-6-2025
[32] https://en.majalla dot com/node/326719/politics/illicit-economies-play-big-role-syria%E2%80%99s-post-assad-flashpoints
[33] https://www.ft.com/content/d81e3c6c-c157-4281-92ec-135d70b497cb
[34] https://www.ft.com/content/d81e3c6c-c157-4281-92ec-135d70b497cb
[35] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/29/3380622; https://nournews dot ir/en/news/240657/
[36]
https://www.eda dot
admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/human-rights/peace/switzerland-s-good-offices/protective-power-mandates.html
[37] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1958196817432096953
[38] h https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-21/iran-s-freeze-on-nuclear-inspections-prompts-un-us-crisis-talks
[39] h https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-21/iran-s-freeze-on-nuclear-inspections-prompts-un-us-crisis-talks
[40] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/29/3380412/
[41] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/29/3380412/
[42] https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel/defense/artc-pm-netanyahu-we-would-have-struck-iran-even-without-the-us ;
[43] https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel/defense/artc-pm-netanyahu-we-would-have-struck-iran-even-without-the-us ;
[44]
https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-uranium-7f6c9962c1e4199e951559096bcf5cc0?taid=683ae0271dc7320001739354&utm_campaign=TrueAnthem&utm_medium=AP&utm_source=Twitter
[45] https://apnews.com/article/iran-navy-drill-israel-war-f9b2057a6162ab3466af95220d2e70d3
[46] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85919119
[47] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85919119
[48] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/30/3381009 ; https://nournews dot ir/en/news/240729/
[49] https://nournews dot ir/en/news/240729/
[50] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0229
[51] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0229
[52] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2758
[53] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0229
[54]
https://www.facebook.com/sana.gov/posts/pfbid02P7JiQvHu76dxrbT832C1DvVredTjnCSjRRKihgNNp2UB7Ra6nB7t7RgvjweNBkGgl?rdid=Eu6M0ekcIjusk8Sf#
[55]
https://www.facebook.com/sana.gov/posts/pfbid02P7JiQvHu76dxrbT832C1DvVredTjnCSjRRKihgNNp2UB7Ra6nB7t7RgvjweNBkGgl?rdid=Eu6M0ekcIjusk8Sf
; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1958222116102541625
[56] https://www.axios.com/2025/08/12/israel-syria-corridor-suwayda-tom-barrack
[57]
https://www.alhadath dot
net/syria/2025/08/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-80-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7
[58]
https://www.alhadath dot
net/syria/2025/08/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-80-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7
[59]
https://www.alhadath dot
net/syria/2025/08/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-80-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7
[60]
https://www.alhadath dot
net/syria/2025/08/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-80-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7
[61]
https://www.alhadath dot
net/syria/2025/08/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-80-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7
; https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d88
[62]
https://x.com/netanyahu/status/1865757924594786810 ;
https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/un-slams-violation-of-1974-disengagement-deal-as-israel-acts-in-syria-buffer-zone/
[63]
https://x.com/nawafsalam/status/1958560091428249977 ; https://aawsat
dot
com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5177683-انطلاق-عملية-تسليم-السلاح-الفلسطيني-إلى-الجيش-اللبناني
;
https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-palestinian-refugees-camp-weapons-disarmament-e5f4158261635c2ce54e2cd196198758
[64] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5177683-انطلاق-عملية-تسليم-السلاح-الفلسطيني-إلى-الجيش-اللبناني
[65]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-says-it-is-beginning-disarmament-palestinian-factions-refugee-camps-2025-08-21/
[66] https://x.com/nawafsalam/status/1958560091428249977 ; https://x.com/grandserail/status/1958512728605438255
[67]
https://thisisbeirut dot
com.lb/articles/1316380/what-are-the-12-palestinian-camps-in-lebanon#:~:text=Following%20the%20creation%20of%20Israel,)%2C%20spread%20across%20the%20country.
;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-says-it-is-beginning-disarmament-palestinian-factions-refugee-camps-2025-08-21/
[68]
https://x.com/grandserail/status/1958512728605438255 ; https://aawsat
dot
com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5177683-انطلاق-عملية-تسليم-السلاح-الفلسطيني-إلى-الجيش-اللبناني
[69] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5177683-انطلاق-عملية-تسليم-السلاح-الفلسطيني-إلى-الجيش-اللبناني
[70] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-31-2025
[71] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5177683-انطلاق-عملية-تسليم-السلاح-الفلسطيني-إلى-الجيش-اللبناني
[72] https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-palestinian-refugees-camp-weapons-disarmament-e5f4158261635c2ce54e2cd196198758
[73] https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-palestinian-refugees-camp-weapons-disarmament-e5f4158261635c2ce54e2cd196198758
[74] https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-palestinian-refugees-camp-weapons-disarmament-e5f4158261635c2ce54e2cd196198758