NOTE: CTP-ISW will publish the Iran
Update Monday through Friday starting on July 25, 2025. CTP-ISW will
resume seven-day coverage of the region should conditions warrant it and
will notify our readers if we resume seven-day coverage.
The
Iranian Parliament appears to be trying to play an influential role in
shaping Iranian security policy following the Israel-Iran War by
supporting and approving security-related legislation at an anomalously
high rate. Parliament recently approved a bill on July 27 that would further expand the regime’s ability to suppress public dissent.[1] The bill targets unspecified “fake news” on social media and only applies to social media accounts with over 90,000 followers.[2]
The regime could define anti-regime statements or unapproved narratives
as “fake news” to suppress regime dissidents. The “fake news“ bill is
the latest of several security-related pieces of legislation that
Parliament has approved since the conclusion of the war, which is
consistent with the regime’s efforts to securitize Iranian society
following the war.[3] Parliament approved an espionage bill on June 29 that targets suspected spies or individuals aiding hostile states.[4]
The regime could use the espionage bill to target any Iranian who
opposes the regime, similar to the “fake news” bill. The Guardian
Council still needs to approve the espionage bill in order for it to
become law. Parliament separately passed a bill on July 2 to suspend
Iranian cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
which could undermine moderate pro-negotiations officials’ ability to
comply with foreign demands for Iran to cooperate with the IAEA.[5]
The Iranian Parliament regularly passes legislation, including
legislation related to security, but the rate at which it has done so
following the war is anomalous and may reflect Parliament’s efforts to
play a more significant role in shaping Iranian security policy.
Iranian
President Masoud Pezeshkian’s cabinet withdrew the “fake news” bill
from Parliament on July 30, which highlights the fissures between
moderate and hardliner elements in the Iranian political sphere.[6] The decision to withdraw the bill may also reflect government concerns that the legislation could trigger popular unrest. Pezeskhian’s cabinet withdrew the bill to maintain “national unity,” according to the Iranian government spokesperson.[7]
The Government Information Council head separately stated that
Pezeshkian’s cabinet withdrew the bill in order to avoid causing
“concern and discomfort” to the Iranian people.[8]
The decision comes after the justice minister, legal experts, and civil
society members reviewed the bill on July 30 upon Pezeshkian’s request
and amid criticism from reformist and moderate factions that the bill
would further erode trust between the regime and the Iranian people.[9] Iranian hardliners, who comprise the majority of Parliament, will likely oppose Pezeshkian’s decision to withdraw the bill.
The United States is reportedly pressuring the Lebanese Council of Ministers to vote on a resolution to disarm Hezbollah. The
United States and Lebanon have exchanged multiple proposals to disarm
Hezbollah during ongoing negotiations over the past six weeks but have
unable not been able to reach an agreement.[10]
The Lebanese government gave US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack an updated
proposal during his visit to Beirut in early July, which Israel
rejected.[11]
Five unspecified sources told Reuters on July 29 that the United States
will no longer engage in direct negotiations or “pressure Israel” to
stop operations in Lebanon until the Lebanese Council of Ministers votes
on a resolution that commits the Lebanese government to disarming
Hezbollah.[12] The 24-member Council of Ministers is Lebanon’s executive body that sets and implements the Lebanese government’s policies.[13] A council decision would make Hezbollah’s
disarmament Lebanese state policy and publicly affirm the government’s
commitment to do so. Unspecified political sources told Lebanese media
that French President Emmanuel Macron advised Salam to hold a council
session to pass a resolution to monopolize the state’s arms during their July 24 meeting.[14]
Lebanese
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam is attempting to obtain support for a
disarmament resolution from Hezbollah and the Amal Movement before
convening the council for a vote, which will likely further stall
US-Lebanon negotiations given that Hezbollah continues to refuse to
disarm. Unspecified sources told Lebanese media that Salam is avoiding convening the council before obtaining an internal disarmament agreement with Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, which is a close ally of Hezbollah.[15]
Salam agreed to hold a council session on August 5 to discuss Hezbollah
disarmament, but Lebanese sources have indicated that no decision will
be made at the session.[16]
It is unlikely that Hezbollah would support a resolution that calls
for its disarmament given its persistent rejection of calls to disarm.
Hezbollah has long used ongoing Israeli operations in Lebanon and the
1989 Taif Agreement to justify its retention of weapons.[17]
The Taif Agreement calls for the disarmament of all Lebanese militias
except Hezbollah and states that Lebanon would take all necessary steps
“to liberate all Lebanese territories from [Israel].”[18]
Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem has persistently rejected calls
for the group to disarm and said on July 30 that supporters of
disarmament “serve the Israeli project.”[19]
Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri suggested on
July 25 that recent Israeli operations in Lebanon and southern Syria
have reinforced Hezbollah’s fears that Israel will remain in Lebanon and
continue to pose a challenge to Hezbollah.[20]
Iran
may be trying to replace its US-owned Global Positioning System (GPS)
with the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) BeiDou satellite navigation
system.[21] Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on July 30
that repeated GPS disruptions during the recent Israel-Iran War,
especially in the Persian Gulf, have led Iran to seek China’s BeiDou
navigation system.[22]
The Iranian Information and Communications Technology Ministry
confirmed on July 14 that the Iranian government deliberately jammed GPS
signals inside Iran.[23]
IRGC-affiliated media added on July 30 that Iran’s acquisition of
BeiDou would represent a step toward strategic and “technological
independence.”[24]
The report claimed that US-Israeli strikes exposed Iran’s GPS as a
vulnerability and framed Iran’s interest in BeiDou as part of a broader
effort to challenge “Western digital hegemony.”[25]
Iran’s
interest in BeiDou is part of a broader increase in Iranian military
and defense cooperation with the PRC following the war.[26]
Iranian Deputy Information and Communications Technology Minister Ehsan
Chitsaz stated on July 14 that Iran is pursuing cooperation with the
PRC within the framework of the 25-year Iran-PRC strategic agreement and
noted that BeiDou was one of the main issues that Iranian and Chinese
officials discussed during negotiations to reach that agreement.[27] Iran has also reportedly sought to acquire PRC military assets, including J-10 fighter jets and advanced AWACS systems.[28] CTP-ISW cannot verify these reports. The BeiDou system provides navigation to aircraft, submarines, and missiles.[29]
A US-based think tank previously reported that the PRC uses
BeiDou-aided guidance for short-range ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles, and long-range guided rockets.[30]
Iran may seek to use the BeiDou system in similar Iranian weapons
systems, particularly to improve the accuracy of short-range ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. PRC media previously reported
that the BeiDou satellite navigation system is most effective with
missiles with ranges under 500 kilometers.[31]
Key Takeaways
- Iranian Securitization Efforts: The
Iranian Parliament appears to be trying to play an influential role in
shaping Iranian security policy following the Israel-Iran War by
supporting and approving security-related legislation at an anomalously
high rate. This legislation includes a bill that Parliament approved on
July 27 that would further expand the regime’s ability to suppress
public dissent. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s cabinet withdrew
this bill from Parliament on July 30, which highlights the fissures
between moderate and hardliner elements in the Iranian regime. - Hezbollah Disarmament: The
United States is reportedly pressuring the Lebanese Council of
Ministers to vote on a resolution to disarm Hezbollah. Lebanese Prime
Minister Nawaf Salam is attempting to obtain support for a disarmament
resolution from Hezbollah and the Amal Movement before convening the
council for a vote, which will likely further stall US-Lebanon
negotiations given that Hezbollah continues to refuse to disarm. - Iran-China Military Cooperation:
Iran may be trying to replace its US-owned Global Positioning System
(GPS) with the PRC’s BeiDou satellite navigation system. Iran’s interest
in BeiDou is part of a broader increase in Iranian military and defense
cooperation with the PRC following the war.
Iran
Iranian
armed forces-run Defa Press published an article on July 30 that
praised Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s leadership during the 12-day
Israel-Iran War.[32] The article described Khamenei as an “architect of national cohesion” and “leader of strategic rationality.”[33]
The article praised Khamenei for rapidly replacing senior military
commanders whom Israel killed during the war and preventing a
“decision-making vacuum.”[34]
The article also noted that Khamenei confronted the war’s
“psychological, media, cognitive, and diplomatic fronts” and effectively
reassured the Iranian people.[35]
This article notably follows reports of efforts to sideline Khamenei
amid his prolonged absence from public view during the war.[36]
It
is possible that the Defa Press article was a response to a July 29
Nour News op-ed that called on the Iranian regime to alter its internal
and external strategy following the war.[37]
Nour News has historically been affiliated with the Supreme National
Security Council (SNSC) broadly but has recently aligned itself
increasingly with former SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani. The op-ed argued
that Iran’s threat environment has changed after the war and urged Iran
to “rearrange the country’s decision-making system.”[38]The
op-ed proposed the creation of a “Strategic Command Center” with
“cross-sectoral authority” to coordinate between “security, economic,
and diplomatic centers” and develop rapid responses to evolving threats.[39]The
Defa Press article may be a rejection of the proposal for a new
decision-making institution by arguing that Khamenei effectively led
Iran’s military efforts while also effectively overseeing Iran’s “soft
war” efforts during the recent conflict. “Soft war” is a term that
Iranian leaders use to refer to the West’s alleged use of nonmilitary
means, such as economic and psychological pressure and information
operations, to erode the regime’s legitimacy, cultivate domestic
opposition, and propagate Western values in Iran.[40]
The Nour News article also advocated for a transition from “reactive
security” to “proactive security” to address future threats.[41]
The Defa Press article, contrastingly, argued that Iran was not in a
“position of reaction” but in a position of “setting the stage” during
the recent war.[42]
Iranian
Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali discussed media cooperation with
Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova in Moscow on July
30, likely to discuss efforts to counter Western reporting about Iran
and Russia.[43]
Iranian media reported that Jalali and Zakharova discussed “strategies
to combat fake news.” Jalali reportedly condemned Axios for spreading
“lies” about Russo-Iranian relations, possibly referring to a July 12
report that Russian President Vladimir Putin had encouraged Iranian
officials to accept the US demand for zero uranium enrichment.[44] Russia serves as a model for Iran in the cognitive warfare space.[45]
Moscow’s engagement with Iran is consistent with Russia’s engagement
with other allied states, such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC),
to coordinate messaging on key issues, particularly Russia’s war in
Ukraine.[46]
Jalali and Zakharova’s meeting takes place as Iranian leaders are
taking steps to further crack down on the Iranian information space. The
Iranian Parliament recently introduced a bill that would penalize
social media users who spread “fake news,” for example.[47]
Iran’s worsening water crisis has reportedly triggered protests in at least two cities across Iran since July 22.
Anti-regime media published footage on July 29 of a large protest in
Khomam, Gilan Province, that featured chants such as “water and
electricity are cut off, this happens every day” and “we don’t want
incompetent officials.”[48] Security forces reportedly violently suppressed the protest.[49] A similar protest against water shortages reportedly took place in Sabzevar, Khorasan Razavi Province, on July 22.[50]
Iran’s
water crisis has continued to worsen and may lead to further protests.
Iranian Energy Minister Abbas Aliabadi stated on July 26 that 30 out of
Iran’s 31 provinces are facing “water stress.”[51]
Tehran Province Governor Mohammad Sadegh Motamedi said on July 25 that
four of the dams that supply the province with water are 13 percent
full. Certain areas of Tehran are reportedly experiencing water outages
for up to 12 hours a day.[52]
A resident of Bushehr in southwestern Iran told Western media that
Bushehr residents only have access to running water for a few hours per
day.[53]
Water shortages have become increasingly common in Iran in recent years
due to industrial expansion, climate change, and sanctions.[54] Tehran Province has entered its fifth straight year of drought, according to Iranian state media.[55] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian warned in a cabinet meeting on July 19 that the water crisis requires “urgent action.”[56]
The Iranian regime is likely concerned that water shortages could cause
further internal unrest. Water shortages in Khuzestan and Esfahan
provinces in 2021 and Sistan and Baluchistan Province in 2023 previously
triggered protests.[57]
Iraq
Nothing significant to report.
Syria
The Syrian and Iraqi interior ministries dismantled a Captagon smuggling network in Damascus on July 30.[58] The Syrian Interior Ministry seized 1.35 million Captagon pills and arrested several individuals.[59] A Syrian source assessed that the pills were likely bound for Iraq.[60] The Syrian and Iraqi interior ministries shared intelligence during the operation.[61]
This operation marks the first time that the Syrian and Iraqi interior
ministries have collaborated on anti-narcotics since the fall of the
Assad regime in December 2024.[62]
The Syrian Interior Ministry previously conducted joint anti-narcotics
operations with Turkey along the Turkish-Syrian border in May 2025 and
with Saudi Arabia in June 2025.[63] Captagon was one of the largest sources of income for the Assad regime and Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah.[64]
Arabian Peninsula
The Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting Ben Gurion Airport in Israel on July 29.[65] The Israeli Air Force (IAF) intercepted the Houthi missile before it crossed into Israeli territory.[66]
The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles
targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an
economic blockade on Israel in October 2023.[67]
Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
See topline section.
[1]
https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/05/3362752;
https://www.dw.com/fa-ir/%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-%D9%84%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AD%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C/a-73442200
[2] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/05/3362752; https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1080365/
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-1-2025
[4] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/08/3344834
[5] https://amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/iranian-hardline-daily-stirs-trouble-as-trump-s-shifts-confuse-tehran; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/25/irans-parliament-approves-bill-to-suspend-cooperation-with-iaea ;
https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/31/middleeast/iran-nuclear-weapons-watchdog-report-intl ;
https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1938173802958995930 ; https://x.com/PressTV/status/1938204404081156141; https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-cooperation-8bbdc81b9199d8d179d0fb2e1b8dac2a
[6] https://x.com/F_Mohajerani/status/1950419853581619493
[7] https://x.com/F_Mohajerani/status/1950419853581619493
[8] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/05/08/3364864/
[9] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/877316; https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1080541/; https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1080416
[10] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5169830-us-pressures-lebanon-issue-cabinet-decision-disarm-hezbollah-talks-continue
[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-pressures-lebanon-issue-cabinet-decision-disarm-hezbollah-before-talks-2025-07-29/
[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-pressures-lebanon-issue-cabinet-decision-disarm-hezbollah-before-talks-2025-07-29/
[13] https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/08/middleeast/lebanon-prime-minister-new-government-intl
[14] https://www.reutersconnect.com/item/french-president-macron-meets-lebanese-prime-minister-salam-in-paris/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjU6bmV3c21sX1JDMlpTRkE3M1BEVA
; https://www.naharnet dot
com/stories/en/314486-report-salam-seeks-prior-agreement-from-shiite-duo-on-cabinet-session-tackling-hezbollah-arms
[15]
https://www.naharnet dot
com/stories/en/314486-report-salam-seeks-prior-agreement-from-shiite-duo-on-cabinet-session-tackling-hezbollah-arms
[16] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/314487-cabinet-to-meet-tuesday-on-arms-as-israel-reportedly-rejects-lebanese-response
[17] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/06/how-hezbollah-holds-sway-over-lebanese-state/05-influence-over-military-and-security
[18] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201022-remembering-the-taif-accord/ ; https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/06/how-hezbollah-holds-sway-over-lebanese-state/05-influence-over-military-and-security
[19] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-chief-rejects-disarmament-pressure-lebanon-grows-2025-07-30/
[20] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/851856/توم-براك-في-زيارته-الثالثة–1–وقائع-من–الاجتماع-الوحيد–وض
[21] https://www.aljazeera dot com/opinions/2025/7/27/irans-plan-to-abandon-gps-is-about-much-more-than-technology ;
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202507149948
[22] https://snn dot ir/fa/news/1290226
[23] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202507149948 ;
https://fararu dot com/fa/news/887238/ ;
https://hammihanonline
dot
ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D9%81%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C-36/42687-%D8%AF%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AC%DB%8C-%D9%BE%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA
[24] https://snn dot ir/fa/news/1290226
[25] https://snn dot ir/fa/news/1290226
[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2025 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-29-2025
[27]
https://www.didbaniran dot
ir/بخش-سیاسی-3/230360-معاون-وزیر-ارتباطات-gps-تحت-کنترل-وزارت-دفاع-آمریکاست-از-نسخه-چینی-استفاده-می-کنیم
ک
https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1400/01/08/2475887/
[28]
https://www.scmp dot
com/news/china/military/article/3315901/chinas-dong-jun-hosts-iran-defence-minister-and-others-warship-condemns-hegemony?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection
;
http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/qwfb/16393377.html
https://armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2025/intelligence-iran-seeks-to-acquire-chinese-j-10c-fighter-jets-to-counter-israeli-f-35i-superiority
[29]
https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/the-economic-and-military-impact-of-chinas-beidou-navigation-system/#:~:text=There%20are%20also%20clear%20security,its%20allies%20seek%20to%20intervene.
[30] https://jamestown.org/program/putting-precision-in-operations-beidou-satellite-navigation-system/
[31] https://club.6parkbbs dot com/military/index.php?app=forum&act=threadview&tid=16327174
[32] www.defapress dot ir/fa/news/766279
[33] www.defapress dot ir/fa/news/766279
[34] www.defapress dot ir/fa/news/766279
[35] www.defapress dot ir/fa/news/766279
[36] https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2025/06/inside-plot-push-khamenei-aside/683286/ ; https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-war-nuclear-06-26-2025-d09bf2282deea3b2edd63f29c867c058
[37] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/237258/
[38] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/237258/
[39] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/237258/
[40] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/The-Soft-War-Understanding-Irans-Domestic-Ideological-Crisis.pdf?x85095
[41] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/237258/
[42] www.defapress dot ir/fa/news/766279
[43] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/08/3365150
[44] https://www.axios.com/2025/07/12/putin-iran-nuclear-deal-uranium-enrichment
[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare
[46] https://www.bna dot bh/en/news?cms=q8FmFJgiscL2fwIzON1%2BDq1DmNG%2BG11Pd48y9TLpRtg%3D
https://www.documentcloud dot org/documents/23558638-china-russia-media-cooperation-agreement-july-2021/;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-expanding-media-conglomerate ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-16
[47] https://x.com/F_Mohajerani/status/1950419853581619493; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/05/3362752
[48] https://x.com/ManotoNews/status/1950138719639355581
[49] https://x.com/ManotoNews/status/1950138719639355581
[50] https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1947749209483948462 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-24-2025#_edne698157fecb1bbe6f8db70462a6c910157
[51] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1404050603263
[52] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/05/3363407 ; https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/516164/Power-cuts-water-shortage-amid-scorching-summer
[53] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/26/world/middleeast/iran-water-crisis-drought.html
[54] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-28/iran-faces-another-water-crisis-as-drought-strains-supply?srnd=phx-green
[55] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85899505
[56] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/22/iran-limit-water-temperature-50c-and-reservoirs-depleted-extreme-heat-drought
[57] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/26/world/middleeast/iran-water-crisis-drought.html
[58] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1950580385529696378 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/25168
[59] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1950587766502232329
[60] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1950587766502232329
[61] https://x.com/AlekhbariahSY/status/1950587701398565348
[62] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1950587766502232329
[63] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1923328051724640677 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1937938122496491972
[64] https://www.dw dot com/en/syrias-dictator-is-gone-but-his-drug-dealers-are-still-busy/a-72033154
[65] https://t.me/army21ye/3239
[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1950249453811593684
[67] https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/12/briefing-on-developments-related-to-houthi-attacks-on-israel.php
; https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-houthis-have-launched-40-missiles-320-drones-at-israel-since-start-of-war/