Iran Update, May 8, 2025

We do not report in detail on war crimes
because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not
directly affect the military operations we are assessing and
forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict
and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we
do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of
Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new
transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups,
have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the
Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these
extrajudicial killings.

Houthi Supreme Leader
Abdulmalik al Houthi acknowledged the US–Houthi ceasefire but reiterated
that the Houthi movement will continue to support Hamas against
Israel.[1] Abdulmalik’s statements demonstrate how the Houthis
view the Red Sea attack campaign as one element of a broader Houthi
strategic effort to pressure Israel to end its campaign in the Gaza
Strip. The ceasefire secures an end to maritime shipping attacks, but
the Houthis will continue to fire on other Israeli economic targets in
pursuit of the same objectives. The Houthis have already shifted to
targeting Israeli airports, for example. Abdulmalik framed the ceasefire
as a victory against the United States. Abdulmalik implied that the
ceasefire would not be permanent by adding that “when” the United States
gets involved in a “third round” of airstrikes, the Houthis will
confront the United States again.[2] The Houthis could resume attacks at
any time and for any reason they choose.

Air campaigns
targeting the Houthis can have only temporary military effects because
the Houthis can rebuild damaged infrastructure after the end of the
campaign.[3] The United States conducted at least 32 airstrikes
targeting Houthi oil offloading infrastructure at Ras Issa Port between
April 2 and May 5.[4] This initially created fuel shortages and posed
challenges for both the Houthis’ military operations and separately
civil service provision in Houthi-controlled territories, but the
Houthis gradually learned techniques to ensure service continuity
despite the airstrikes.[5] The US airstrikes on April 17 targeting Ras
Issa Port alone cost the Houthis approximately $700 million worth of
damage, according to a Yemeni economist.[6] The Yemeni Oil Company
announced on May 8 that they have successfully repaired the Ras Issa Oil
Port’s filling platforms and would restore fuel distribution to all
their stations within 24 hours, which demonstrates that even serious
damage can be rapidly fixed.[7] Cargo ships have also reportedly resumed
offloading operations at Ras Issa Port.[8] Even the best-designed air
campaigns can only achieve temporary effects that must be sustained
through other means.

International shipping companies are
reluctant to return to Red Sea routes despite the US–Houthi ceasefire
agreement, which demonstrates the limited economic and strategic impact
of the most recent US air campaign against the Houthis.[9] Shipping
companies are still “assessing the deal” and remain deeply skeptical
about returning to the Red Sea routes because of the ambiguity of the
ceasefire terms, according to the Wall Street Journal on May
8.[10] This includes whether the truce applies broadly to commercial
shipping or just US vessels.[11] Other regional events, such as a strike
on Iran’s nuclear facilities, could prompt the Houthis to target
international shipping again in the future if the Houthis see a benefit
in doing so. The Houthis claimed a likely Iranian attack targeting Saudi
Arabia in 2019 during the 2019 US-Iran escalation, demonstrating that
the Houthis will sometimes support Iran’s regional objectives even at
risk to the Houthi movement.[12] The US airstrikes only addressed the
tactical manifestations of the Houthi threat to the freedom of
navigation in the Red Sea rather than resolving the underlying strategic
and political drivers motivating the Houthis’ campaign. The Wall Street
Journal added that industry experts expect it could
take months to restore shipping confidence.[13] The persistent risk that
the Houthis could disrupt global maritime commerce for months–if not
years–at a time underscores the seriousness of the Houthi strategic and
economic threat.

Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al
Shara reportedly wants to discuss a broad economic reconstruction plan
with US President Donald Trump, likely in part to secure US sanctions
relief for Syria.[14] Unspecified Syrian transitional
government officials told the Wall Street Journal on May 7 that Syrian
President Ahmed al Shara wants to meet US President Donald Trump to
discuss broad US investment and aid to rebuild Syria.[15] Shara
reportedly requested to meet with Trump during Trump’s upcoming Gulf
visit through US businessman and liquified natural gas (LNG) company CEO
Jonathan Bass and Syrian Emergency Task Force head Mouaz Moustafa.[16]
Bass and Moustafa met with Shara in Damascus on May 2 and presented him
with a plan for Western firms to invest in Syria’s energy industry.[17]
Syria has significant oil and gas infrastructure that needs to be
rebuilt or updated after over a decade of civil war.[18] Bass and
Moustafa said that Shara “responded favorably” to the idea of the United
States’ waiving or lessening sanctions in order to make the investment
possible.[19] An unspecified senior Syrian Foreign Affairs official
confirmed Shara’s interest by telling Western media that Syria seeks a
relationship with the United States that includes “energy and economic
ties.”[20] Bass said that Shara and Syrian officials were also
interested in participation from US companies in all areas of Syrian
reconstruction.[21] The Trump administration has not yet acknowledged
Shara’s reported request.

Shara’s proposal may seek to obtain full
sanctions relief from the United States by offering investment in
Syria. Shara will find it hard to meet all of the Trump administration’s
“confidence-building measures,” and could view possible investment in
Syria’s energy sector as a bargaining chip.[22] The United States under
the first Trump administration previously sought to allow US companies
to invest in energy infrastructure in northeastern Syria, and Shara
could calculate that a similar scheme would help him obtain sanctions
relief.[23] US sanctions that have been in place since the fall of the
Assad regime currently prevent direct US economic involvement in Syria.
Shara and Syrian transitional government officials have attempted to
attain partial or full US sanctions relief since assuming power in
December 2024 and have communicated back and forth about several
“confidence-building” conditions that the US requested that Syria
observe.[24] The Syrian government said that it plans to fully address
most of the US demands, including the destruction of remaining chemical
weapons stockpiles and the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to
find missing US citizen Austin Tice.[25] The government has also taken
tangible steps to honor the US request that it limit Palestinian
military and political activity in Syria.[26] Shara is likely unwilling
to act on the US condition that he bar foreign fighters from senior
government positions, however, given that this condition would require
him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him.[27] Shara said
on May 8 during a press conference in Paris that his government
guarantees that foreign fighters will not pose a threat to neighboring
countries, which suggests that he does not plan to remove them from the
current Syrian army ranks or offices.[28] Shara could calculate that a
counter-proposal that creates opportunities for US industry in Syria
could mitigate his unwillingness to fully observe all the US conditions
and still secure sanction relief on Syria.

Syrian
officials may also be attempting to exploit perceived US interest in
curtailing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) influence abroad in
order to secure US sanctions relief and economic support. Unspecified
Syrian government officials described Shara’s proposal as a “Marshall
Plan-style” program in which US and other Western companies would invest
in Syria’s reconstruction instead of China or other powers, according
to the Wall Street Journal.[29] That the Syrian officials reportedly
specified that Shara would be willing to exclude China suggests that the
Syrian government may be attempting to exploit a perceived US interest
in curbing the PRC’s influence abroad in order to spur US interest and
investment in Syria. Bass said that Shara wants “Boeing” and “US
telecom” and not “Huawei,” referring to the Chinese telecommunications
company that has invested heavily in partnerships in the Middle
East.[30]

Recent steps by the Syrian government suggest that it
seeks to develop genuine economic partnerships with US adversaries like
China and Russia if it cannot secure sanctions relief and economic
assistance elsewhere, however. The Syrian government most recently
hosted PRC officials on March 27 and discussed “enhancing cooperation,”
which CTP-ISW assessed was likely related to securing Chinese support
for the transition.[31] Shara and the Syrian transport minister have met
with Chinese transport and medical manufacturing businessmen to discuss
Chinese investment in Syria within the past week.[32] The Syrian
government also reinitiated Syria’s economic ties with Russia in recent
months. Russia has delivered Syrian currency and Russian oil to Syria,
and Russia also reportedly seeks to re-negotiate Russian investment
contracts for phosphate mines and oil fields in the central Syrian
desert.[33] Both PRC and Russian officials have made it clear that they
seek to increase involvement in Syria. Chinese President Xi Jinping and
Russian President Vladimir Putin released a joint statement on May 8
following a press conference in Moscow that emphasized Russian and
Chinese support for Syria’s “sovereignty, independence, and territorial
integrity.”[34]

A Qatari-backed initiative will provide
Syria with civil sector salary support after the US Treasury Department
reportedly granted Qatar a sanctions exemption.[35] Reuters
originally reported that the Treasury Department granted the sanctions
exemption, but the United States has not yet confirmed the sanctions
exemption.[36] The Qatari-backed grant initiative will
provide Syria with $27 million monthly for three months to pay the
salaries of select civilian public sector workers.[37] An unspecified
Syrian financial source told Western media that the grant is conditional
and will not apply to Syrian Defense Ministry or Interior Ministry
personnel.[38] The Syrian government previously announced in January
2025 that it would raise public sector salaries by 400% the following
month, but has yet to do so due to a lack of funding.[39] The
unspecified Syrian source said that the Qatari funding will help
implement this salary raise over the next several months and that the
Syrian government would acquire other funds for employees excluded from
the initiative.[40] Qatar had previously delayed this initiative in late
February 2025 due to uncertainty over whether the funding would breach
US sanctions.[41] Syrian Finance Minister Mohammad Yasser Barniyeh
welcomed the exemption and said that the Syrian government hopes it will
be followed by further measures to ease sanctions.[42] Barniyeh is an
economist trained at Damascus, Kansas State, and Oklahoma State
universities before working for the Arab Monetary Fund.[43] Barniyeh
participated in the liberalization of the Assad regime’s economy in the
early 2000s, when he served on the Syrian Commission on Financial
Markets and the Damascus Securities Exchange.[44]

Senior
Iranian military officials inspected a military facility in southern
Iran, likely as part of preparations for a potential US or Israeli
strike on Iran. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Commander Major General Hossein Salami and IRGC Navy Commander Rear
Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri inspected an underground drone hangar in
Hormozgan Province on May 8.[45] Salami threatened to attack any country
that supports an attack on Iran. Footage of the base during the visit
showed Iranian Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 drones. Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5
drones have a range of 200 and 480 km, respectively.[46] The precise
location of the facility is unclear, but the inspection of a base
hosting drones that has the range to target most of the Persian Gulf
from the southern Iranian coast suggests that Iranian officers were
inspecting units and reviewing plans for post-strike responses in the
Persian Gulf region. Hormozgan Province lies along Iran‘s southern
coast. The visit follows a series of similar inspections at Iranian
military and defense sites in Hormozgan and the surrounding
provinces.[47] Senior military officers often visit units and facilities
under their command as part of their preparations for major defensive
and offensive operations to ensure that their commands are
well-prepared. IRGC-affiliated media also published old footage on May 8
that showed an Iranian Mohajer-6 drone surveilling the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower
aircraft carrier.[48] Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General
Hamid Vahedi separately claimed on May 8 that Iran equipped all of its
fighter jets with long-range munitions and updated navigation
systems.[49] Most Iranian fighter jets are Cold War third- and
fourth-generation aircraft like the F4 Phantom and F14 Tomcat. These
threats follow new US threats to attack Iran. US President Donald Trump
stated on May 7 that he wants to “blow up” Iran’s nuclear centrifuges
either “nicely” through an agreement with Iran or “viciously.”[50]

An
attempted Iranian attack on the Israeli embassy in London highlights
the unconventional ways through which Iran has and will likely continue
to attempt to impose costs on Israel. UK authorities arrested
eight Iranian nationals on May 4 after foiling a suspected
Iranian-directed terror plot to target the Israeli Embassy in
London.[51] The Guardian reported on May 8 that the UK police
conducted its largest raid across the country due to threats of a
suspected terror plot.[52] UK MI5 assessed that the plot had reached an
“advanced but not imminent” stage and detained the suspects. Iranian
Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi denied Iranian involvement in
the terror plot and called for diplomacy.[53] It is possible that the
Iranian IRGC did not notify Araghchi about this plot. The IRGC has
previously failed to notify other government bodies about its
operations.[54] Iran has historically relied on unconventional methods
to impose costs on Israel, including conducting terror attacks on
Israeli diplomatic and civilian targets abroad. This recent Iranian plot
in the UK does not represent an inflection in Iranian activity but is
part of a decades-long strategy that includes assassination and bombing
plots against Israeli interests in Argentina, Cyprus, Turkey, Georgia,
Greece, and Azerbaijan.[55] Iranian officials and Iranian media have
previously suggested that Iran may attack Israeli diplomatic facilities
in response to the Israeli airstrike near the Iranian embassy in
Damascus in April 2024.[56] Iranian officials have also repeatedly
warned that Iran will conduct a third missile attack on Israel.[57]
Israeli strikes on Iran in October 2024 damaged Iranian long-range
missile production, which suggests that Iran‘s ability to respond
militarily using its missile stockpile may be somewhat constrained. Iran
can still impose costs on Israel by attacking Israeli diplomatic
targets in the region and beyond, however.[58]

Key Takeaways:

• Houthis Respond to Ceasefire: Houthi
  Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi acknowledged the US–Houthi
  ceasefire but reiterated that the Houthi movement will continue to
  support Hamas against Israel. Air campaigns targeting the Houthis can
  have only temporary military effects because the Houthis can rebuild
  damaged infrastructure after the end of the campaign. International
  shipping companies are reluctant to return to Red Sea routes despite the
  US–Houthi ceasefire agreement, which demonstrates the limited economic
  and strategic impact of the most recent US air campaign against the
  Houthis.
• Syria and Sanctions Relief: Syrian
  Transitional President Ahmed al Shara reportedly wants to discuss a
  broad economic reconstruction plan with US President Donald Trump,
  likely in part to secure US sanctions relief for Syria.
• Syrian Salaries: A
  Qatari-backed initiative will provide Syria with civil sector salary
  support after the US Treasury Department reportedly granted Qatar a
  sanctions exemption.
• Iranian Officers Inspect Military Facilities: Senior
  Iranian military officials inspected a military facility in southern
  Iran, likely as part of preparations for a potential US or Israeli
  strike on Iran.
• Iranian Terrorist Operations in the United Kingdom:
  An attempted Iranian attack on the Israeli embassy in London highlights
  the unconventional ways through which Iran has and will likely continue
  to attempt to impose costs on Israel.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian rial depreciated from 828,500 rials to one US dollar on May 7 to 831,000 rials to one US dollar on May 8.[59]

Iranian
Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Indian officials in
New Delhi, India, on May 8 to discuss India-Pakistan tensions and
bilateral economic cooperation.[60] Araghchi met with Indian
President Droupadi Murmu and Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam
Jaishankar.[61] Araghchi and Jaishankar discussed the implementation of
the May 2024 ten-year Chabahar cooperation agreement.[62] The agreement
outlines the development of Iran’s southeastern Chabahar port to
facilitate trade between Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asian countries,
which effectively bypasses Pakistani ports.[63] India was the second
largest importer of Iranian oil before the US maximum pressure campaign
in 2018.[64] Araghchi also met with Pakistani officials in Pakistan on
May 5.[65] This series of meetings comes amid military escalation between India and Pakistan.[66]

Supreme
National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian stated that
direct negotiations under “threat or coercion” are irrational and
dishonorable but that negotiations in “equal, pressure-free conditions”
are “rational and honorable.”[67] Ahmadian’s remarks may lay
the ground for justifying direct negotiations with the United States.
Ahmadian’s remarks follow an Israeli report on May 7 that Iranian
Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi approached US Special Envoy to
the Middle East Steve Witkoff to request direct US-Iran negotiations,
reportedly due to Iran’s frustration with the slow progress of
Omani-mediated talks.[68] The fourth round of US-Iran talks, initially
scheduled for May 3, was postponed due to “logistical reasons.”[69]

Syria

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) opened a field hospital for Druze civilians in Hader, Quneitra Province, on May 8.[70]
The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson announced that the field hospital
is part of the IDF’s efforts to support the Syrian Druze population.[71]
The IDF has been operating in Hader since December 2024.[72] The
establishment of an IDF field hospital in Hader follows Israel’s efforts
to pressure the Syrian transitional government to halt sectarian
violence against the Syrian Druze community.[73]

The Syrian and Iraqi governments continued to strengthen border security on both sides of the northern Syria-Iraq border.[74]
The Syrian Interior Ministry began to recruit new members for the
General Directorate of Border Guards on May 8.[75] The Syrian Defense
Ministry recently deployed forces to the Iraqi border on April 18 to
tighten control and curb illegal smuggling activities.[76] Syrian media
also reported on May 7 that the Iraqi Army deployed new unspecified
military units along the border across from the Syrian towns of Albu
Kamal and Baghouz.[77] The Iraqi Army previously deployed the 34th
Armored Brigade’s 1st Tank Battalion, which operates under the 9th
Armored Division, to the Iraq-Syria border on April 16.[78] Iraqi
Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari said in an interview on May 6
that the Iraqi federal government has had no security coordination with
the Syrian Interior Ministry yet.[79]

Iraq

Iraqi
media reported that a “high-level” Shia Coordination Framework
delegation will discuss multiple “key” issues with Iranian officials
from May 8 to 9, including the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi
parliamentary elections.[80] The Shia Coordination Framework is
a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. A
Shia Coordination Framework source stated that the delegation
represents all Shia Coordination Framework components and is authorized
to “reach an understanding with Tehran on certain [unspecified] issues
of mutual understanding.”[81] Iran reportedly sent a message to Shia
Coordination Framework leaders on April 30 that called on the Shia
Coordination Framework to remain unified ahead of the upcoming
elections. Iran‘s message likely aims to increase the
likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the
Iraqi government.[82] A fragmented Shia Coordination Framework could
allow smaller, less organized parties to outperform Iranian-backed
parties.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani and
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed multiple memoranda of
understanding (MOU) during bilateral talks in Ankara, Turkey, on May
8.[83] The MoUs focused on multiple areas, including defense
manufacturing and counter-narcotics. Sudani emphasized the importance of
Iraq-Turkey security and counterterrorism cooperation and welcomed
efforts to disarm the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) during a press
conference with Erdogan.[84] Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan agreed in
February 2025 to form a strategic alliance to counter the Islamic
State.[85]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

See topline section.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing Significant to Report.

CTP-ISW
will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We
have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran’s nuclear
program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its
networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given
that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas’ military organization
and severed the group’s ability to resupply itself, we are now focused
on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah
and Hamas through Syria.

The Iran Update provides
insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It
also covers events and trends that affect the stability and
decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project
(CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the
Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional
events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the
unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East
since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational
coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that
cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself
to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these
groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support
in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions.
Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian
direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited
influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand
strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling
American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state,
or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance
to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3478139.htm

[2] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3478139.htm

[3] https://x.com/ypcye/status/1920388873915355381

[4] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907498123565453467 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912942033763004448 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916213258056335479 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1918360758649344161 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1918403660272324682 ;

https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1919099222781006166 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919496900392165504

[5] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1919089443178213687 ;https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1919385020013170971

[6] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1913172913831727220

[7] https://x.com/ypcye/status/1920388873915355381

[8]
https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1920404660914933860 ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/seafarers-stranded-off-yemen-port-eye-exit-after-us-houthi-ceasefire-deal-2025-05-08/

[9] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-houthis-truce-shipping-industry-a3b01ecf?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1

[10] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-houthis-truce-shipping-industry-a3b01ecf?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1

[11] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-houthis-truce-shipping-industry-a3b01ecf?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1

[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/iran-file/iran-file-october-7-2019

[13] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-houthis-truce-shipping-industry-a3b01ecf?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1

[14] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0

[15] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0

[16] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0

[17]
www dot sana.sy/en/?p=354232;
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0

[18]

https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/011725-feature-syria-seeks-to-rebuild-oil-and-gas-industry-but-needs-western-backing#:~:text=However%2C%20Syria’s%20oil%20and%20gas,former%20dictator%20Bashar%20al%2DAssad.

[19] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0

[20] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0

[21] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0

[22] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25

[23]

https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-we-left-troops-behind-in-syria-only-for-the-oil;

https://www.kuow.org/stories/fact-check-president-trump-s-plans-for-syrian-oil

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-7-2025

[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-letter-delivers-response-us-conditions-sanctions-relief-2025-04-26

[26]

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-letter-delivers-response-us-conditions-sanctions-relief-2025-04-26
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-22-2025 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025

[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-26-2025

[28]
https://www.enabbaladi dot
net/752795/الشرع-لا-يتخلى-عن-المقاتلين-الأجانب-في ;
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[29] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0

[30]

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0
;
https://gulfnews.com/business/huawei-is-scoring-5g-and-cloud-wins-in-middle-east–next-it-wants-to-do-green-1.87244763
; https://restofworld.org/2025/china-cloud-middle-east/

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-27-2025

[32] https://t.me/SyPresidency/890; https://sana dot sy/?p=2213826

[33]
https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1890343048099303916;
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-ships-diesel-syria-tanker-under-us-sanctions-data-shows-2025-03-06;

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/russia-is-chasing-a-deal-to-keep-its-military-bases-in-syria-f9f6ca6e?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1
; https://www.ft.com/content/30ddfdd0-b83e-11e9-96bd-8e884d3ea203

[34] https://ria dot ru/20250508/siriya-2015806365.html;

[35] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-financing-syrian-salaries-gets-us-go-ahead-sources-say-2025-05-07

[36] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-financing-syrian-salaries-gets-us-go-ahead-sources-say-2025-05-07

[37]

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-financing-syrian-salaries-gets-us-go-ahead-sources-say-2025-05-07
; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/129250

[38] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-financing-syrian-salaries-gets-us-go-ahead-sources-say-2025-05-07

[39]

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-caretaker-government-hike-public-sector-salaries-by-400-next-month-2025-01-05
;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-financing-syrian-salaries-gets-us-go-ahead-sources-say-2025-05-07

[40] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-financing-syrian-salaries-gets-us-go-ahead-sources-say-2025-05-07

[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-sanctions-hold-up-qatari-support-syria-sources-say-2025-02-26

[42] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/129253

[43]

https://www.facebook.com/AlWatanNewspaper.sy/posts/pfbid0r6zcYaC6YvcmieJi7WXdNEbL4uuTxogybg1C3Sc4tpdY4xYzNpiYtRwupAC9LWoJl?__cft__[0]=AZXVgCVo8cMwrPBbveMb0K4b3FuLegXUadoGHiQ9-_ATogTTcJDvwk-Cgyv87NibnILoEnxzemLGf85yVuF6G28S–0aLtsKkD1Gr89mHHxHqZTd2Xemnd93w63xI3Lz2xUye98iXrhV0YkyoXwDH22M2E4K5HGYh0z2NHyzwt9NDA&__tn__=%2CO*F;
https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1906091628840018352

[44]
https://www.facebook.com/AlWatanNewspaper.sy/posts/pfbid0r6zcYaC6YvcmieJi7WXdNEbL4uuTxogybg1C3Sc4tpdY4xYzNpiYtRwupAC9LWoJl?__cft__[0]=AZXVgCVo8cMwrPBbveMb0K4b3FuLegXUadoGHiQ9-_ATogTTcJDvwk-Cgyv87NibnILoEnxzemLGf85yVuF6G28S–0aLtsKkD1Gr89mHHxHqZTd2Xemnd93w63xI3Lz2xUye98iXrhV0YkyoXwDH22M2E4K5HGYh0z2NHyzwt9NDA&__tn__=%2CO*F;
https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1906091628840018352

[45] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/18/3308640

[46] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/740048 ; https://farsi.iranpress dot com/ابابیل-5-گامی-جدید-در-توسعه-خانواده-پهپاد-ابابیل

[47]
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-4-2025 ;
https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/15/3285079 ;
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-23-2025 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-7-2025 ;
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-14-2025

[48] https://farsnews dot ir/M_r7726/1746724159981282069

[49] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/744752/

[50] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/trump-irans-centrifuges-will-either-blow-up-nicely-in-a-deal-or-viciously-without-one/

[51] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/05/04/iranian-terror-attack-uk-hours-away-from-being-launched/ ;

https://www.thetimes.com/uk/crime/article/israel-embassy-iran-terror-plot-cbj8bfcsx

[52]

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2025/may/07/iranians-arrested-in-counter-terrorism-raids-allegedly-targeted-israeli-embassy

[53] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/865038

[54]

https://www.dw.com/fa-ir/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%84-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%AE%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B8%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%B3%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C/a-57331260

[55] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/12/argentina-iran-1994-amia-bombing ;

https://apnews.com/article/cyprus-israel-iran-mossad-plot-5f390cc785900f3f6600042779d54868 ;

https://www.timesofisrael dot com/three-iranian-agents-said-caught-in-turkey-plotting-to-kill-israelis/ ;

https://www.timesofisrael dot com/israel-says-irans-quds-force-tried-to-kill-israeli-businessman-in-georgia/ ;

https://www.reuters.com/investigations/murder-hire-inside-irans-proxy-war-with-israel-west-2024-10-05/ ;

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/azerbaijan-says-it-thwarted-an-iranian-plot-to-kill-an-israeli-ambassador/252111/

[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-2-2024 ;

https://twitter.com/j_rashidikoochi/status/1774907313402327450 ;

https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/659259

[57] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/10/3266596 ;

https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1289572 ;

https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1038817

[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-7-2024

[59] https://www.bon-bast.com/

[60] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/744642/

[61] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/18/3308434

[62] https://farsnews dot ir/akramsharifi/1746700625456124858

[63] https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-sign-10-year-pact-with-iran-chabahar-port-management-et-reports-2024-05-13/

[64]

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/us-oil-embargo-stalls-iran-india-energy-relations/#:~:text=India%20was%20Iran’s%20second%20largest,(JCPOA)%20in%20May%202018.

[65] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/231448

[66] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/08/world/asia/india-pakistan-diplomacy-kashmir.html

[67] https://www.jamaran dot news/fa/amp/news-1667557

[68] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rjok30dlee

[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-1-2025

[70] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1920385063432204723 ; https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-853143

[71] https://t.me/damascusv011/31247 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1920385063432204723 ;

[72]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-11-2024#:~:text=The%20Israel%20Defense,Daraa%20Province.%5B20%5D

[73] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-1-2025

[74] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/56580

[75] https://x.com/syrianmoi/status/1920164492085792839

[76] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/121826 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/55260

[77] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/56580

[78] https://t.me/MODiraq/11367

[79]
https://www.alhadath dot
net/iraq/2025/05/06/%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86

[80]
https://www.shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9

[81]
https://www.shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9

[82]
https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B4-%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-30-2025

[83] https://ina dot iq/eng/39783-al-sudani-and-erdogan-sponsor-mou-signing-ceremony-between-iraq-and-turkey.html

[84]
https://www.shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B8%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%AD-%D9%84-%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1

[85] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraq-neighbors-near-security-alliance-agreement

Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Avery Borens, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Schmida, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

 

The
Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and
the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which
provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.
CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

 

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The
Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this
report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in
February 2025.

 

We
do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are
well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military
operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn
violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and
crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these
reports.

 

A
variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new
transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups,
have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the
Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these
extrajudicial killings.

 

 

Houthi
Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi acknowledged the US–Houthi
ceasefire but reiterated that the Houthi movement will continue to
support Hamas against Israel.[1] Abdulmalik’s
statements demonstrate how the Houthis view the Red Sea attack campaign
as one element of a broader Houthi strategic effort to pressure Israel
to end its campaign in the Gaza Strip. The ceasefire secures an end to
maritime shipping attacks, but the Houthis will continue to fire on
other Israeli economic targets in pursuit of the same objectives. The
Houthis have already shifted to targeting Israeli airports, for example.
Abdulmalik framed the ceasefire as a victory against the United States.
Abdulmalik implied that the ceasefire would not be permanent by adding
that “when” the United States gets involved in a “third round” of
airstrikes, the Houthis will confront the United States again.[2] The Houthis could resume attacks at any time and for any reason they choose.

 

Air
campaigns targeting the Houthis can have only temporary military
effects because the Houthis can rebuild damaged infrastructure after the
end of the campaign.[3]
The United States conducted at least 32 airstrikes targeting Houthi oil
offloading infrastructure at Ras Issa Port between April 2 and May 5.[4]
This initially created fuel shortages and posed challenges for both the
Houthis’ military operations and separately civil service provision in
Houthi-controlled territories, but the Houthis gradually learned
techniques to ensure service continuity despite the airstrikes.[5]
The US airstrikes on April 17 targeting Ras Issa Port alone cost the
Houthis approximately $700 million worth of damage, according to a
Yemeni economist.[6]
The Yemeni Oil Company announced on May 8 that they have successfully
repaired the Ras Issa Oil Port’s filling platforms and would restore
fuel distribution to all their stations within 24 hours, which
demonstrates that even serious damage can be rapidly fixed.[7] Cargo ships have also reportedly resumed offloading operations at Ras Issa Port.[8] Even the best-designed air campaigns can only achieve temporary effects that must be sustained through other means.

 

International
shipping companies are reluctant to return to Red Sea routes despite
the US–Houthi ceasefire agreement, which demonstrates the limited
economic and strategic impact of the most recent US air campaign against
the Houthis.[9] Shipping
companies are still “assessing the deal” and remain deeply skeptical
about returning to the Red Sea routes because of the ambiguity of the
ceasefire terms, according to the Wall Street Journal on May 8.[10] This includes whether the truce applies broadly to commercial shipping or just US vessels.[11]
Other regional events, such as a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities,
could prompt the Houthis to target international shipping again in the
future if the Houthis see a benefit in doing so. The Houthis claimed a
likely Iranian attack targeting Saudi Arabia in 2019 during the 2019
US-Iran escalation, demonstrating that the Houthis will sometimes
support Iran’s regional objectives even at risk to the Houthi movement.[12]
The US airstrikes only addressed the tactical manifestations of the
Houthi threat to the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea rather than
resolving the underlying strategic and political drivers motivating the
Houthis’ campaign. The Wall Street Journal added that industry experts expect it could take months to restore shipping confidence.[13]
The persistent risk that the Houthis could disrupt global maritime
commerce for months–if not years–at a time underscores the seriousness
of the Houthi strategic and economic threat.

 

Syrian
Transitional President Ahmed al Shara reportedly wants to discuss a
broad economic reconstruction plan with US President Donald Trump,
likely in part to secure US sanctions relief for Syria.[14] Unspecified
Syrian transitional government officials told the Wall Street Journal
on May 7 that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara wants to meet US President
Donald Trump to discuss broad US investment and aid to rebuild Syria.[15]
Shara reportedly requested to meet with Trump during Trump’s upcoming
Gulf visit through US businessman and liquified natural gas (LNG)
company CEO Jonathan Bass and Syrian Emergency Task Force head Mouaz
Moustafa.[16]
Bass and Moustafa met with Shara in Damascus on May 2 and presented him
with a plan for Western firms to invest in Syria’s energy industry.[17] Syria has significant oil and gas infrastructure that needs to be rebuilt or updated after over a decade of civil war.[18]
Bass and Moustafa said that Shara “responded favorably” to the idea of
the United States’ waiving or lessening sanctions in order to make the
investment possible.[19]
An unspecified senior Syrian Foreign Affairs official confirmed Shara’s
interest by telling Western media that Syria seeks a relationship with
the United States that includes “energy and economic ties.”[20]
Bass said that Shara and Syrian officials were also interested in
participation from US companies in all areas of Syrian reconstruction.[21] The Trump administration has not yet acknowledged Shara’s reported request.

 

Shara’s
proposal may seek to obtain full sanctions relief from the United
States by offering investment in Syria. Shara will find it hard to meet
all of the Trump administration’s “confidence-building measures,” and
could view possible investment in Syria’s energy sector as a bargaining
chip.[22]
The United States under the first Trump administration previously
sought to allow US companies to invest in energy infrastructure in
northeastern Syria, and Shara could calculate that a similar scheme
would help him obtain sanctions relief.[23]
US sanctions that have been in place since the fall of the Assad regime
currently prevent direct US economic involvement in Syria. Shara and
Syrian transitional government officials have attempted to attain
partial or full US sanctions relief since assuming power in December
2024 and have communicated back and forth about several
“confidence-building” conditions that the US requested that Syria
observe.[24]
The Syrian government said that it plans to fully address most of the
US demands, including the destruction of remaining chemical weapons
stockpiles and the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to find
missing US citizen Austin Tice.[25]
The government has also taken tangible steps to honor the US request
that it limit Palestinian military and political activity in Syria.[26]
Shara is likely unwilling to act on the US condition that he bar
foreign fighters from senior government positions, however, given that
this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply
loyal to him.[27]
Shara said on May 8 during a press conference in Paris that his
government guarantees that foreign fighters will not pose a threat to
neighboring countries, which suggests that he does not plan to remove
them from the current Syrian army ranks or offices.[28]
Shara could calculate that a counter-proposal that creates
opportunities for US industry in Syria could mitigate his unwillingness
to fully observe all the US conditions and still secure sanction relief
on Syria.

 

Syrian
officials may also be attempting to exploit perceived US interest in
curtailing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) influence abroad in
order to secure US sanctions relief and economic support. Unspecified
Syrian government officials described Shara’s proposal as a “Marshall
Plan-style” program in which US and other Western companies would invest
in Syria’s reconstruction instead of China or other powers, according
to the Wall Street Journal.[29]
That the Syrian officials reportedly specified that Shara would be
willing to exclude China suggests that the Syrian government may be
attempting to exploit a perceived US interest in curbing the PRC’s
influence abroad in order to spur US interest and investment in Syria.
Bass said that Shara wants “Boeing” and “US telecom” and not “Huawei,”
referring to the Chinese telecommunications company that has invested
heavily in partnerships in the Middle East.[30]

 

Recent
steps by the Syrian government suggest that it seeks to develop genuine
economic partnerships with US adversaries like China and Russia if it
cannot secure sanctions relief and economic assistance elsewhere,
however. The Syrian government most recently hosted PRC officials on
March 27 and discussed “enhancing cooperation,” which CTP-ISW assessed
was likely related to securing Chinese support for the transition.[31]
Shara and the Syrian transport minister have met with Chinese transport
and medical manufacturing businessmen to discuss Chinese investment in
Syria within the past week.[32]
The Syrian government also reinitiated Syria’s economic ties with
Russia in recent months. Russia has delivered Syrian currency and
Russian oil to Syria, and Russia also reportedly seeks to re-negotiate
Russian investment contracts for phosphate mines and oil fields in the
central Syrian desert.[33]
Both PRC and Russian officials have made it clear that they seek to
increase involvement in Syria. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian
President Vladimir Putin released a joint statement on May 8 following a
press conference in Moscow that emphasized Russian and Chinese support
for Syria’s “sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.”[34]

 

A Qatari-backed
initiative will provide Syria with civil sector salary support after
the US Treasury Department reportedly granted Qatar a sanctions
exemption.[35] Reuters originally reported that the Treasury Department granted the sanctions exemption, butthe United States has not yet confirmed the sanctions exemption.[36] The Qatari-backed grant initiative will provide Syria with $27 million monthly for three months to pay the salaries of select civilian public sector workers.[37]
An unspecified Syrian financial source told Western media that the
grant is conditional and will not apply to Syrian Defense Ministry or
Interior Ministry personnel.[38]
The Syrian government previously announced in January 2025 that it
would raise public sector salaries by 400% the following month, but has
yet to do so due to a lack of funding.[39]
The unspecified Syrian source said that the Qatari funding will help
implement this salary raise over the next several months and that the
Syrian government would acquire other funds for employees excluded from
the initiative.[40]
Qatar had previously delayed this initiative in late February 2025 due
to uncertainty over whether the funding would breach US sanctions.[41]
Syrian Finance Minister Mohammad Yasser Barniyeh welcomed the exemption
and said that the Syrian government hopes it will be followed by
further measures to ease sanctions.[42]
Barniyeh is an economist trained at Damascus, Kansas State, and
Oklahoma State universities before working for the Arab Monetary Fund.[43]
Barniyeh participated in the liberalization of the Assad regime’s
economy in the early 2000s, when he served on the Syrian Commission on
Financial Markets and the Damascus Securities Exchange.[44]

 

Syria CoT Map

 

Senior
Iranian military officials inspected a military facility in southern
Iran, likely as part of preparations for a potential US or Israeli
strike on Iran.
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General
Hossein Salami and IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri
inspected an underground drone hangar in Hormozgan Province on May 8.[45]
Salami threatened to attack any country that supports an attack on
Iran. Footage of the base during the visit showed Iranian Mohajer-6 and
Ababil-5 drones. Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 drones have a range of 200 and
480 km, respectively.[46]
The precise location of the facility is unclear, but the inspection of a
base hosting drones that has the range to target most of the Persian
Gulf from the southern Iranian coast suggests that Iranian officers were
inspecting units and reviewing plans for post-strike responses in the
Persian Gulf region. Hormozgan Province lies along Iran‘s southern
coast. The visit follows a series of similar inspections at Iranian
military and defense sites in Hormozgan and the surrounding provinces.[47]
Senior military officers often visit units and facilities under their
command as part of their preparations for major defensive and offensive
operations to ensure that their commands are well-prepared.
IRGC-affiliated media also published old footage on May 8 that showed an
Iranian Mohajer-6 drone surveilling the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier.[48] Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi separately claimed on May 8 that Iran equipped all of its fighter jets with long-range munitions and updated navigation systems.[49]
Most Iranian fighter jets are Cold War third- and fourth-generation
aircraft like the F4 Phantom and F14 Tomcat. These threats follow new US
threats to attack Iran. US President Donald Trump stated on May 7 that
he wants to “blow up” Iran’s nuclear centrifuges either “nicely” through
an agreement with Iran or “viciously.”[50]

 

An
attempted Iranian attack on the Israeli embassy in London highlights
the unconventional ways through which Iran has and will likely continue
to attempt to impose costs on Israel. UK
authorities arrested eight Iranian nationals on May 4 after foiling a
suspected Iranian-directed terror plot to target the Israeli Embassy in
London.[51] The Guardian reported on May 8 that the UK police conducted its largest raid across the country due to threats of a suspected terror plot.[52]
UK MI5 assessed that the plot had reached an “advanced but not
imminent” stage and detained the suspects. Iranian Foreign Affairs
Minister Abbas Araghchi denied Iranian involvement in the terror plot
and called for diplomacy.[53]
It is possible that the Iranian IRGC did not notify Araghchi about this
plot. The IRGC has previously failed to notify other government bodies
about its operations.[54]
Iran has historically relied on unconventional methods to impose costs
on Israel, including conducting terror attacks on Israeli diplomatic and
civilian targets abroad. This recent Iranian plot in the UK does not
represent an inflection in Iranian activity but is part of a
decades-long strategy that includes assassination and bombing plots
against Israeli interests in Argentina, Cyprus, Turkey, Georgia, Greece,
and Azerbaijan.[55]
Iranian officials and Iranian media have previously suggested that Iran
may attack Israeli diplomatic facilities in response to the Israeli
airstrike near the Iranian embassy in Damascus in April 2024.[56] Iranian officials have also repeatedly warned that Iran will conduct a third missile attack on Israel.[57]
Israeli strikes on Iran in October 2024 damaged Iranian long-range
missile production, which suggests that Iran‘s ability to respond
militarily using its missile stockpile may be somewhat constrained. Iran
can still impose costs on Israel by attacking Israeli diplomatic
targets in the region and beyond, however.[58]

 

Key Takeaways:

·        Houthis Respond to Ceasefire: Houthi
Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi acknowledged the US–Houthi
ceasefire but reiterated that the Houthi movement will continue to
support Hamas against Israel. Air campaigns targeting the Houthis can
have only temporary military effects because the Houthis can rebuild
damaged infrastructure after the end of the campaign. International
shipping companies are reluctant to return to Red Sea routes despite the
US–Houthi ceasefire agreement, which demonstrates the limited economic
and strategic impact of the most recent US air campaign against the
Houthis.

·        Syria and Sanctions Relief: Syrian
Transitional President Ahmed al Shara reportedly wants to discuss a
broad economic reconstruction plan with US President Donald Trump,
likely in part to secure US sanctions relief for Syria.

·             Syrian Salaries: A Qatari-backed
initiative will provide Syria with civil sector salary support after
the US Treasury Department reportedly granted Qatar a sanctions
exemption.

·        Iranian Officers Inspect Military Facilities: Senior
Iranian military officials inspected a military facility in southern
Iran, likely as part of preparations for a potential US or Israeli
strike on Iran.

·             Iranian Terrorist Operations in the United Kingdom:
An attempted Iranian attack on the Israeli embassy in London highlights
the unconventional ways through which Iran has and will likely continue
to attempt to impose costs on Israel.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian rial depreciated from 828,500 rials to one US dollar on May 7 to 831,000 rials to one US dollar on May 8.[59]

Iranian
Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Indian officials in
New Delhi, India, on May 8 to discuss India-Pakistan tensions and
bilateral economic cooperation.[60] Araghchi met with Indian President Droupadi Murmu and Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.[61] Araghchi and Jaishankar discussed the implementation of the May 2024 ten-year Chabahar cooperation agreement.[62]
The agreement outlines the development of Iran’s southeastern Chabahar
port to facilitate trade between Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asian
countries, which effectively bypasses Pakistani ports.[63] India was the second largest importer of Iranian oil before the US maximum pressure campaign in 2018.[64] Araghchi also met with Pakistani officials in Pakistan on May 5.[65] This series of meetings comes amid military escalation between India and Pakistan.[66]

Supreme
National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian stated that
direct negotiations under “threat or coercion” are irrational and
dishonorable but that negotiations in “equal, pressure-free conditions”
are “rational and honorable.”[67]
Ahmadian’s remarks may lay the ground for justifying direct
negotiations with the United States. Ahmadian’s remarks follow an
Israeli report on May 7 that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas
Araghchi approached US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff to
request direct US-Iran negotiations, reportedly due to Iran’s
frustration with the slow progress of Omani-mediated talks.[68] The fourth round of US-Iran talks, initially scheduled for May 3, was postponed due to “logistical reasons.”[69]

Syria

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) opened a field hospital for Druze civilians in Hader, Quneitra Province, on May 8.[70]
The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson announced that the field hospital
is part of the IDF’s efforts to support the Syrian Druze population.[71] The IDF has been operating in Hader since December 2024.[72]
The establishment of an IDF field hospital in Hader follows Israel’s
efforts to pressure the Syrian transitional government to halt sectarian
violence against the Syrian Druze community.[73]

Southwestern Syria Map

The Syrian and Iraqi governments continued to strengthen border security on both sides of the northern Syria-Iraq border.[74] The Syrian Interior Ministry began to recruit new members for the General Directorate of Border Guards on May 8.[75]
The Syrian Defense Ministry recently deployed forces to the Iraqi
border on April 18 to tighten control and curb illegal smuggling
activities.[76]
Syrian media also reported on May 7 that the Iraqi Army deployed new
unspecified military units along the border across from the Syrian towns
of Albu Kamal and Baghouz.[77]
The Iraqi Army previously deployed the 34th Armored Brigade’s 1st Tank
Battalion, which operates under the 9th Armored Division, to the
Iraq-Syria border on April 16.[78]
Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari said in an interview on
May 6 that the Iraqi federal government has had no security coordination
with the Syrian Interior Ministry yet.[79]

Deir Ez Zor map

Iraq

Iraqi
media reported that a “high-level” Shia Coordination Framework
delegation will discuss multiple “key” issues with Iranian officials
from May 8 to 9, including the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi
parliamentary elections.[80] The
Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political
parties, some of which Iran backs. A Shia Coordination Framework source
stated that the delegation represents all Shia Coordination Framework
components and is authorized to “reach an understanding with Tehran on
certain [unspecified] issues of mutual understanding.”[81]
Iran reportedly sent a message to Shia Coordination Framework leaders
on April 30 that called on the Shia Coordination Framework to remain
unified ahead of the upcoming elections. Iran‘s message likely aims to
increase the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the Iraqi government.[82] A fragmented Shia Coordination Framework could allow smaller, less organized parties to outperform Iranian-backed parties.

 

Iraqi
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani and Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan signed multiple memoranda of understanding (MOU) during
bilateral talks in Ankara, Turkey, on May 8.[83] The
MoUs focused on multiple areas, including defense manufacturing and
counter-narcotics. Sudani emphasized the importance of Iraq-Turkey
security and counterterrorism cooperation and welcomed efforts to disarm
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) during a press conference with
Erdogan.[84] Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan agreed in February 2025 to form a strategic alliance to counter the Islamic State.[85]

 

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

·        Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas

·        Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen

·        Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

 

See topline section.

 

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

 

Nothing Significant to Report.

 

CTP-ISW
will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We
have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran’s nuclear
program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its
networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given
that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas’ military organization
and severed the group’s ability to resupply itself, we are now focused
on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah
and Hamas through Syria.

 

The
Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored
activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US
forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the
stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical
Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly
based on regional events.

 

CTP-ISW
defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that
Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came
to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state,
semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their
collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the
alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels
of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some
degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional
proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others
are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of
the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives,
which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from
the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these
objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have
become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.