We do not report in detail on war crimes
because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not
directly affect the military operations we are assessing and
forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict
and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we
do not describe them in these reports.
A variety of
Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new
transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups,
have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the
Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these
extrajudicial killings.
The verbal ceasefire between
the United States and the Houthis appears to only cover one of the three
reported original US demands conveyed by Oman at this time.[1] The
United States reportedly passed three demands to the Houthis via Oman,
according to a Yemeni analyst. The three conditions required the Houthis
to cease all attacks on US commercial and military vessels, stop
targeting Israel, and re-engage in peace talks within the Saudi-led
roadmap. The Houthis have followed the first condition
to cease attacks on US commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea,
but have demonstrated that they will not comply with the second demand
to stop targeting Israel.[2] The Houthis attacked Ben Gurion Airport and
the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area on May 9, for example (see below for more
information on this attack). The Houthis could re-engage with the
roadmap
The Houthis could re-engage in peace talks within
the Saudi-led roadmap and technically follow a second of the three
demands. The Houthis are unlikely to engage seriously in peace talks
because the Houthis have not suffered any defeats that would force them
to the negotiating table, however.[3] The roadmap includes a
“political process under UN auspices” that would presumably work towards
some form of power-sharing agreement between the Houthis and the Yemeni
government.[4] The Houthis are likely unwilling to engage in
negotiations that would cause them to lose their control over northern
Yemen because they desire to control all of Yemen and view themselves as
the rightful Yemeni government. The Houthis appear to believe that the
US-Houthi ceasefire is a “victory.“[5]
The Yemeni analyst stated
that Saudi Arabia was “fully informed” of the US proposal and Omani
mediation efforts, but the extent of the Houthi engagement with the
third condition remains unclear.[6] Riyadh and the Houthis almost
reached a deal before the October 7 War broke out in 2023 and have
maintained communication since.[7] The timing of the US-Houthi ceasefire
is particularly significant as US President Donald Trump is scheduled
to visit Saudi Arabia on May 13 and 14, although Yemen is reportedly not
on the agenda for his Riyadh meetings, according to the Yemeni
analyst.[8]
The ambiguity surrounding the US-Houthi
ceasefire will likely cause international shipping companies to exercise
caution before reentering the Red Sea in greater numbers. The
ceasefire only applies to US vessels, according to the reported terms,
though US officials have suggested that the agreement covers all
ships.[9] The Houthis have implied that they will not attack other
ships. Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi referred to the Houthi
maritime attack campaign in the past tense on May 8, suggesting the
campaign would not continue.[10] The last Houthi attack on commercial
shipping was in November 2024, though the Houthis threatened to resume
the attack campaign in March 2025. The Houthis may be interfering with
international shipping, however. The UK Maritime Trade Operations
(UKMTO) reported on May 9 that several vessels experienced Global
Positioning System (GPS) interference in the Red Sea lasting several
hours.[11] The Houthis have interfered with GPS systems in the past.[12]
These disruptions, combined with the ambiguity surrounding the
ceasefire, suggest that the safety of commercial shipping in this
maritime corridor remains under threat.
Israeli defense
officials gave conflicting information about whether the US THAAD
missile defense system succeeded or failed to intercept a Houthi
ballistic missile on May 9. The Houthis launched a ballistic
missile targeting Ben Gurion Airport and claimed a drone attack
targeting the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area in central Israel on May 9.[13]
Israeli defense officials stated on May 9 that the US THAAD system
successfully intercepted the Houthi ballistic missile, but other
unspecified Israeli defense sources said that the THAAD system failed to
intercept the missile.[14] The unspecified Israeli defense sources said
the Arrow 3 intercepted the missile.[15]
Details about
the activities of senior Hezbollah commanders in northern Yemen in the
early 2010s demonstrate how Iran and its allies likely share lessons,
techniques, and capabilities over time.[16] Yemeni sources
posted new photos and information showing Hezbollah advisers in Yemen on
May 8. [17] The IDF killed both Hezbollah advisers in Fall 2024 during
the campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[18] One Hezbollah commander,
Ali Adel Ashmar, played a major role in the capture of Amran and Sanaa
cities, which happened in July and September 2014, respectively.[19]
This suggests that Hezbollah played a major role in advising the 2014
Houthi campaign. Hezbollah also sent Mohammad Hussein Srour, who at the
time of his death was Hezbollah’s Aerial Command commander, to Yemen to
support the development of Houthi missile capabilities and drone
manufacturing.[20] Key Houthi commanders have now assumed an advising
role with Iraqi militias that is similar to Hezbollah’s advising role in
Yemen. A US airstrike killed a top Houthi drone expert outside Baghdad
in July 2024, for example.[21] This demonstrates how Iran and its key
proxies and partners share lessons learned, techniques, and capabilities
over time and across the region. The Houthi commanders in Iraq today
surely share lessons learned from their Hezbollah advisers in the 2010s,
as well as the lessons the Houthis have learned over two decades of war
against several different regional and international powers.
Unspecified
Iranian diplomatic sources told anti-regime media on May 8 that the
US-Iran nuclear talks are “faltering” over Iranian uranium enrichment
restrictions and “fluctuating US demands.”[22] Iranian sources
added that shifting US demands on Iran’s missile program and support for
the Axis of Resistance are complicating progress in the negotiations.
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi previously stated on
April 16 that “contradictory” US positions do not help the negotiations
and emphasized that “Iran must hear Washington’s real stance” to assess
whether a framework agreement is possible.[23] An Iranian expert close
to the regime separately stated on May 1 that the fourth round of talks
originally scheduled for May 3 was postponed due to “contradictory US
positions.”[24] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff
initially said Iran could enrich uranium to 3.67 percent, but later
demanded all enrichment be stopped and eliminated.[25] Witkoff then said
in a Breitbart interview on May 9 that he hoped that Iran would
“voluntarily“ stop enrichment before adding that the US “red line“ is
that “an enrichment program can never exist in Iran again.“[26] Araghchi
confirmed on May 9 that the fourth round of talks will take place in
Muscat, Oman, on May 12.[27] An Iranian Parliamentarian claimed on May 6
that the talks were postponed partly due to International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi’s reported desire to join
the nuclear talks as a European representative.[28] The Parliamentarian
also claimed that Grossi provided reports to the United States
suggesting that Iran is “very close” to a nuclear bomb.[29] Araghchi
held a phone call with Grossi on May 9 to discuss cooperation between
Iran and the agency and the current status of the US-Iran nuclear
talks.[30] CTP-ISW previously assessed that it is unlikely that Iran
will accept zero uranium enrichment and full dismantlement of its
nuclear program, as Iran views uranium enrichment as its “undeniable
right” and sees giving up as a core national red line. CTP-ISW also
continues to assess that Iran is unlikely to concede on its missile
program, as the missile program is essential to its defense strategy,
especially given the weakness of Iran’s conventional armed forces.[31]
Senior
Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for potential US or
Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and energy infrastructure.
Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi
visited the Abdanan Air Defense Group in Ilam Province on May 9 to
assess its combat readiness and defensive capabilities.[32] Mousavi
emphasized the key role of air defense in protecting Iran’s airspace,
and stressed the importance of modern training, advanced technologies.
Various senior Iranian commanders including Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense
Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard and Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Commander Brigadier General
Amir Ali Haji Zadeh conducted several inspections on Iranian air
defense zones in southeastern, south and western Iran in recent
weeks.[33] The amount and frequency of these air defense inspections are
highly unusual. Senior Iranian commanders do not typically visit so
many air defense sites within such a short period of time. Iranian
commanders are presumably conducting these inspections to ensure that
units remain prepared for a strike.
The Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK) announced on May 9 that it held a conference to discuss its
disarmament and will soon announce a decision of “historic
importance.”[34] PKK-affiliated media reported that the PKK
held a two-day conference from May 5 to 7 in Iraqi Kurdistan’s Qandil
Mountains after imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan called for the
group to disarm.[35] Ocalan made the historical call in late February
2025 after months of negotiations with the pro-Kurdish Turkish People’s
Equality and Democracy (DEM) party and politicians allied with Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[36] The PKK said it would provide
“relevant documents and information” along with its upcoming
announcement.[37] A Turkish journalist who previously wrote for a
pro-Erdogan newspaper reported on May 9 that the PKK is expected to
announce that it will end all operations against Turkey and will disband
itself, citing two sources familiar with the matter.[38] The PKK
Executive Committee said in late February 2025 that it would disarm in
response to Ocalan’s call to dissolve the group, but several
high-ranking PKK leaders have continued to insist since Ocalan’s call
that Turkey must free Ocalan from prison before the group officially
disarms.[39] Erdogan and his Justice and Democracy Party (AKP) have
repeatedly stressed that they will not negotiate with the PKK and that
PKK disarmament is a unilateral process.[40] DEM Party co-chair Pervin
Buldan told PKK-affiliated media on May 9 that Erdogan will “imminently”
make a statement on the PKK announcement.[41]
The PKK’s possible
refusal to disarm may result in a Turkish decision to resume attacks on
alleged PKK targets in northern Syria, which could further complicate
the US-backed Syrian Defense Forces’ (SDF) integration into the Syrian
state. Turkey identifies the targets of its operations in Syria as the
“PKK,” even when striking forces under the SDF.[42] Turkey often equates
the entirety of the SDF and the PKK-linked Syrian Kurdish People’s
Protection Units (YPG) with the PKK.[43] YPG elements in the SDF, while
linked to the PKK, have prioritized the protection of Syrian Kurds over
the achievement of PKK objectives in recent months. Turkey has linked
its campaign to disarm the PKK through Ocalan to the US-backed SDF’s
integration into the Syrian state.[44] Turkish officials stated in late
February 2025 that they believed Ocalan’s call for the PKK to disarm and
dissolve would pressure the SDF into disarmament and integration into
the Syrian transitional government under the Defense Ministry.[45] This
belief is based on the Turkish government’s conflation between the PKK,
the SDF, and the YPG, which dominates the SDF. SDF Commander Mazloum
Abdi reportedly agreed to expel non-Syrian Kurds from the SDF, but he
rejected Ocalan’s call and argued that it “is only for the PKK [and is
not] related to us in Syria.”[46] Abdi later agreed to integrate the SDF
and Kurdish-controlled territory into the Syrian state in March
2025.[47]
Key Takeaways:
- US-Houthi Ceasefire: The
verbal ceasefire between the United States and the Houthis appears to
only cover one of the three reported original US demands conveyed by
Oman at this time. The three conditions required the Houthis to cease
all attacks on US commercial and military vessels, stop targeting
Israel, and re-engage in peace talks within the Saudi-led roadmap. - Houthis and the Saudi-Led Roadmap: The
Houthis are unlikely to seriously re-engage in peace talks within the
Saudi-led roadmap because the Houthis have not suffered any defeats that
would force them to the negotiating table. The Houthis are likely
unwilling to engage in negotiations that would cause them to lose their
control over northern Yemen because they desire to control all of Yemen
and view themselves as the rightful Yemeni government. The Houthis
appear to believe that the US-Houthi ceasefire is a “victory.“ - Red Sea and Shipping Prices: The
ambiguity surrounding the US-Houthi ceasefire will likely cause
international shipping companies to exercise caution before reentering
the Red Sea to a greater degree. - The Axis of Resistance in Yemen: Details
about the activities of senior Hezbollah commanders in northern Yemen
in the early 2010s demonstrate how Iran and its allies likely share
lessons, techniques, and capabilities over time. Key Houthi commanders
have now assumed an advising role with Iraqi militias that is similar to
Hezbollah’s advising role in Yemen. A US airstrike killed a top Houthi
drone expert outside Baghdad in July 2024, for example. - Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Unspecified
Iranian diplomatic sources told anti-regime media on May 8 that the
US-Iran nuclear talks are “faltering” over Iranian uranium enrichment
restrictions and “fluctuating US demands.” - Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK): The
PKK announced on May 9 that it held a conference to discuss its
disarmament and will soon announce a decision of “historic importance.”
Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy
The Iranian rial depreciated from 831,000 rials to one US dollar on May 8 to 840,000 rials to one US dollar on May 9.[48]
Iran faces growing disruption to its key oil exports as US sanctions on Chinese refineries threaten its main revenue stream.
Reuters reported on May 8 that US sanctions imposed in March and April
2025 on two small Chinese independent refineries—Shandong Shouguang
Luqing Petrochemical and Shandong Shengxing Chemical—have begun to
disrupt Chinese handling of Iranian crude oil.[49] The sanctioned
refineries now face a loss of port access, financing restrictions from
major Chinese banks, and the loss of domestic crude oil supply from
state firms like China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).[50]
The sanctioned Chinese refineries are also using third-party entities to
sell their products and bypass formal restrictions. The US State
Department separately sanctioned China-based Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group
and three oil terminal operators, along with numerous firms, vessels,
and captains, for facilitating hundreds of millions of dollars in
Iranian oil sales on May 8.[51] These sanctions follow an increase in US
sanctions targeting China-based entities involved in the illicit
Iranian oil trade as part of US President Donald Trump’s renewed
“maximum pressure” campaign.[52] China remains the largest importer of
Iranian oil, purchasing approximately 90 percent of Iran’s total oil
exports, according to Reuters.[53]
Syria
US
State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce said on May 9 that the US has
a sanction waiver mechanism “in place” but is waiting for Syria to
“appropriately” respond to US conditions.[54] Bruce’s statement
comes amid US debates over easing sanctions on Syria.[55] The United
States gave Syrian officials a list of conditions for partial US
sanctions relief on March 18. These demands called on Syria to combat
terrorism, adopt a policy of non-aggression with neighboring states, and
exclude foreign fighters from official roles.[56] The Syrian government
responded to the US on April 26 and said that it had addressed a
majority of these conditions.[57] The government has fought terrorists
and adopted a non-aggression policy, but it has not excluded foreign
fighters from official positions.[58] Bruce also condemned the Syrian
Defense Ministry’s May 5 appointment of Brigadier General Ahmad al Hais
(Abu Hatem Shaqra) as a division commander in the army, which Bruce
called a “serious mistake that the [United States] does not
support.”[59] Shaqra founded and commanded Ahrar al Sharqiya in 2016, a
Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) faction comprised of fighters
from eastern Syria who were close to Shaqra.[60] The United States
sanctioned Ahrar al Sharqiya and Shaqra in 2021 for committing abuses
against civilians, particularly Syrian Kurds, and integrating former
ISIS members into its ranks.[61]
Israeli media reported on
May 9 that Syrian officials asked Israel for time to allow the Syrian
transitional government to “organize” and “stabilize its internal
affairs” during Emirati-mediated talks in Abu Dhabi.[62] The
United Arab Emirates (UAE) has reportedly facilitated recent talks
between Israel and Syria on security, counterterrorism, and
confidence-building measures.[63] Israeli media reported that three
close aides to President Ahmed al Shara met with two Israelis with
previous Israeli security experience in Abu Dhabi on a recent,
unspecified date.[64] An Israeli official who did not confirm whether
they had personally attended the talks said that the Israel-Syria talks
were “preliminary, non-committal discussions.”[65] Unspecified members
of the Syrian delegation told the Israelis that Syria has no interest in
conflict with its neighbors, including Israel.[66] Israeli officials
reportedly said that Shara’s messages were “positive but not
enough.”[67]
The Syrian Navy conducted its first “large-scale” naval operation on May 9 to combat smuggling along the Syrian coast.[68]
Syrian naval forces arrested several human traffickers and seized
weapons aboard vessels during the operation.[69] The Syrian Navy began
to conduct routine patrols along the Syrian coast on April 25.[70] There
has been significant smuggling and human trafficking along the Syrian
coast for over a decade.[71]
Syrian Energy Minister Mohammad al Bashir and Turkish Energy Minister Alp Arslan Bayraktar signed a natural gas deal on May 9.[72]
Bashir is a trained engineer who served as interim Syrian prime
minister from December 2024 to March 2025 and as Hayat Tahrir al Sham
(HTS)-controlled Syrian Salvation Government prime minister in Idlib
from January 2024 to December 2024.[73] Turkey will supply Syria with
six million cubic meters of natural gas per day through the Kilis-Aleppo
pipeline located in northwestern Syria.[74] Bayraktar said that Turkey
aims to start supplying natural gas within three months.[75] Bashir said
that the Turkish supply will contribute to increasing electricity usage
and improving the energy situation in Syria.[76] The Syrian government
has consistently sought foreign assistance for its severely damaged
energy sector since coming to power in December 2024.[77] Syrian
President Shara met with US businessman and Argent liquified natural gas
(LNG) company CEO Jonathan Bass on May 2 to discuss potential
investment in Syria’s energy infrastructure by Western firms.[78] Bashir
has also recently met with Saudi and Qatari officials to discuss
cooperation in the energy sector.[79] Qatar began providing natural gas
supplies to Syria from Jordan in mid-March to help address electricity
production shortages and improve infrastructure.[80]
Likely Alawite insurgents conducted an unsuccessful raid targeting the Syrian Army’s 56th Division barracks in Khirbet al Maza, Tartous Province, on May 8.[81] 56th
Division soldiers reportedly wounded several insurgents in the
attack..[82] The 56th Division pursued the retreating insurgents and
continued to search the local area for fighters.[83] The attack follows
the Syrian Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) reinforcement and increased
surveillance in Tartous Province as part of a security plan to counter
the Alawite-majority, pro-Assad insurgency that has been active in
Tartous since the fall of the Assad regime.[84] This is the first
pro-Alawite insurgent attack on Syrian government forces since April
21.[85] The pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigades, a sectarian Alawite
insurgent group in western Syria, denied that the attack took place.[86]
The Coastal Shield Brigades has frequently published false information
about Assad regime elements and has framed recent extrajudicial killings
targeting former regime commanders across Syria as murders against
innocent civilians.[87] Extrajudicial killings—including those targeting
former regime elements—are destabilizing and underscore the need for
transitional justice.
The General Security Services (GSS)
thwarted a likely Lebanese Hezbollah-supported attempt to smuggle
weapons, ammunition, and narcotics into Lebanon from Serghaya, Rif
Dimashq Province, on May 9.[88] The weapons included a
locally-produced anti-FPV drone gun, a 9A91 compact assault rifle, and a
light machine gun.[89] A large box of the prescription opioid Tramadol
was also found along with tactical accessories, such as rifle scopes,
gas masks, and a tactical chest rig.[90] The smugglers were likely
attempting to smuggle these supplies to Hezbollah, which is in the
process of reconstituting itself after the Fall 2024 Israeli campaign in
Lebanon. Serghaya lies on a road that travels northwards into Lebanon’s
Bekaa Valley, which is a Hezbollah stronghold. Hezbollah could use
Tramadol as a substitute for morphine or other pain management drugs in
combat, though Hezbollah could also generate money by smuggling
Tramadol.[91] GSS forces previously seized a weapons shipment heading to
Lebanese Hezbollah in Serghaya on January 26.[92]
Gunmen
on motorcycles and Salafi-jihadi groups continued to conduct
extrajudicial revenge killings targeting former Assadists across Syria
from May 7 to 9, which underscores the need for transitional justice in
Syria. Unknown gunmen on motorcycles killed a former Assad
regime Air Force Intelligence member on May 7.[93] Unknown gunmen
separately killed a Tiger Forces fighter in Safira, Aleppo Province, in a
separate attack on May 8.[94] The Tiger Forces were an elite special
forces unit that was part of Assad’s Syrian Arab Army.[95] Salafi-Jihadi
group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah assassinated a National Defense Forces
(NDF) commander in the al Waer neighborhood of Homs City, on May 9.[96]
The slain commander was known for his efforts to organize a military defense
of Homs City against HTS before the fall of the Assad regime in
December 2024.[97] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah also assassinated a Shia Assad
regime fighter known for his association with Liwa al Quds in the al
Mashad neighborhood of Aleppo city in a separate attack on May 9.[98]
Liwa al Quds was a pro-Assad Palestinian militia. These killings are
spurred in part by a lack of government-led transitional justice efforts
to punish those responsible for crimes committed during the civil war.
Suwayda
Province Governor Mustafa Bakour announced on May 8 that police
stations will open in four areas of Suwayda Province.[99] The
activation of new police stations in Suwayda City, Shabha, Salkhad, and
outside of Suwayda City, Suwayda Province, is the result of a recent
agreement between the Syrian transitional government and Druze leaders
to integrate Suwaydawi fighters into state security services.[100]
Bakour recently confirmed that Suwayda’s police forces, which will be
composed of Suwaydawi policemen, have already integrated into the Syrian
Ministry of Interior.[101] Bakour said that there are 100 officers and
nearly 2,100 personnel in the police forces thus far, which includes
both former officers and new recruits.[102] A non-Suwaydawi officer
appointed by Damascus will command these police forces, likely in order
to ensure the police remain responsive to the state.[103]
Iraq
Nothing significant to report.
Arabian Peninsula
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
- Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
- Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip
See topline section.
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Nothing significant to report.
CTP-ISW
will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We
have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran’s nuclear
program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its
networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given
that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas’ military organization
and severed the group’s ability to resupply itself, we are now focused
on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah
and Hamas through Syria.
The Iran Update provides
insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It
also covers events and trends that affect the stability and
decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project
(CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the
Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional
events.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the
unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East
since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational
coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that
cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself
to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these
groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support
in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions.
Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian
direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited
influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand
strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling
American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state,
or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance
to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
[1] https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862 ; https://www.axios.com/2025/05/06/houthi-ceasefire-trump-yemen-attacks
[2] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3478139.htm
[3] https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862
[4]
https://osesgy.unmissions.org/update-efforts-secure-un-roadmap-end-war-yemen;
https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1145087;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-reaffirms-its-commitment-promoting-dialogue-among-all-parties-yemen-2023-09-19/
[5] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3478139.htm
[6] https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862
[7]
https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862 ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-reaffirms-its-commitment-promoting-dialogue-among-all-parties-yemen-2023-09-19/
[8]
https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862;
https://www.axios.com/2025/05/03/trump-gulf-leaders-summit-saudi-arabia
[9]
https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862 ;
https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/06/politics/us-to-stop-strikes-on-houthis-in-yemen
[10] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3478139.htm; https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82be
[11] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1920869477698191489
[12] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CTC-SENTINEL-042024_cover-article.pdf
[13] https://t.me/army21ye/2955 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1920833856283787289
[14] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1920835058656571694
[15] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1920837162976604486
[16] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1920609794534109678 ; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1920612464401531052
[17] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1920609794534109678 ; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1920612464401531052
[18]
https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1855678557323985366 ;
https://www.israelhayom dot
com/2024/11/11/liveblog-hezbollah-commander-houthi-advisor-eliminated/ ;
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/09/26/israel-eliminates-head-of-hezbollah-drone-unit/
; https://x.com/IDF/status/1839337017936875640
[19] https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2024/12/E_271_24.pdf
[20]
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/09/26/israel-eliminates-head-of-hezbollah-drone-unit/
; https://x.com/IDF/status/1839337017936875640
[21] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/08/05/us-strike-iraq-houthi-drone/
[22] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202505081189
[23] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/27/3292802
[24] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1917961234391224733
[25] https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/15/politics/us-iran-talks-focus-nuclear-verification-trump-envoy-says-intl/index.html ;
https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1911963766972953004 ;
https://x.com/SE_MiddleEast/status/1912141949932298432
[26]
https://x.com/gbrew24/status/1920888597143564420;
https://x.com/gbrew24/status/1920865275081011565 ;
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2025/05/09/exclusive-steve-witkoff-shreds-his-total-fake-news-critics-the-neocon-element-believes-that-war-is-the-only-way-to-solve-things/
[27] https://x.com/Tasnimnews_Fa/status/1920887609993138354
[28] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2060020/
[29] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2060020/
[30] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/19/3308949
[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-16-2025 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-2-2025
[32] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/19/3308847
[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-1-2025 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-24-2025 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-16-2025 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-21-2025 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-4-2025
[34] https://firatnews dot com/kurdIstan/pkk-12-kongresi-basariyla-yapildi-212451
[35] https://firatnews dot com/kurdIstan/pkk-12-kongresi-basariyla-yapildi-212451
[36] https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1895120510109000176
[37] https://firatnews dot com/kurdIstan/pkk-12-kongresi-basariyla-yapildi-212451
[38] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/pkk-officially-disband-week-sources-say; https://www.middleeasteye.net/users/ragip-soylu
[39]
https://firatnews dot
com/guncel/bayik-Onder-apo-disinda-kimse-kongre-yi-toplayamaz-210411;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-5-2025
[40]
https://www dot
dailysabah.com/politics/top-turkish-official-denies-talks-with-pkk-says-group-must-lay-down-arms/news
;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/kurdish-pkk-militia-says-it-will-heed-jailed-leaders-peace-call-declare-2025-03-01/
[41] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/05/pkk-holds-congress-response-ocalans-call-end-war-turkey
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https://x.com/tcsavunma/status/1893598676729172100 ;
https://x.com/tcsavunma/status/1892889632943055124 ;
https://x.com/tcsavunma/status/1890315552893055361
[43]
https://www.aa dot
com.tr/tr/politika/disisleri-bakani-fidan-turkiye-bekasina-yonelik-tum-tehditleri-kaynaginda-yok-etme-gucune-ve-kararliligina-sahiptir/3446537
[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-27-2025
[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-27-2025
[46]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-27-2025;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-19-2024
[47]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025
;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-19-2024
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[53] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chinas-march-iranian-oil-imports-surge-us-sanctions-fears-2025-04-10/
[54] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-may-08-2025/#post-628618-SYRIA
[55] https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2025/04/16/should-syria-get-sanctions-relief-00293691
[56]
https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25
;
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/17/syria-us-military-withdrawal-trump
;
https://www.reuters.com/world/us-lists-demands-un-syria-seeks-sanctions-relief-2025-04-25
[57] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-letter-delivers-response-us-conditions-sanctions-relief-2025-04-26/
[58]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-letter-delivers-response-us-conditions-sanctions-relief-2025-04-26
; https://x.com/ALBADIA24/status/1889296890627272975 ;
https://x.com/MohammedHawaidi/status/1888899612590719029
[59] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-may-08-2025/#post-628618-SYRIA
[60]
https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919371128302100651 ;
https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919373420296278177 ;
https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919378447228362904 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-6-2025 ;
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2019/06/25/remnants-of-the-deiri-opposition-contention-and-controversy-in-north-aleppo
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[62] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rks7q8illx
[63] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-mediating-secret-talks-between-israel-syria-sources-say-2025-05-07/
[64] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rks7q8illx
[65] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rks7q8illx
[66] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rks7q8illx
[67] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rks7q8illx
[68] https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1920582998161813769 ; https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1920583001336951101
[69] https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1920582998161813769
[70] https://t.me/LatakiaGov1/3755
[71]
https://maritime-executive.com/article/syria-s-new-regime-seizes-cargo-of-iranian-weapons-in-tartus
;
https://maritime-executive.com/article/cma-cgm-renews-terminal-lease-at-latakia-syria-s-notorious-smuggling-port
;
https://apnews.com/article/cyprus-human-smuggling-syria-lebanon-turkey-arrests-e55ecbe91ea22ad14971f7a1560b473f
; https://www.i24news dot
tv/en/news/middle-east/196936-190312-exclusive-iran-reviving-maritime-smuggling-route-to-syria-using-civilian-firms
; https://www.ynet dot co.il/article/4042891
[72] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1920842668654960708
[73]
https://www.enabbaladi dot
net/682894/%D8%A5%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5
;
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/11/world/middleeast/syria-bashir-prime-minister.html
[74] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1920842668654960708
[75] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1920795599047123325
[76] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1920842668654960708
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; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-8-2025 ;
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/qatar-supply-gas-syria-with-us-nod-sources-say-2025-03-13/
;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkish-energy-ministry-delegation-visit-syria-discuss-energy-cooperation-2024-12-24/
[78]
www dot sana.sy/en/?p=354232;
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;
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%B1
; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920766078767997115 ;
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https://alikhbariah dot
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;
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%B1
; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920766078767997115 ;
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https://alikhbariah dot
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;
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%B1
; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920766078767997115 ;
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https://alikhbariah dot
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;
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%B1
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/understanding-syria%E2%80%99s-emerging-insurgency
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https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-22-2025#:~:text=Likely%20Alawite%20insurgents,restrict%20insurgent%20movement.
[86] https://t.me/almougahid313/494
[87]
https://t.me/almougahid313/494 ; https://t.me/almougahid313/473 ;
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920063779661816192 ;
https://www.facebook.com/Sewar.Sul/photos/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AB%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%81/3866503183601595/?_rdr
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[89]
https://www.youtube.com/watchv=0XTC8KvC9gY ;
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920776712708604112 ;
https://x.com/warsmonitoring/status/1032603158781063168 ;
https://x.com/war_noir/status/1899930769658609737
[90] https://www.youtube.com/watchv=0XTC8KvC9gY
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[92] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1883434966425772390
[93]
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920506923398365308 ;
https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1920305470704582831 ;
https://www.facebook.com/share/p/195M7VEwZo/
[94]https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920506923398365308 ; (GRAPHIC) https://x.com/Al_Basheer1/status/1920483010664628576
[95] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/25th_Special_Mission_Forces_Division
[96]
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920816057968734353
; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/56661;
https://t.me/alaydiat/334;
https://x.com/SyrNetworkNews/status/1920832499074183665
;
https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1920874858222592085 ;
[97] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920816057968734353
[98]
https://t.me/alaydiat/328 ;
https://www.facebook.com/AL.LAYARMUN/posts/pfbid0VPFFbejCcQgMbYNWcp8KG7tALbaeSfsBt2M2xR5KNZTLE3SCdurwKfNzTE1V3BVgl
; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EyvuqQy1F/ ;
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920873586031468874
[99] https://sana dot sy/?p=2216401
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https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid02xMMPDoW9Sw7y5eaoUrok2BkFsojUpTw1gKZvfLJRtuMD6LemhqUxPjsnXeAzTesEl&id=61573484227328&_rdr
; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025
[101] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1919098569878798395; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025
[102] https://sana dot sy/?p=2216401
[103] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1919100469105864982 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1919098569878798395