Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 20, 2025

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1 pm ET on August
20, 2025. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 21, 2025,
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin is demanding that Russia have a veto over any
Western security guarantees for Ukraine in an effort to undermine
ongoing US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to establish conditions for
lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov stated on August 20 that any serious discussions on Western
security guarantees for Ukraine without Russian input are a “road to
nowhere” and that Russia “cannot agree” that now-proposed “collective
security issues” can be resolved without Russia, effectively demanding a
Russian veto over Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[1] Lavrov
also threatened that Russia will take “firm and harsh” action to ensure
that Russia’s “legitimate interests” are a part of any postwar security
arrangement for Ukraine.

The Kremlin is likely trying to inject its demands into the ongoing
US, European, and Ukrainian joint effort to create a security structure
that will serve as a safeguard against a future Russian re-invasion in
the event of a peace settlement.[2] Granting Russia veto power over
Western security guarantees would enable the Kremlin to dictate
conditions that will weaken Ukraine’s ability to resist another Russian
invasion by preventing Ukraine from forming binding bilateral or
multilateral security agreements such as are now being discussed,
increasing and modernizing its military, and receiving support from
Ukraine’s partners. Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Maria
Zakharova recently said that Russia could not tolerate the presence of
troops from NATO member states in Ukraine as part of any security
guarantees.[3]

European leaders recently released a joint statement reaffirming that
no peace agreement should place limitations on Ukraine’s armed forces
or on its cooperation with third countries nor can Russia have veto
power over Ukraine’s pathway to joining the European Union (EU) or
NATO.[4] European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas stated on August
19 that Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot be trusted to honor any
promises or commitments to permanently cease military activity against
Ukraine and that any security guarantees must be robust and credible to
deter the Russian military command does not re-group and launch a future
invasion of Ukraine.

The Kremlin appears to be demanding that any security
guarantees be based on those proposed in the Istanbul 2022 framework,
which would grant Russia and its allies the right to veto Western
military assistance to Ukraine and leave Ukraine helpless in the face of
future Russian threats. Lavrov stated on August 20 that Russia
is in favor of collective security guarantees that are “truly reliable”
and that a good example of such guarantees was evident in the 2022
Istanbul Ukraine-Russia negotiations, which would have permanently
prohibited Ukraine from joining NATO, imposed limitations on the
Ukrainian military, and banned Ukraine from receiving Western military
assistance without any imposing restrictions on the size or capability
of Russian forces.[5] The security guarantees proposed in the draft 2022
Istanbul Protocol treated Russia as a neutral security “guarantor
state” of Ukraine along with the other permanent members of the UN
Security Council, failing to identify Russia as a belligerent in the
war. The outlined security guarantees would give China and Russia veto
power over any action the guarantors could take in response to a renewed
Russian attack by granting the UN Security Council the authority to
take “measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and
security.”[6] Such “security guarantees” would allow the Kremlin and
its allies to dictate the means and tools that Ukraine could use to
defend itself against Russia and restrict the ability of other guarantor
states to come to Ukraine’s assistance.

The Kremlin is continuing to indicate that Russian President
Vladimir Putin is unwilling to have an immediate bilateral meeting with
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the timeline proposed by US
President Donald Trump. Lavrov stated on August 20 that Putin
confirmed his readiness to continue direct negotiations with Ukraine in
the Istanbul format.[7] Russian and Ukrainian delegations have engaged
in three rounds of bilateral talks in Istanbul since February 2025,
which have resulted in nine prisoners of war (POW) exchanges, but little
more.[8] Lavrov claimed that Putin would consider raising the level of
the delegation heads after working groups had been established but added
that a summit between Putin and Zelensky would need thorough
preparations that could take time. Several US officials have stated that
Putin promised Trump that he would meet with Zelensky following the
multilateral summit between the United Stated, Ukraine, and European
leaders on August 18.[9] Trump stated on August 18 that Zelensky and
Putin need to meet urgently and that waiting too long before having a
leader-level bilateral meeting would result in thousands of deaths.[10]
Lavrov may have attempted to portray the Kremlin’s proposal of continued
negotiations within the Istanbul framework and working groups as
fulfilling Putin’s reported promise to Trump to hold a bilateral meeting
with Zelensky. Continued negotiations within the Istanbul framework are
a far cry from a head of state-level bilateral meeting, however, and
Lavrov’s statement is likely part of the Kremlin’s continued efforts to
protract peace negotiations and deflect blame for delays onto Ukraine
and the West.

The Russian economy continues to face budget deficits as a
result of increased defense spending and detrimental effects of Western
sanctions and secondary tariffs. Reuters reported on August 20
that the Russian government is preparing to increase taxes and reduce
its spending as it attempts to maintain its defense expenditure amid
economic cooling.[11] Russian Finance Ministry data indicated that the
Kremlin ran a budget deficit of 4.9 trillion rubles (roughly $61
billion) from January to August of 2025, exceeding the target for the
entire year by a quarter.[12] Russian Federation Council Committee on
Budget and Financial Markets Chairperson Antatoly Artamonov claimed in
late July 2025 that Russia needed to “urgently start fiscal
consolidation” amidst increasingly pessimistic economic indicators and a
decline in oil and gas revenues.[13] Reuters reported that Russia
spends over 17 trillion rubles (roughly $211 billion) or 41 percent of
its federal budget on its defense and national security. A Russian
government source stated that Russia’s defense spending likely
constitutes more than the stated eight percent of Russian GDP and
assessed that defense spending if unlikely to decrease in 2026 or in an
event of a ceasefire.[14] Reuters reported that the Russian government
is increasingly pulling funds away from the healthcare and education
sectors, and Russian officials are pushing for Russia to reallocate
funds from non-defense budgetary items to the defense sector. Reuters
reported that Russia has relatively a low debt-to-GDP ratio of around 20
percent; however, this metric is much less consequential as Russia is a
rentier state which uses oil and gas revenues and Russia’s sovereign
wealth fund to fund its war in Ukraine. The sovereign wealth fund is a
state-owned investment fund that Russia pulls money from to avoid
incurring debt, but Putin is steadily depleting the fund’s liquid
reserves to fund its war in Ukraine.[15]

Russia is jeopardizing its economic stability and the livelihoods of
Russian civilians to increasingly feed its defense industrial base (DIB)
and sustain the war effort in Ukraine. Russia faces a growing list of
costs from the war, including providing compensation for servicemembers
and their families, expanding its DIB, and sponsoring recruitment drives
for its war in Ukraine.[16] Russian officials have repeatedly attempted
to convince the Russian population that the Russian federal budget
prioritizes civilian and social expenditures while continuing to
allocate greater sums of the budget to defense spending.[17] The Russian
government also must face the future costs of compensating veterans and
their families by providing them with financial, medical, and
psychological support from the government over the coming decades.

Secondary tariffs are likely forcing Russia to sell oil below
market price, which could be decreasing the incoming flow of foreign
funds into the Russian economy and depleting Russia’s primary source of
wealth. Bloomberg reported on August 20 that India’s
state-owned oil refineries purchased an increased amount of Russian oil
from August 18 to 19, and Russian deputy trade representative in India
Yevgeny Griva told Bloomberg on August 20 that Russia expects India to
continue buying Russian oil because of a five percent discount.[18]
Bloomberg reported that Russia deepened its discount from one dollar in
July 2025 to $2.50 a barrel to Dated Brent, likely to incentivize Indian
refineries to purchase Russian oil amidst secondary tariffs.[19]
Bloomberg reported that Chinese oil refiners stepped up purchases of
Russian flagship oil as some Indian companies pulled back purchases of
Russian oil in August amidst US threats of tariffs.[20] Bloomberg
reported that China received shipments of 75,000 barrels per day from
the Urals, a marked increase from the year-to-date average of 40,000
barrels per day. Secondary tariffs may cost Russia additional foreign
funds if Russia is unable to successfully convince tariffed countries to
buy more oil from Russia that would compensate the difference between
the discount and market price. ISW continues to assess that secondary
sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting
Russian oil revenues which are essential for the Kremlin’s financing of
its war against Ukraine.[21]

The Kremlin is reportedly considering replacing Russian
Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairman Alexander Bastrykin, likely
as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to form a new and younger elite. Moscow-based business newspaper Vedomosti reported
on August 20 that the Kremlin is considering Bastrykin for the vacant
position of Chairman of the Russian Supreme Court.[22] Unspecified
sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration, Supreme Court,
and judicial community told Vedomosti that Bastrykin’s
replacement presents an opportunity to “introduce new blood” to Sledkom,
given that Bastrykin has headed Sledkom since 2011 and is approaching
the age of 72. The Kremlin allowed Bastrykin to remain in office past
the age of 70 in September 2024.[23] The Kremlin’s replacement of
Bastrykin is in line with Putin’s recent practice of reshuffling older
members of his inner circle to other roles rather than retiring or
firing them, as demonstrated by the appointment of former Russian
Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to oversee the Russian
shipbuilding industry in May 2025.[24] Putin has been recently promoting
younger officials who have significant involvement with the Russian war
effort such as former Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin, who became
the youngest ever member of the Russian Security Council in September
2024.[25] The promotion of younger officials connected to the war effort
is consistent with Putin’s February 2024 announcement that he is
forming a new elite out of veterans and committed supporters of the war
effort.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is demanding that Russia have a veto over
  any Western security guarantees for Ukraine in an effort to undermine
  ongoing US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to establish conditions for
  lasting peace in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin appears to be demanding that any security
  guarantees be based on those proposed in the Istanbul 2022 framework,
  which would grant Russia and its allies the right to veto Western
  military assistance to Ukraine and leave Ukraine helpless in the face of
  future Russian threats.
• The Kremlin is continuing to indicate that Russian President
  Vladimir Putin is unwilling to have an immediate bilateral meeting with
  Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the timeline proposed by US
  President Donald Trump.
• The Russian economy continues to face budget deficits as a
  result of increased defense spending and detrimental effects of Western
  sanctions and secondary tariffs.
• Secondary tariffs are likely forcing Russia to sell oil
  below market price, which could be decreasing the incoming flow of
  foreign funds into the Russian economy and depleting Russia’s primary
  source of wealth.
• The Kremlin is reportedly considering replacing Russian
  Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairman Alexander Bastrykin, likely
  as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to form a new and younger elite.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces
  advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Toretsk, and
  Velykomykhailivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because
these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly
affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will
continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal
activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and
specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn
Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva
Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe
them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from
  the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within
  tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of
  Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and
  encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk
  Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and
  possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 19 and 20.[27]

A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing in the direction of Novyi Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[28]

Sources in the Ukrainian military told The New Voice of Ukraine (NV)
that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian BARS Kursk Unmanned Systems
Battalion base in Oboyansky Raion, Kursk Oblast, where Russian forces
stationed drones overnight on August 19 to 20.[29] Social media sources
geolocated footage of the strikes on August 20.[30]

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed on August 20 that
the FSB detained three Ukrainian servicemen conducting a sabotage and
reconnaissance operation in an unspecified area of Bryansk Oblast’s
international border area.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
(Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine
along the international border and approach to within tube artillery
range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Sumy direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 19
and 20 indicates that Russian forces advanced seized Bezsalivka
(northwest of Sumy City) and into central Oleksiivka (north of Sumy
City).[32]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces
advanced southeast of Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and west of
Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[33]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Ryzhivka and
Bezsalivka; north of Sumy City near Kindrativka; and northeast of Sumy
City near Yunakivka on August 19 and 20.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed
that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and northeast of
Sumy City near Varachyne and Sadky.[35]

Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy
Kovalenko stated on August 20 that Russian milbloggers are mentioning
Sumy Oblast less frequently because Russian forces in Sumy Oblast are
suffering losses and gradually retreating in several areas of the
oblast.[36] A Ukrainian reserve officer noted that Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s June 2025 plan to create a buffer zone in Sumy Oblast
failed since Russian forces only maintain two small pockets in the
oblast.[37]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade
(Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka.[38] Elements
of the 1434th Akhmat-Chechnya Regiment, including an attached Storm V
company of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle
Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and
the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near
Varachyne.[39]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City).[40]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk,
Synelnykove, and on the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River on August
19 and 20.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces
counterattacked near Synelnykove.[42]
 

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near
Ambarne and southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Katerynivka on August 19
and 20 but did not advance..[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern and northern Kupyansk.[44]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near
Sobolivka; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove; north of Kupyansk near
Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, Fyholivka, and
Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August
19 and 20.[45] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated
that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking within Kupyansk itself.[46]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking
near Synkivka and Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[47]

The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on August 19 that a
Russian drone struck an ambulance in Kupyansk, in violation of
international law.[48]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1st
Guards Tank Army [GTA] (Moscow Military District [MMD]) and infantry,
likely of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army
[CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating in the Kupyansk
direction.[49] Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army
Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly operating near Stepova
Novosellivka.[50] Drone operators of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade
(1st GTA, MMD) and the Udaya Drone Group (reportedly of the 68th MRD)
are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk and in the
Kupyansk direction, respectively.[51]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and
southeast of Borova toward Olhivka and near Hlushchenkove on August 19
and 20.[52]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1st GTA (MMD) are operating near Zahryzove.[53]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 20
indicates that Russian forces advanced within southern Zarichne (east of
Lyman).[54]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove and
Serednie; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Ridkodub;
northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Torske
and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the
Serebryanske forest area on August 19 and 20.[55]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in
the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces in this direction
launch small infantry group assaults against Ukrainian positions at all
times of the day, attacking from multiple directions simultaneously and
constantly bringing up reserves to prolong assaults, sending as many as
10 successive small infantry groups per assault wave.[56] The NCO
reported that Russian forces are supported by drone operators using
Mavic, Lancet, and first-person view (FPV) drones, and occasionally
leverage motorcycles for these assaults. The NCO noted that terrain
features in this direction, including the Chorny Zherebets River,
prevent Russian forces from leveraging armored vehicles. The NCO also
stated that the Russian military command is deploying drone operators as
close as possible to the line of contact in this direction in order to
strike at Ukrainian firing points and logistical routes in the rear and
that fighting is attritional in Lyman direction.[57]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian
144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD), and the 1st and 15th
motorized rifle regiments (both of the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle
Division, 1st GTA, MMD) are operating toward the west (right) bank of
the Oskil River and Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman).[58] Mashovets
stated that elements of the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (1st
GTA, MMD) are operating south of Karpivka. Mashovets stated that
elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are
operating near Ridkodub and that elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle
Division (20th CAA, MMD) are operating near Hrekivka (north of Lyman).
Drone elements of the BARS-16 Kuban Detachment are reportedly striking
Ukrainian positions west of Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[59]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed
territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces
advanced northeast of Siversk and south of Novoselivka (east of
Siversk).[60]

Russian forces attacked north of Siversk near Serebryanka and in the
Kreminskyi forest area, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, east of
Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and Novoselivka, southeast of Siversk near
Vyimka, south of Siversk near Pereizne, and southwest of Siversk near
Fedorivka on August 19 and 20.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that
Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Serebryanka.[62]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle
Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s
Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are
reportedly operating near Vyimka.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces
advanced to the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv
Yar).[64]

Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and
Predtechyne and southwest of Chasiv Yar near Kostyantynivka on August
20.[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 77th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) are
reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv
Yar) direction.[66] Sniper elements and drone operators of the 98th
Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating and striking Ukrainian
positions in the Kostyantynivka direction and near Chasiv Yar,
respectively.[67] Elements of the 299th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division)
are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[68] Drone operators of the
8th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]), including its 439th Rocket
Artillery Brigade and 238th Artillery Brigade, are reportedly
coordinating Lancet drone strikes against Ukrainian positions near
Kostyantynivka.[69]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 19
indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of
Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk).[70]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near
Oleksandro-Shultyne, Dyliivka, and Bila Hora; west of Torestk near
Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Kleban Byk, Katerynivka,
Pleshchiivka, Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka and toward Stepanivka
on August 19 and 20.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian
forces counterattacked near Shcherbynivka.[72]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade
(3rd CAA, formerly 2nd LNR AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near
Oleksandro-Shultyne.[73] Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment
(150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating
near Kleban Byk.[74]
 

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August
20 indicates that Ukrainian forces retook Petrivka (north of
Pokrovsk).[75] ISW did not previously extend assessed advances or claims
over Petrivka and does not assess that Ukrainian forces retook Petrivka
in the last 24 hours, given that Ukrainian military sources reported
that Ukrainian forces retook the settlement on August 15.[76]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed
that Russian forces seized Pankivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[77] Russian
milbloggers claimed that Russian forced advanced north of Poltavka and
northeast of Poltavka within Volodymyrivka, east of Shakhove, toward
Sofiivka, and north of Kucheriv Yar.[78]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near
Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman; northeast of Pokrovsk near Shakhove,
Zapovidne, Novoekonomichne, Fedorivka, Mayak, Sofiivka, Zolotyi
Kolodyaz, Vesele, Kucheriv Yar, Zatyshok, and Volodymyrivka and toward
Myrnohrad; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Hrodivka, and Myrolyubivka;
southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka
and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and
Udachne on August 19 and 20.[79] Russian milbloggers claimed that
Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Russian penetration northeast of
Dobropillya, including north of Pokrovsk near Rubizhne and northeast of
Pokrovsk near Zolotyi Kolodyaz and Zapovidne.[80]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August
20 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking along the entire perimeter
of the Dobropillya penetration.[81] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian
forces are counterattacking Russian positions at the base of the
penetration in order to cut off the salient along the Nykanorivka-Mayak
line but that Russian forces still hold several positions along the
railroad west of Sukhetske. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces broke
through to Mayak and are fighting in the settlement.

Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 51st CAA (formerly
1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are operating in the
Dobropillya penetration appear to be reinforced by up to one and a half
battalions-worth of reserve units but that command will need time to
regroup manpower and materiel before any units can press north of
Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[82] Mashovets stated that the Russian 41st CAA
and 2nd CAA (both of the Central Military District [CMD]) are
accumulating personnel and materiel near Pokrovsk in anticipation of
future attempts by the 51st CAA to break through toward the northern
outskirts of Pokrovsk and sever the ground lines of communication
(GLOCs) to Dobropillya, though this breakthrough is delayed due to
Ukrainian counterattacks.[83] Mashovets reported that the Russian 114th
and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) are operating
northeast of Pokrovsk between Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and attacking
toward Kucheriv Yar in order to advance to the remaining Russian assault
units within the settlement but cannot break through.[84] Mashovets
stated that the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion (77th Motorized Rifle
Regiment, reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) and the
39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD])
are attacking Ukrainian positions east of Nykanorivka and seized a
windbreak north of Zatyshok (all northeast of Pokrovsk). Mashovets
reported that elements of the Russian 137th Motorized Rifle Brigade
(41st CAA) and the 72nd Spetsnaz Battalion (reportedly of the 3rd AC)
are attacking toward Hrodivka and Myrnohrad and advanced one kilometer
toward Promin (all east of Pokrovsk).[85] Mashovets stated that elements
of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are operating near
Udachne but have not advanced and that the 1437th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (formed during 2022 partial reserve call up) are still
operating in Zvirove.

Russian milbloggers claimed on August 20 that the Dobropillya
penetration remains a fluid part of the frontline and that neither
Ukrainian nor Russian forces are able to seize the initiative.[86] One
milblogger claimed that Russian forces maintain positions in Zolotyi
Kolodyaz despite Ukrainian counterattacks and that Russian forces are
consolidating positions in Rodynske.[87] Another milblogger claimed that
Ukrainian forces allegedly cleared Zolotyi Kolodyaz and Kucheriv Yar
but did not affirm those reports.[88]

An intelligence officer of a Ukrainian special forces unit operating
in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 20 that Russian forces are
using anti-drone thermal imaging cloaks and transporting electronic
warfare (EW) systems to forward infantry positions to counteract
Ukrainian drone activity.[89] The intelligence officer reported that
Russian forces often attempt to transport EW systems to the line of
contact on motorcycles and scooters due to Ukrainian drone activity
impeding Russian forces’ access to GLOCs.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate
Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st DNR AC, SMD) are reportedly
striking Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[90] Drone
operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are
reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myrnohrad.[91] Electronic
warfare elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD) are
reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[92]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of
Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near
Horikhove and Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Hrushivka,
and Dachne and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near
Hrushivske and Tovste on August 19 and 20.[93]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 11th Air Force and
Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly
coordinating airstrikes against Ukrainian positions near Ivanivka
(southwest of Novopavlivka).[94] Drone operators of the 656th Motorized
Rifle Regiment and the 657th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (both of the
29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near
Filya.[95] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned
Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near
Novopavlivka.[96] Elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st
CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
(Novopavlivka) direction.[97]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 20
shows elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA,
EMD) raising a flag in northern Novoheorhiivka, indicating that Russian
forces recently seized Novoheorhiivka (southeast of
Velykomykhailivka).[98] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited
elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade with the seizure of
Novoheorhiivka.[99] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets
stated on August 20 that Russian forces seized Maliivka and advanced
east of Vorone (both southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[100]

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated on August 20 that elements of
the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) and the 336th Naval
Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) advanced toward Voskresenka (east of
Velykomykhailivka) and Sichneve (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[101]
Mashovets added that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle
Division (5th CAA, EMD) and 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA)
advanced up to 2 kilometers southeast of Velykomykhailivka between
Zaporizke (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and Novoserhiivka referring
to Novomykolaivka or Novoheorhiivka) from the Temyrivka-Vilne Pole line.
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Vorone and
advanced toward Komyshuvakha (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[102]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Zelenyi
Hai; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad; and
southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Shevchenko, Zaporizke, Sichneve, and
Vorone and toward Komyshuvakha.[103]
 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
(Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas
against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of
Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets
reported on August 20 that Russian forces advanced along both sides of
the O-080619 Velyka Novosilka – Hulyaipole road and in the Novopil –
Novoivanivka direction (all northeast of Hulyaipole).[104] Russian
milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized and advanced north and
south of Temyrivka and toward Novomykolaivka (both northeast of
Hulyaipole).[105]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Temyrivka,
Obratne, and Zelene Pole and toward Novohryhorivka on August 19 and
20.[106]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1198th Motorized
Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern
Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions
near Hulyaipole.[107] Drone operators of the 60th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast and
artillery elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are
reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[108]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces
advanced near Plavni (southwest of Orikhiv) and south of Stepnohirsk
(west of Orikhiv).[109]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka;
southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka; west of Orikhiv near Plavni,
Stepnohirsk, and Shcherbaky; and northwest of Orikhiv toward Prymorske
on August 19 and 20.[110]

Geolocated footage published on August 20 shows Ukrainian forces
striking a Russian command post in Myrne (southwest of Orikhiv) and
Ukrainian drones striking a Russian S-300V air defense system north of
Oleksiivka (southeast of Orikhiv).[111]
 

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on August 20 but did not advance.[112]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for
Advanced Unmanned Technologies and elements of the Naval Detachment of
the 88^th Hispaniola Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer
Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near the coast of
occupied Crimea.[113]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes
against Ukraine on the night of August 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force
reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles
from occupied Crimea and 93 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the
directions of Bryansk and Millerovo cities; Primosko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar
Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda,
Crimea.[114] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces
downed 62 drones and one Iskander-M ballistic missile and that one
missile and 31 drones struck 20 locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian
officials reported that Russian drones and missile damaged civilian and
energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and
Sumy oblasts.[115] Sumy Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported that Russian
forces struck a residential area in Okhtyrka, Sumy Oblast, injuring 18
civilians.[116] Izmail Raion Administration reported that Russian forces
struck port infrastructure and caused a fire at a fuel and energy
infrastructure facility in Izmail, Odesa Oblast.[117]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Belarusian President
Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on August 20 to discuss opportunities to
expand bilateral relations.[118] Pezeshkian stated that Iran and Belarus
share common interests and that both countries seek to combat US and
European efforts to ”push unilateralism” in the regional and
international affairs.[119] Pezeshkian emphasized that Iran and Belarus
can cooperate to mitigate the effects of international sanctions.[120]
Iranian and Belarusian officials signed 12 memorandums of understanding
(MoU) focused on increasing bilateral trade, military-tech cooperation,
and mutual investment during Pezeshkian’s visit.[121] Iranian Minister
of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi stated on August 20 that Iran plans to
sign a comprehensive strategic partnership with Belarus.[122] Iran and
Belarus have increased defense and security cooperation in recent
years.[123] Iran showcased military equipment at a Belarusian military
exhibit in May 2025.[124] Iran has reportedly worked to establish a
drone factory in Belarus since May 2023 to support the Russian invasion
of Ukraine.[125]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any
source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively
on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.