Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 8, 2025

Note: The Ukrainian General
Staff’s 1600 May 8 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from
0000 to 1600 on May 8, and any reports of Russian ground activity in
this SITREP are by default an accusation that Russian forces violated
Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire. The Ukrainian General Staff’s
0800 May 8 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on
May 7 to 0800 on May 8. ISW is unable to assess whether Russian attacks
reported in the 0800 SITREP occurred after the start of Russia’s
ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff’s
2200 May 7 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to
2200 on May 7 before Russia’s implementation of its unliteral ceasefire
on May 8.]

The Kremlin continues to seize on
the Russian mythos of the Second World War ahead of Russia’s May 9
Victory Day holiday to set informational conditions to justify a
prolonged war in Ukraine and future aggression against NATO to Russian
society.
Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov published an
article on May 8 in which he argued that Russia’s war in Ukraine will go
down in history as a feat of courage and significance equal to the
victory of the Soviet military and people during the Second World
War.[1] Belousov claimed that Russia’s war in Ukraine is a continuation
of the “glorious traditions” of Soviet bravery and heroism and of the
Soviet people’s enthusiasm for enlisting and otherwise supporting the
war effort. Belousov claimed that Russia’s victory in Ukraine is
“inevitable.” Belousov said that domestic unity is a necessity for
Russia’s victory in Ukraine just as the Soviet Union’s “moral and
spiritual unity” was a critical factor for its victory in the Second
World War. Russian state media highlighted Belousov’s statements
comparing the Second World War to Russia’s war in Ukraine in their
coverage of his 10-page essay, indicating that the Kremlin is trying to
message to the domestic audience that Russia will achieve its goals in
its war in Ukraine as long as Russian society remains unified and
supportive.[2] Kremlin officials have recently seized on the mythos of
the Second World War to form the basis of a new pseudo-state ideology
that will span across generations and that the Kremlin intends to use to
justify potential future aggression against the West.[3]

Belousov
reiterated the Kremlin’s oft-repeated fallacious narrative that Russia
had no choice but to launch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in
February 2022 because the situation was “life or death.” Belousov
claimed that Ukraine is a conduit for the collective West’s “crusade”
against Russia, which Belousov claimed is a manifestation of “eternal
Russophobia” and intended to eradicate Russian statehood. Belousov
quoted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speech from February 24, 2022,
announcing the full-scale invasion.[4] Belousov amplified Putin’s
accusations that the United States and its Western allies had a policy
of “containment” against Russia and created a situation in which Russia
had to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine to defend Russia’s
interests.[5] The Kremlin is attempting to link Putin’s anti-Western
claims to the mythos of the Second World War in order to heighten the
existential threat against Russia that the Kremlin claims Russia is
currently facing. It is also reconstructing the Soviet-era narrative
that the West is conspiring to destroy Russia (in place of the Soviet
Union) and that the conflict will be unending.

Belousov
explicitly identified large-scale Russian military reforms as
preparations for a future conflict with NATO as Russian Security Council
Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened European countries that support
Ukraine.[6]
Belousov stated in his May 8 essay that Russia has
reformed and augmented its military specifically in response to NATO
expansion and military build-up (undertaken only well after the Russian
2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine), including by reorganizing Russia’s
Western Military District (WMD) into the Moscow and Leningrad military
districts (MMD and LMD); re-opening two former military academies and
establishing a new third military academy; and fully forming, staffing,
and equipping two combined arms armies, a river flotilla, a mixed
aviation corps, and 50 other formations and units.[7] ISW has long
assessed that Russian military restructuring efforts, including reforms
of the LMD and MMD, are part of future preparations for war against
NATO.[8]

Medvedev threatened that European countries must
“remember” the “crushing defeat of Nazi Germany” when supporting
Ukraine.[9] Medvedev notably made his threat on his English-language X
account, indicating that Medvedev intended this threat for international
audiences.[10] Other senior Russian officials have also intensified
accusations against European states for supporting “Naziism” in recent
days.[11] Medvedev’s threat and Russian claims of European “Nazism” are
part of the Kremlin’s ongoing reflexive control campaign that aims to
push European countries into refraining from providing further
assistance to Ukraine.[12] Kremlin officials have also recently framed
European efforts to shoulder more of their own defense requirements (in
line with US President Donald Trump’s efforts) as threatening to Russia,
and the Kremlin’s reflexive control campaign likely also aims to
prevent European states from building up their defenses. Dutch Military
Intelligence and Security Service Head Vice Admiral Peter Reesink warned
in an interview with Politico published on May 8 that Russia’s most
threatening behavior is its military buildup and moving military assets
towards Russia’s borders with Finland and the Baltic states.[13] Reesink
stated that Russia appears to be producing more artillery than the
Russian military needs for its war in Ukraine when taking account of the
assistance Russia is receiving from its allies. Reuters published
an investigation on May 8 revealing that Russia has been constructing a
significant new production line for explosives at the Biysk Oleum Plant
in Siberia that is planned to produce 6,000 metric tons of explosives
annually.[14] Reuters noted that this would be enough explosive
to manufacture 1.28 million 152mm artillery rounds and that Russia
produced nearly two million 122mm and 152mm artillery rounds in 2024,
suggesting that this new production line could expand Russia’s artillery
shell production capacity by over 50 percent when completed.

Russia
claimed to have implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May
8 and accused Ukraine of ceasefire violations even though Ukraine did
not officially and publicly agree to Russia’s ceasefire. Russia’s
unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and accusations of violations continue
to demonstrate the necessity that any ceasefire or peace agreement be
formally agreed to in advance by all parties and include robust
monitoring mechanisms.
Russian President Vladimir Putin
announced on April 28 Russia’s ceasefire starting at midnight on the
night of May 7 to 8 and ending at midnight on the night of May 10 to 11
in honor of Victory Day on May 9.[15] Russia’s Victory Day celebrates
the Soviet Union’s contributions to defeating Nazi Germany during the
Second World War while minimizing the role of the United States. The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completely
ceased combat operations and remained at their current positions at
midnight Moscow time on May 8 in accordance with Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s unilateral ceasefire.[16] The Russian MoD claimed that
Ukrainian forces did not stop combat operations “despite the
announcement of the ceasefire.” Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha
stated on May 8 that Russian forces continued to attack across the
entire frontline.[17] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation
Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Russian forces shelled Sumy
and Kharkiv oblasts after the start of the ceasefire.[18] Ukrainian
outlet Suspilne reported that servicemembers from three
Ukrainian units operating in the Pokrovsk direction and in southern
Ukraine confirmed that they received instructions to open fire only in
response to Russian combat operations.[19]

Ukrainian
officials continue to highlight Ukraine’s willingness to implement US
President Donald Trump’s desired 30-day ceasefire to precede peace talks
.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that he spoke with Trump
on May 8 about the concrete steps needed to achieve peace.[20] Zelensky
reiterated to Trump that Ukraine is ready for an immediate 30-day
ceasefire and for talks “in any format.” Zelensky reported that Trump
supported a 30-day ceasefire. Ukrainian Presidential Administration
Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated that Ukraine can only start peace
negotiations after the implementation of an unconditional 30-day
ceasefire and that the United States and Ukraine’s European partners
agree with this timeline.[21] Yermak noted that Russia and Ukraine can
agree on a format for peace negotiations and appoint delegations after a
longer-term ceasefire is in place.

The Kremlin is
attempting to exploit its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire to blame
Ukraine for the lack of progress toward a longer-term ceasefire and
peace negotiations despite Russia’s continued rejection of such a
longer-term ceasefire.
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 7 that Ukraine does
not want to seriously discuss a long-term ceasefire.[22] Zakharova
claimed that Russia’s support for the previous US- and
Ukrainian-proposed 30-day moratorium on strikes against energy
infrastructure and Russia’s unilateral Easter truce shows that Russia
has never been against a ceasefire, even though the Kremlin has
continued to protract and delay meaningful negotiations to establish a
comprehensive ceasefire.[23] Zakharova accused Ukraine of repeatedly
violating the strikes and Easter ceasefires and claimed that there could
be progress toward a long-term ceasefire should Ukraine observe
shorter-term ceasefires. Zakharova repeated recent Kremlin narratives
that Ukraine cannot control its own military and Putin’s rejection of
previous US and Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposals on the grounds that
there are “nuances” about enforcement mechanisms and weapons provisions
to Ukraine that the parties would need to work out prior to
implementation.[24] Russia previously accused Ukraine of violating the
strikes and Easter ceasefires while rarely offering evidence supporting
these accusations, and Russian officials will likely do the same during
the unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in order to distract from Russia’s
continued intransigence in negotiations about Ukraine.[25]

Russian
President Vladimir Putin and People’s Republic of China (PRC) President
Xi Jinping conducted a series of bilateral engagements in Moscow on May
8, showcasing deeper Russian–Chinese cooperation and alignment.
[26]
These engagements mark the third official meeting in 2025 between Putin
and Xi. Putin and Xi signed a package of bilateral intergovernmental
and interdepartmental cooperation documents and issued a joint statement
on May 8.[27] Xi travelled to Russia to attend Russia’s Victory Day
celebrations on May 9. Putin and Xi discussed the roles that China and
the Soviet Union played in the Second World War, emphasized the
importance of their countries’ contributions to the defeat of fascism,
highlighted significant Chinese and Soviet losses in the war, and
claimed that China and the Soviet Union were the “main theaters” in the
war.[28] Russian officials repeatedly use the mythos of the Soviet
Union’s sacrifice during the Second World War to persuade the Russian
population that their increasing social and economic sacrifices for the
Russian war effort in Ukraine can lead to victory.[29] Russian officials
are likely overemphasizing World War II mythos to bolster support for
Russia’s war effort in Ukraine in part due to Russia’s inability to
showcase battlefield successes for Victory Day 2025.

The
joint Russian–Chinese statement on May 8 referenced Putin’s original
aims in launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to
lend international support and legitimacy to Russia’s goals and
attempted justifications for the war.
The Russian–Chinese joint
statement asserted that Russia and the PRC are “convinced” that a
long-term and sustainable settlement in the war in Ukraine requires the
elimination of the “root causes” of the war.[30] The joint statement
claimed that Russia and the PRC will work to counter attempts to
“rehabilitate” Nazism and the rise of militarism that contribute to
discrimination and intolerance. The joint statement noted that Russia
“positively evaluates” the PRC’s position on the war in Ukraine and that
Russia welcomes the PRC’s desire to play a role in the political and
diplomatic efforts towards settling the war. The PRC and Brazil — two
members of BRICS — have notably put forth peace proposals for the war in
Ukraine that heavily favored Russia.[31] The Kremlin has repeatedly
claimed that Russia must eliminate the “root causes” of its full-scale
invasion of Ukraine, which Russian officials have defined as NATO’s
alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and
along Russia’s borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian
government’s alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian
language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[32] Putin named Ukraine’s
“demilitarization” and “denazification” as Russia’s main goals when he
launched his full-scale invasion in February 2022, and Russian officials
have consistently used these terms to call for the removal of the
current legitimate Ukrainian government, the installation of a
pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv, and the reduction of Ukraine’s
military such that Ukraine is unable to defend itself in the future.[33]
Russia has attempted to exploit diplomatic meetings with PRC and
Iranian officials in recent months to publicly reiterate these original
war aims and posture Russia’s allies as supportive in these efforts.[34]
The PRC has previously publicly attributed talk of Russia’s alleged
need to eliminate the “root causes” of the war in Ukraine only to
Kremlin officials — not PRC officials.[35] The May 8 joint
Russian–Chinese statement declaring that “the parties” are “convinced”
of the need to eliminate the “root causes” of the war is a notable
inflection in PRC rhetoric.

The joint Russian–Chinese
statement supported Putin’s proposed Eurasian security architecture and
Russia’s ongoing efforts to create a Russia-dominated alternative,
anti-Western bloc.
Russia and the PRC reiterated their mutual
interest in establishing a multipolar world order in which the UN plays a
central role.[36] Xi further claimed that both Russia and the PRC bear a
special responsibility as permanent members of the UNSC and great
powers to oversee the creation of a new multipolar world.[37] The joint
statement underscored both parties’ commitment to the creation of a
Eurasian security architecture – a reference to the architecture that
Putin first proposed in June 2024 with Xi’s support.[38] The joint
statement highlighted the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), and BRICS – organizations that Kremlin officials have previously
labelled as the foundation of Putin’s proposed Eurasian security
architecture.[39] The joint statement paradoxically called for an end to
confrontational bloc mentality and specifically cited NATO expansion as
an example of such bloc mentality. The statement noted that Russia and
the PRC find the construction of military blocs that are anti-Russian
and anti-Chinese in nature unacceptable. The statement emphasized the
need to eliminate the “root causes” of interstate conflicts before the
creation of a Eurasian security architecture – the first time Russian
officials have publicly linked their calls for the elimination of “root
causes” with Putin’s proposed Eurasian security architecture. ISW
continues to assess that Russia has been building a web of overlapping
coalitions and partnerships, including within the CSTO, CIS, ASEAN,
BRICS, and SCO, to offset the limits of Russian state power and that
Putin’s Eurasian security architecture proposal is part of Russian
efforts to create an alternative Russian-led bloc to further Putin’s
goals of destroying NATO and weaking the West and its allies.[40]

The
United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine’s (UN HRMMU)
reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties have significantly increased
between 2024 and 2025.
The UN HRMMU reported that Ukrainian
civilian casualties increased 23 percent between March 2025 and April
2025 and increased by 84 percent between April 2024 and April 2025.[41]
The UN HRMMU reported that at least 209 civilians were killed and 1,146
civilians were injured in the war in April 2025. The UN HRMMU reported
that 97 percent of these civilian casualties were in unoccupied Ukraine
and that April 2025 had the highest number of civilian casualties since
September 2024. The HRMMU reported that almost half of these casualties
were due to missile and loitering munition strikes and noted several
Russian drone and missile strikes in urban areas of Kryvyi Rih and Sumy,
Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv, and Kharkiv cities in April 2025. The UN
HRMMU reported that short-range drone strikes accounted for 23 percent
of civilian casualties, most of which were in Kherson Oblast. The UN
HRMMU noted that a drone strike against a civilian bus in Marhanets,
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (on the east [right] bank of the Dnipro River
immediately across from the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power
Plant) significantly contributed to these casualties.

The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada ratified the US–Ukrainian bilateral economic partnership agreement on May 8.[42] The United States and Ukraine signed the bilateral economic partnership agreement on April 30.[43]

Key Takeaways:

  • The
    Kremlin continues to seize on the Russian mythos of the Second World
    War ahead of Russia’s May 9 Victory Day holiday to set informational
    conditions to justify a prolonged war in Ukraine and future aggression
    against NATO to Russian society.
  • Belousov
    explicitly identified large-scale Russian military reforms as
    preparations for a future conflict with NATO as Russian Security Council
    Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened European countries that support
    Ukraine.
  • Russia claimed to have implemented its
    unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8 and accused Ukraine of
    ceasefire violations even though Ukraine did not officially and publicly
    agree to Russia’s ceasefire. Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire
    and accusations of violations continue to demonstrate the necessity that
    any ceasefire or peace agreement be formally agreed to in advance by
    all parties and include robust monitoring mechanisms.
  • Ukrainian
    officials continue to highlight Ukraine’s willingness to implement US
    President Donald Trump’s desired 30-day ceasefire to precede peace talks
    .
  • The
    Kremlin is attempting to exploit its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire
    to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress toward a longer-term ceasefire
    and peace negotiations despite Russia’s continued rejection of such a
    longer-term ceasefire.
  • Russian President
    Vladimir Putin and People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping
    conducted a series of bilateral engagements in Moscow on May 8,
    showcasing deeper Russian–Chinese cooperation and alignment.
  • The
    joint Russian–Chinese statement on May 8 referenced Putin’s original
    aims in launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to
    lend international support and legitimacy to Russia’s goals and
    attempted justifications for the war.
  • The joint
    Russian–Chinese statement supported Putin’s proposed Eurasian security
    architecture and Russia’s ongoing efforts to create a Russia-dominated
    alternative, anti-Western bloc.
  • The United
    Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine’s (UN HRMMU) reported
    that Ukrainian civilian casualties have significantly increased between
    2024 and 2025.
  • The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada ratified the US-Ukrainian bilateral economic partnership agreement on May 8.
  • Ukrainian
    forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian
    forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts and near Kupyansk,
    Borova, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

image

We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Alleged Ceasefire Violation
  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian
    Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the
    international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube
    artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort
    #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into
    eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian
    Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast,
    the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly
    advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

See topline and axes text for reports of violations of Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian
and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast before Russia’s
unilaterally imposed Victory Day ceasefire as Russian and Ukrainian
sources accused each other of violating Russia’s ceasefire on May 8

Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates
that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Chapayeva Street in
southwestern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and southeast of the
settlement.[44]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage
published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced up to
the international border south of Oleshnya (southeast of Sudzha).[45]

The
Ukrainian General Staff’s May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian
forces attacked in Kursk Oblast on May 7 before Russia implemented its
unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[46]

The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces
violated Russia’s ceasefire by attacking across the international border
in Kursk Oblast on May 8.[47] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 that
Ukrainian forces attacked toward Tetkino and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino
along the international border).[48]

A Russian milblogger claimed
on May 7 that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in Kursk
Oblast and that Ukrainian forces maintain their drone superiority over
Russian forces in the area.[49] Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces
reported on May 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian “Zaslon” radar
system in Kursk Oblast.[50]

Order of Battle: Elements of the
Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly
operating near Tetkino.[51]

image

A
Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia’s
unilateral Victory Day ceasefire near Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod
City) on May 8.[52]

Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis
(Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine
along the international border and approach to within tube artillery
range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently
advanced in northern Sumy Oblast before Russia’s unilateral Victory Day
ceasefire as Russian sources accused Ukrainian forces of violating
Russia’s ceasefire on May 8.

Assessed Russian advances:
Geolocated footage published on May 6 indicates that Russian forces
recently advanced to central Loknya (northeast of Sumy City).[53]

Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 8 that Russian forces
advanced near Vodolahy, Bilovody (both north of Sumy City), and
Loknya.[54]

A Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia’s unilateral ceasefire near Bilovody on May 8.[55]

Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd
Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military
District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction, and
elements of the “Anvar Spetsnaz” detachment (possibly referring to the
BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian
positions northwest of Sumy City near the Sumy-Bryansk Oblast
international border.[56]

image

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian sources accused Russian
forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast of violating Russia’s unilateral
Victory Day ceasefire on May 8.

Unconfirmed claims: A
Russian milblogger claimed on May 7 that Russian forces advanced on the
eastern outskirts of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[57]

The
Ukrainian General Staff’s May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian
forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski
Khutory on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day
ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[58]

The Ukrainian General
Staff’s May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near
Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory.[59] ISW is unable to assess whether
these attacks occurred after the start of Russia’s unilateral ceasefire
at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff’s May 8
1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s unilateral
Victory Day ceasefire by attacking in unspecified areas of northern
Kharkiv Oblast.[60] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson
Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on May 8 that Russian forces continued to
attack in the Kharkiv direction following Russia’s implementation of
its unilateral ceasefire.[61]

Order of Battle: Elements of the
Russian “Anvar Spetsnaz” detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25
“Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian
positions near Synelnykove (south of Vovchansk).[62]

image

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

image

Russian
forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction before the start of
Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire as Ukrainian sources accused
Russian forces of violating Russia’s ceasefire on May 8.

Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that
Russian forces marginally advanced to the northeastern outskirts of
Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[63]

The Ukrainian General
Staff’s May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked
southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka on May 7 before Russia implemented
its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[64]

The
Ukrainian General Staff’s May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian
forces attacked near Hlushkivka.[65] ISW is unable to assess whether
these attacks occurred after the start of Russia’s unilateral ceasefire
at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff’s May 8
1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s unilateral
Victory Day ceasefire by attacking northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka
and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka.[66] Ukrainian
Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated on May
8 that fighting is ongoing in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the
Kupyansk direction.[67]

image

Russian
forces recently advanced in the Borova direction as Ukrainian forces
accused Russian forces of violating Russia’s unilateral Victory Day
ceasefire on May 8.

Assessed Russian Advances:
Geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that Russian forces
recently advanced northwest of Makiivka (northeast of Borova).[68] ISW
is unable to assess if this recent Russian advance occurred before the
start of Russia’s unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The
Ukrainian General Staff’s May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian
forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova
Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near
Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on May 7 before Russia implemented its
unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[69]

The
Ukrainian General Staff’s May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian
forces attacked near Zahryzove, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Hrekivka and
toward Olhivka.[70] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks
occurred after the start of Russia’s unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow
time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff’s May 8 1600 SITREP
implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s unilateral Victory Day
ceasefire by attacking near Nova Kruhlyakivka, Novoyehorivka (east of
Borova), and Hrekivka.[71]

Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces in the Lyman direction of violating Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8.

Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced
northwest and west of the Nove (northeast of Lyman).[72]

The
Ukrainian General Staff’s May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces
attacked northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and toward Ridkodub and
Novyi Mir on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day
ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[73]

The Ukrainian General
Staff’s May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near
Kolodyazi and toward Ridkodub and Novyi Mir.[74] ISW is unable to assess
whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia’s unilateral
ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General
Staff’s May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s
unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Kolodyazi and Torske
(east of Lyman) and toward Novomykhailivka, Ridkodub, and Zelena Dolyna
(all northeast of Lyman).[75] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces
Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian forces
continued to attack in the Lyman direction after Russia’s implementation
of its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.[76]

image

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed
territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

image

Ukrainian
sources accused Russian forces in the Siversk direction of violating
Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8.

The
Ukrainian General Staff’s May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces
attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near
Verkhnokamyanske on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral
Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[77]

The
Ukrainian General Staff’s May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces
attacked near Bilohorivka and Verkhnokamyanske.[78] ISW is unable to
assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia’s
unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian
General Staff’s May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated
Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Bilohorivka
and Fedorivka (southeast of Siversk)[79]

Ukrainian and
Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia’s unilateral
Victory Day ceasefire in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 8.

Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 that Russian forces
advanced north of Chasiv Yar and entered the Sieverny mine.[80]

The
Ukrainian General Staff’s May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian
forces attacked near Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora
and Predtechnye on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral
Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[81]

The
Ukrainian General Staff’s May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces
attacked near Chasiv Yar, Bila Hora, and Predtechnye.[82] ISW is unable
to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia’s
unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian
General Staff’s May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated
Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Chasiv Yar
and Kurdyumivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) on May 8.[83] Ukrainian
Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported
on May 8 that Russian forces violated Russia’s unilateral ceasefire in
the Chasiv Yar direction after Russia implemented its unilateral
ceasefire[84]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces
violated Russia’s unilateral ceasefire and counterattacked in the Chasiv
Yar direction on May 8.[85]

Order of Battle: Elements of the
Russian “Burevestnik” detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) and the
“Volga” Artillery Regiment (reportedly Russian Volunteer Corps) are
reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[86]

Ukrainian
and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction before
Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire as Ukrainian and Russian
sources accused each other of violating Russia’s ceasefire on May 8.

Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 6 indicates
that Ukrainian forces advanced to Radhospna Street in northwest
Druzhba.[87]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage
published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces advanced in southern
Nova Poltavka (west of Toretsk).[88]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian
milbloggers claimed on May 7 and 8 that Russian forces advanced north of
and into central Nova Poltavka, west of Nelipivka (northwest of
Toretsk), north of and into northern Novoolenivka (west of Toretsk),
north of and toward Oleksandropil, and into the western outskirts of
Leonidivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[89] A Russian milblogger claimed
on May 8 that Russian forces seized most of Oleksandropil but did not
specify when the advance occurred.[90] A Russian milblogger claimed on
May 8 that Russian forces advanced to the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka
highway near Novoolenivka.[91]

The Ukrainian General Staff’s May 7
2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Toretsk, north
of Toretsk near Dyliivka, west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Nova
Poltavka, and southwest of Toretsk near Malynivka on May 7 before Russia
implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on
May 8.[92]

The Ukrainian General Staff’s May 8 0800 SITREP
reported that Russian forces Russian forces attacked near Toretsk,
Dyliivka, Shcherbynivka, Nova Poltavka, Malynivka, and Yelyzavetivka and
toward Romanivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[93] ISW is unable to
assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia’s
unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian
General Staff’s May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated
Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Toretsk,
Krymske (north of Toretsk), Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk), and
Yelyzavetivka on May 8.[94] Trehubov stated on May 8 that Russian forces
attacked in the Toretsk direction following Russia’s implementation of
its unilateral ceasefire.[95]

The Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD) claimed on May 8 that Ukrainian forces violated Russia’s
unilateral ceasefire by counterattacking near Toretsk.[96] A Russian
milblogger claimed on May 8 that Ukrainian forces violated Russia’s
ceasefire near Toretsk.[97]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces
Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on May 8 that
Russian forces operating in the Toretsk direction are using the cover of
spring foliage to storm Ukrainian positions in small infantry
groups.[98]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th
Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military
District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukranian positions near
Kleban-Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[99] Elements of the 33rd Motorized
Rifle Regiment and the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 20th
Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in
Novoolenivka (west of Toretsk).[100]

image

Ukrainian
and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia’s unilateral
Victory Day ceasefire in the Pokrovsk direction on May 8.

Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 that Russian forces
marginally advanced near Novoserhiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[101] One
milblogger claimed that Russian forces made this advance on May 7 prior
to Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire, but the other milblogger
did not specify when this advance occurred.[102]

The Ukrainian
General Staff’s May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked
southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and southwest of Pokrovsk near
Kotlyne, Zvirove, Novoserhiivka, and Udachne on May 7 before Russia
implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on
May 8.[103]

The Ukrainian General Staff’s May 8 0800 SITREP
reported that Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk, Lysivka, Kotlyne,
Zvirove, Novoserhiivka, and Udachne.[104] ISW is unable to assess
whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia’s unilateral
ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General
Staff’s May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s
unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Myrolyubivka (east of
Pokrovsk), near Hrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), Dachenske (south of
Pokrovsk), and near Kotlyne, Zvirove, and Udachne on May 8.[105]
Trehubov stated on May 8 that Russian forces continued to attack in the
Pokrovsk direction following Russia’s implementation of its unilateral
Victory Day ceasefire.[106]

A Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian
forces of violating Russia’s ceasefire on May 8 by conducting drone
strikes against Russian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[107]

Ukraine’s
Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on May 7 that Russian forces
continue to increase their use of motorcycles in assaults in the
Pokrovsk direction.[108] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade
operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on May 8 that Russian forces
are conducting small infantry assaults with motorized vehicle and drone
support.[109] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are repeatedly
deploying assaults consisting of poorly trained infantry to first
overwhelm Ukrainian defenses before better-trained infantry attack.

Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Vega” Spetsnaz Detachment
(24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff’s Main Intelligence
Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk
direction.[110]

image

Ukrainian
sources accused Russian forces in the Novopavlivka direction of
violating Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8.

Unconfirmed
claims: The Russian MoD claimed on May 8 that Russian forces seized
Troitske (southeast of Novopavlivka) before Russia implemented its
unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8.[111] Russian milbloggers
claimed on May 7 that Russian forces advanced south of Novooleksandrivka
(northeast of Novopavlivka) and near Kotlyarivka, Nadiivka (both east
of Novopavlivka), and Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[112]

The
Ukrainian General Staff’s May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian
forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka; east
of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka and Kotlyarivka; and southeast of
Novopavlivka near Trotiske and Bohdanivka on May 7 before Russia
implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on
May 8.[113]

The Ukrainian General Staff’s May 8 0800 SITREP
reported that Russian forces attacked near Novooleksandrivka, Nadiivka,
Kotlyarivka, Trotiske, and Bohdanivka.[114] ISW is unable to assess
whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia’s unilateral
ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General
Staff’s May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s
unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Novooleksandrivka,
Kotlyarivka, and Preobrazhenka (east of Novopavlivka) on May 8.[115]
Trehubov stated on May 8 that Russian forces attacked in the
Novopavlivka direction after Russia implemented its unilateral
ceasefire.[116]

image

Russian
forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction before Russia
implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and Ukrainian sources
accused Russian forces of violating Russia’s ceasefire on May 8.

Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that
Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Rozdolne (southwest of
Kurakhove).[117]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed
on May 8 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Andriivka (west of
Kurakhove) and near Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove) prior to Russia’s
unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.[118]

The Ukrainian General
Staff’s May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked west of
Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Bahatyr, and Oleksiivka and
toward Odradne on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory
Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[119]

The Ukrainian
General Staff’s May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Bahatyr,
Oleksiivka, and Odradne.[120] ISW is unable to assess whether these
attacks occurred after the start of Russia’s unilateral ceasefire at
0000 Moscow time on May 8.[121]

The Ukrainian General Staff’s May 8
1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s unilateral
Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Andriivka and Rozlyv (southwest
of Kurakhove) on May 8.[122] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian
detachment reported on May 8 that Russian forces violated Russia’s
unilateral ceasefire by attacking near Bahatyr on May 8.[123]

Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 200th Artillery Brigade and 36th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 29th CAA, Eastern Military District
[EMD]) and 43rd Spetsnaz Company (reportedly also of the 29th CAA) are
reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[124]

Russian forces
recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction before Russia’s
unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and Ukrainian and Russian sources
accused each other of violating Russia’s ceasefire on May 8.

Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that
Russian forces advanced in fields northwest of Rozdolne (northeast of
Velyka Novosilka).[125]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers
claimed on May 7 that Russian forces advanced north of Dniproenerhiya
(north of Velyka Novosilka) and west of Novosilka (west of Velyka
Novosilka).[126]

The Ukrainian General Staff’s May 7 2200 SITREP
reported that Russian forces attacked west of Velyka Novosilka near
Vilne Pole and Novosilka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka toward
Novopil on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day
ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[127]

The Ukrainian General
Staff’s May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near
Vilne Pole and Novosilka and toward Novopil.[128] ISW is unable to
assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia’s
unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian
General Staff’s May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated
Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Burlatske
(northwest of Velyka Novosilka), Novosilka, Pryvilne (west of Velyka
Novosilka), and Novopil on May 8.[129] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces
Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on May 8 that Russian
forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by attacking near Novopil and
Novosilka.[130] Voloshyn stated that Russian aviation has ceased
activity since the start of Russia’s ceasefire but that Russian forces
continue artillery and drone strikes, albeit at a decreased intensity.

A
Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia’s
ceasefire on May 8 by conducting drone strikes against Russian positions
along the Vilne Pole-Novosilka-Novodarivka line (west and southwest of
Velyka Novosilka).[131]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
(Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas
against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of
Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian sources accused
Russian forces in the Zaporizhia direction of violating Russia’s
unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8.

The Ukrainian
General Staff’s May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked
southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske
before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000
Moscow time on May 8.[132]

The Ukrainian General Staff’s May 8
0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Kamyanske and
Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv).[133] ISW is unable to assess whether these
attacks occurred after the start of Russia’s unilateral ceasefire at
0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff’s May 8
1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s unilateral
Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Stepove and Shcherbaky.[134]
Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 that Russian forces attacked near
Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv), Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv),
Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske.[135]

Order of Battle: Drone
operators of the Russian BARS-3 “Rodina” Battalion (Russian Combat Army
Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction, and drone
operators of the “Viking” Drone detachment are reportedly operating near
Kamyanske.[136] Drone operators of the 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment
(7th VDV Division) and of the “Nemets” group of the 291st Motorized
Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army
[CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the
Zaporizhia direction.[137]

image

Ukrainian
and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia’s unilateral
Victory Day ceasefire in the Kherson direction on May 8.

The
Ukrainian General Staff’s May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian
forces attacked in the Kherson direction before Russia implemented its
unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[138]

The
Ukrainian General Staff’s May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian
forces attacked in the Kherson direction.[139] ISW is unable to assess
whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia’s unilateral
ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General
Staff’s May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s
unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking in the Kherson
direction.[140] Ukrainian officials reported on May 8 that Russian
forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by striking civilian infrastructure
in the Kherson direction.[141]

A Russian milblogger accused
Ukrainian forces of violating Russia’s ceasefire on May 8 by attempting
to land on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River near the Antonvisky
Bridge.[142]

A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Kherson
direction reported that Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaging in
combat at a distance, so this area of the front is largely static.[143]

Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Separate Naval Infantry
Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating on the west (right)
bank of the Dnipro River.[144]

image

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian
forces conducted a drone strike against Ukraine on the evening of May 7
before Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire. The Ukrainian Air
Force reported that Russian forces launched a third wave of drone
strikes against Ukraine during the evening consisting of 31 Shahed and
decoy drones.[145] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian
forces downed 20 drones in northern and central Ukraine and that six
decoy drones were “lost in location.” The Ukrainian State Emergency
Service reported that the evening drone strike hit infrastructure near
Uman, Cherkasy Oblast.[146]

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Russian forces did not launch missiles or long-range drones against
Ukraine on May 8 as of 0800 Kyiv time.[147] The Ukrainian Air Force
noted that Russian forces had increased glide bomb strikes against Sumy
Oblast in violation of Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.[148]

Former
Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the General Staff, retired Lieutenant General
Ihor Romanenko, stated in an interview published on May 8 that Russian
forces are using a roughly one –to-one ratio of Shahed strike drones to
decoy drones in their strike packages.[149] Romanenko stated that these
decoy drones include “Gerber” and “Parodi” drones and that Russian
forces have improved their decoy drones over time, using the decoys to
conduct reconnaissance and equipping the decoys with small warheads.
Romanenko reported that some of the explosives in decoy drones are meant
to detonate immediately upon impact while others have delayed
detonations. Romanenko stated that Russian forces use these decoys
primarily to distract Ukrainian air defenses and augment the drones with
parts that make them falsely appear on radars as much larger targets.

Romanenko
clarified that reports from the Ukrainian Air Force that Russian drones
were “locationally lost” mean that Ukrainian forces detected the drones
but that the drones then maneuvered and left the area of responsibility
of the Ukrainian unit that first identified the drone such that
Ukrainian air defenders could not locate the drone again.[150]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia
is likely using increased Belarusian-Chinese cooperation as part of its
sanctions evasions measures. Belarusian Economy Minister Yuriy Chebotar
claimed on May 7 during a meeting of Belarusian-Chinese
Intergovernmental Committee on Cooperation’s Commission on Trade and
Economic Cooperation in Beijing that Belarus aims to increase trade,
economic, and industrial cooperation with the People’s Republic of China
(PRC).[151] Chebotar highlighted Belarusian-Chinese cooperation in
mechanical engineering, machine tool production, and optics and
electronics.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified
material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and
draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and
social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and
other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all
sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

image


[1] http://www.scrf.gov dot ru/media/files/file/83ufGkI0SUHYUOJoEaGisEuiDfyFVUMu.pdf

[2]
https://iz dot
ru/1883256/2025-05-08/belousov-sravnil-borbu-vs-rf-s-neonatcizmom-s-podvigom-naroda-i-krasnoi-armii;
https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23884365; https://www.kommersant dot
ru/doc/7711576; https://lenta dot
ru/news/2025/05/08/belousov-sravnil-borbu-s-neonatsizmom-s-podvigom-krasnoy-armii/;

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025

[4] kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67843

[5] http://www.scrf.gov dot ru/media/files/file/83ufGkI0SUHYUOJoEaGisEuiDfyFVUMu.pdf

[6] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1920352919485845990

[7] http://www.scrf.gov dot ru/media/files/file/83ufGkI0SUHYUOJoEaGisEuiDfyFVUMu.pdf

[8]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020825;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar020525

[9] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1920352919485845990

[10] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1920352919485845990

[11]
https://t.me/MID_Russia/57570; https://t.me/RusEmbUK/2165;
https://t.me/MID_Russia/57448; https://t.me/tass_agency/313910 ;
https://t.me/tass_agency/313911;

 

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025

[13] https://www.politico.eu/article/china-cyber-menace-more-threatening-russia-warns-dutch-spy-chief/

[14] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-russia-explore-ways-restore-russian-gas-flows-europe-sources-say-2025-05-08/

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825

[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/52304

[17] https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1920415076143514031

[18] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9223

[19] https://t.me/suspilnenews/49674

[20] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1920573788967833743

[21] https://www.zeit dot de/2025/19/andrij-jermak-wolodymyr-selenskyj-ukrainekrieg-verhandlungen-russland-usa/komplettansicht

[22] https://tass dot ru/politika/23883057

[23]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar050725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar042325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050425 ;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825 ;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325

[26] https://tass dot ru/politika/23891041 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23888557 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23886607

[27] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76870

[28] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76873

[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025

[30] http://www.kremlin dot ru/supplement/6309; http://www.news dot cn/world/20250509/753c2b212a76424ab45a3be0bab53eca/c.html

[31]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar022325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121224;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102424;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar101824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092724

[32] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025

[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025

[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025

[36]
http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/76872 ;
http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76873 ; http://kremlin dot
ru/events/president/transcripts/76871 ; http://www.news dot
cn/world/20250508/53e27a12b51f4423b4b2602323b16015/c.html ;
http://www.news dot
cn/world/20250509/32253c7ff4d9487e9c68a8d58a315112/c.html

[37] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/76872

[38] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2024

[39]

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024
; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/76872 ;
http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76873 ; http://kremlin dot
ru/events/president/transcripts/76871 ; http://www.news dot
cn/world/20250508/53e27a12b51f4423b4b2602323b16015/c.html ;
http://www.news dot
cn/world/20250509/32253c7ff4d9487e9c68a8d58a315112/c.html

[40]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin%27s%20Offset%20The%20Kremlin%27s%20Geopolitical%20Adaptations%20Since%202014.pdf;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024

[41]

https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/Protection-of-Civilians-in-Armed-Conflict-April-2025
; https://suspilne dot
media/1012683-nimeccina-peredala-novij-paket-dopomogi-zelenskij-zaklikav-pripiniti-vogon-sonajmense-na-30-dib-1170-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1746708297&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[42]
https://www dot rbc.ua/ukr/news ; https://www dot
rbc.ua/ukr/news/rada-ratifikuvala-ugodu-zi-ssha-nadra-1746635236.html ;
https://www dot youtube.com/live/k6sz-i2lmdw ;
https://t.me/belta_telegramm/310279 ; https://t.me/yzheleznyak/12499;
https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14148;
https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1920507414299672651;
https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14147; https://suspilne dot
media/1013477-zelenskij-i-prezidentka-ek-obgovorili-podalsi-kroki-dla-vstupu-ukraini-v-es/;
https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1920500408457236857

[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-1-2025

[44]
https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1920202569772666922;
https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1920114542593364373;
https://t.me/SHACHA190/130628;
https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10950; https:// t [dot]
me/warriorofnorth/8116; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9100

[45]
https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/status/1920169394442842210;
https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1920028442998845493;
https://t.me/tankova_brugada/2593

[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/52304

[48]
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91343; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91344;
https://t.me/wargonzo/26383; https://t.me/dva_majors/70775;
https://t.me/yurasumy/22845; https://t.me/rybar/70221;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91348; https://t.me/rusich_army/23249;
https://t.me/rusich_army/23250; https://t.me/epoddubny/23377

[49] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64073

[50] https://t.me/usf_army/555

[51] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91319

[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28269

[53] https://x.com/p6060083/status/1919991600165372185 ; https://x.com/Raver__/status/1919884812900266189 ;

[54] https://t.me/dva_majors/70772

[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28269

[56] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/53667; https://t.me/rusich_army/23267; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164003

[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28243

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[59]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[60]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl ;

[61]
https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/1013009-ukrainski-zahisniki-dzerkalno-vidpovidaut-na-vsi-zagrozi-osuv-hortica-pro-peremira-rf-na-frontah-doneccini/

[62] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164003

[63] https://t.me/rubak112/248; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9091

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[67]
https://suspilne dot
media/kharkiv/1012873-bojovi-zitknenna-8-travna-fiksuut-na-pivnoci-harkivsini-ta-na-kupanskomu-napramku-sinegubov/

[68] https://t.me/bratstvo252/1233; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9092

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[72] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163978

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[75] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[76]
https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/1013009-ukrainski-zahisniki-dzerkalno-vidpovidaut-na-vsi-zagrozi-osuv-hortica-pro-peremira-rf-na-frontah-doneccini/

[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[78] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[79] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[80] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64081; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163978

[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[82] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[83] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[84]
https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/1013009-ukrainski-zahisniki-dzerkalno-vidpovidaut-na-vsi-zagrozi-osuv-hortica-pro-peremira-rf-na-frontah-doneccini/

[85] https://t.me/wargonzo/26392

[86] https://t.me/wargonzo/26392

[87] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1920364764485587240; https://t.me/Orki3MsbLauda/170

[88] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9090; https://t.me/bbs117_army/48;

[89] https://t.me/yurasumy/22851; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91335; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91315

[90] https://t.me/dva_majors/70772

[91]
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64078;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28257;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28257 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70756

[92] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[93] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[94] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[95]
https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/1013009-ukrainski-zahisniki-dzerkalno-vidpovidaut-na-vsi-zagrozi-osuv-hortica-pro-peremira-rf-na-frontah-doneccini/

[96] https://t.me/mod_russia/52304; https://t.me/tass_agency/314041

[97] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64088

[98]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform.com dot

ua/2025/05/08/dyktatura-pogody-ta-zelenky-poblyzu-toreczka-rosiyany-zminyly-grafik-shturmiv/

[99] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163939

[100] https://t.me/dva_majors/70756 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70797

[101] https://t.me/yurasumy/22850; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163978

[102] https://t.me/yurasumy/22850

[103] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[104] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[105] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[106]
https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/1013009-ukrainski-zahisniki-dzerkalno-vidpovidaut-na-vsi-zagrozi-osuv-hortica-pro-peremira-rf-na-frontah-doneccini/

[107] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28261

[108] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9567

[109]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/05/08/cze-masshtabne-slaboumiye-yakes-taktyka-myasnyh-shturmiv-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-proczvitaye/

[110] https://t.me/sashakots/53558

[111] https://t.me/mod_russia/52305

[112]
https://t.me/motopatriot78/35552; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35548;
https://t.me/yurasumy/22850; Https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64076;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64079

[113] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[114] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[115] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[116]
https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/1013009-ukrainski-zahisniki-dzerkalno-vidpovidaut-na-vsi-zagrozi-osuv-hortica-pro-peremira-rf-na-frontah-doneccini/

[117]
https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1920276526722851315;
https://www.facebook.com/61573845209927/videos/1215029306922099/;
https://x.com/RALee85/status/1920251724226249030;
https://t.me/TyskNIP/15952; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9102

[118] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35583; https://t.me/voin_dv/14802

[119] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[120] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[121] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[122] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[123] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1012713-nove-peremir

[124] https://t.me/voin_dv/14781; https://t.me/voin_dv/14798

[125] https://x.com/RALee85/status/1920251724226249030; https://t.me/TyskNIP/15952; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9102

[126] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35548; https://t.me/yurasumy/22849

[127] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[128] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[129] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[130]
https://suspilne dot
media/zaporizhzhia/1013229-travneve-peremira-rf-rosijski-vijska-prodovzuut-obstrili-na-zaporizkomu-napramku/

[131] https://t.me/vrogov/20215

[132] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[133] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[134] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[135] https://t.me/dva_majors/70772 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26383

[136]
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163910 ; https://t.me/Viking_SpN/2754 ;
https://t.me/russian_airborne/9988 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163950

[137] https://t.me/wargonzo/26380 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35555

[138] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[139] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[140] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[141] https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/7733 ; https://www.facebook.com/pho.gov.ua/posts/1074894061339321?ref=embed_post

[142] https://t.me/dva_majors/70822; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/26100; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/26095

[143]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IcIrtPsvoEA; https://armyinform.com dot

ua/2025/05/08/yak-vpolyuvaty-okupanta-richkovym-tenisom-na-hersonskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-boyezitknennya-na-dnipri/

[144] https://t.me/dva_majors/70787

[145] https://t.me/kpszsu/34086

[146] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/42561

[147] https://t.me/kpszsu/34086

[148] https://t.me/kpszsu/34086

[149]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/05/08/shho-vidomo-pro-bpla-imitatory-intervyu-z-ekspertom-pro-potenczijni-zagrozy-vid-rosijskyh-droniv-obmanok/

[150]

https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/05/08/shho-vidomo-pro-bpla-imitatory-intervyu-z-ekspertom-pro-potenczijni-zagrozy-vid-rosijskyh-droniv-obmanok/

[151]
https://belta dot
by/economics/view/chebotar-belarus-natselena-na-uglublenie-proizvodstvennoj-kooperatsii-s-kitaem-713444-2025/