Angelica
Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson,
Daria Novikov, and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel and Nate
Trotter
May 9, 2025, 6:30pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 11am ET on May 9. ISW will cover
subsequent reports in the May 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
[Note:
The Ukrainian General Staff’s 2200 May 8 SITREP appears to cover
battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200 on May 8. The Ukrainian General
Staff’s 0800 May 9 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from
0800 on May 8 to 0800 on May 9. The Ukrainian General Staff’s 1600 May 9
SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600 on May
9. Any reports of Russian ground activity in these SITREPs are implicit
accusations that Russian forces violated Russia’s unilateral Victory Day
ceasefire.]
Click here to read ISW’s in-depth coverage of Russia’s May 9 Victory Day holiday.
US
President Donald Trump explicitly called for a longer-term ceasefire in
Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations — a sequence that Ukraine
has consistently supported and that Russia has consistently rejected.
Trump stated on May 8 that the United States calls for a 30-day
unconditional ceasefire that “must ultimately build toward a peace
agreement.”[1] Trump noted that he is committed to securing a
Ukrainian-Russian peace with the Europeans. US Vice President JD Vance
stated on May 8 that Russia asked for “too much” because Russia
perceives that it is winning the war on the battlefield.[2] Vance stated
that Russia cannot expect Ukraine to cede territory to Russia that
Russian forces have not seized — in reference to Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s demand that Ukraine cede territory in eastern and
southern Ukraine that Russian forces do not currently occupy.[3] Vance
reiterated that the United States wants Ukraine to remain a sovereign
country. US President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 9 that he is
working together with European states to achieve a ceasefire at least 30
days long.[4] Zelensky reported that his May 8 phone call with Trump
demonstrated that the United States, Ukraine, and Europe are “on the
same page” about the necessity of a full ceasefire. The Kremlin has
consistently rejected Ukrainian and American proposals for 30-day
ceasefires while blaming Ukraine for the lack of progress towards peace
negotiations.[5]
Ukrainian resistance with Western support
has prevented Russian forces from seizing any of their self-identified
objectives in Ukraine over the past year, depriving Russian President
Vladimir Putin of significant battlefield successes to celebrate on
Victory Day. Putin did not discuss the battlefield situation in
Ukraine during Russia’s Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on May 8 and
9 but claimed that all of Russia supports Russian servicemembers
fighting in Ukraine.[6] Russian forces have not seized any significant
towns in Ukraine since the seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024, and the
only mid-sized settlement that Russian forces have seized in Ukraine
since December 2024 is Velyka Novosilka (pre-war population of
5,000).[7] Ukrainian sources previously reported that Russian forces
were trying to seize Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and the remaining
area of Luhansk Oblast and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast by Victory
Day on May 9.[8] Russian forces did not accomplish any of those
objectives, and have in fact been trying to seize Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar,
and Toretsk for roughly a year.[9]
Ukrainian long-range strikes
and improved integration of tactical drone operations with defensive
operations and counterattacks — all enabled by Western military support —
have slowed, and in some places stalled, Russian offensive operations
in Ukraine. Ukraine’s successful integration of Ukrainian drone
innovators and operators with ground forces appears to have stalled
Russia’s offensive against Pokrovsk and Toretsk in 2024 and early
2025.[10] Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian ammunition
depots, defense industry facilities, and oil and gas infrastructure have
at times compromised Russia’s ability to supply frontline units and
have compounded the rising costs of Russia’s war against Ukraine.[11]
Ukrainian forces have also intentionally exacerbated other Russian
vulnerabilities over the last year, including exacerbating Russia’s
shortage of operational reserves by launching the incursion into Kursk
Oblast in August 2024 and forcing the Russian military to redeploy
troops from other frontline areas to defend against the incursion.[12]
The
only recent military operation that Putin featured on Victory Day was
the repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Putin
thanked and highlighted North Korean troops at the Victory Day parade
on May 9, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov noted that high-ranking
North Korean commanders who participated in recapturing Kursk Oblast
attended the parade.[13] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General
Valery Gerasimov declared that Russian forces pushed all Ukrainian
forces from Kursk Oblast on April 26, after almost nine months of
Russian operations to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[14]
Russian officials have repeatedly platformed the recapture of Kursk
Oblast as a significant military achievement, and ISW previously
forecasted that Russian officials would highlight the Kursk operation as
part of the Victory Day celebrations.[15] Russian officials’ praise of
the Kursk operation ignores the fact that Putin reportedly initially
tasked Russian forces with retaking Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and
Putin’s continued willingness to extend this timeline throughout Fall
2024 and Winter 2024-2025, prioritizing offensive operations in Donetsk
Oblast over retaking Russian territory.[16] Russian officials are also
ignoring recent Ukrainian attacks and advances into Tetkino, Kursk
Oblast.[17]
Russian officials highlighted technological
adaptations and innovations that Russian forces have integrated in
Ukraine over the last three years during national and regional Victory
Day celebrations. Russian state media posted footage on May 9
showing Russian forces displaying Orlan-10, Orlan-30, and Zala
reconnaissance drones; Lancet-51 and Lancer-52 loitering munitions; and
Geran and Garpiya long-range strikes drones during the Victory Day
parade in Moscow City.[18] Russia state news outlet RIA Novosti posted
footage showing Russian forces riding in Chinese-made all-terrain
vehicles (ATVs) and Russian-made buggies during a Victory Day parade in
Khabarovsk City, Khabarovsk Krai.[19] Russian media also posted footage
of Russian forces showcasing tanks equipped with counter drone netting
at a Victory Day parade in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast.[20]
Russia’s use of counter drone netting, ATVs, buggies, and motorcycles
are all tactical adaptations in response to Ukrainian drone operations.
Russian forces have increasingly leveraged reconnaissance and strike
drones to destroy frontline Ukrainian positions and damage Ukrainian
cities throughout the war in Ukraine. Russian officials appear to be
highlighting these weapons, vehicles, and counter-drone adaptations to
the Russian public to frame these innovations as a form of “victory” in
Ukraine. Russian officials’ willingness to highlight these adaptions
during Victory Day parades suggests that the Russian military intends to
preserve these adaptions in future military operations rather than
reverting to pre-2022 forms of combat.
The Kremlin seized
on Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations to posture itself as having
broad international support three years into its invasion of Ukraine and
especially highlighted Russia’s growing partnerships with the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea. The Kremlin indicated
that heads of state and senior representatives of at least 30 states,
the heads of the Palestinian Authority and Kremlin-backed separatist
region of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the heads of several
international organizations — including the Russia-dominated
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eurasian Economic Union
(EAEU), and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) — travelled
to Russia for the Victory Day parade and subsequent events on May 9.[21]
The Kremlin reported that 55 military units and over 11,500 military
personnel in total participated in the parade in Moscow, including
military personnel from Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Egypt, the PRC, Laos,
Mongolia, and Myanmar.[22]
Russian officials specifically praised
the PRC and North Korea for their support, including of the war in
Ukraine. Putin gave a speech at the parade in Moscow highlighting the
contribution of the “courageous people of China” in Russia’s victory in
the Second World War, and Putin sat next to PRC President Xi Jinping at
the Victory Day parade.[23] Putin and Xi issued a joint statement on May
8 that referenced Putin’s original war aims in Ukraine and called for
the resolution of the war in Ukraine to eliminate the “root causes” of
the war — a long-standing Russian talking point and demand for the
installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine.[24] ISW noted that
this joint statement was a notable inflection in PRC rhetoric. Putin
expressed well-wishes to North Korean soldiers and hugged a North Korean
military veteran at the parade, and Russian state media highlighted
this gesture.[25] North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, his daughter Kim
Ju-ae, and several North Korean officials visited the Russian embassy in
Pyongyang to commemorate the May 9 Victory Day holiday.[26] Russia is
likely attempting to emphasize its deepening relationships with the PRC
and North Korea in particular to posture itself as possessing broad
international support, including for its war in Ukraine, to a domestic
Russian audience and the wider international community.
Putin
used the Victory Day holiday to promote the development of a civic
Russian identity at odds with Russian ultranationalist efforts to
promote ethno-religious nationalism predicated on a Russian state mainly
led by and comprised of ethnic Russians. Putin claimed on May 8
at a dinner with foreign delegations in Moscow that May 9 is a “sacred
date” for the “multinational people” of Russia.[27] Putin also claimed
on May 9 in a speech at the Victory Day parade that the Soviet Union’s
“truly iron unity” prevented Nazi Germany from seizing the country.[28]
Putin claimed that Russia defends the honor of all Red Army soldiers
from different nationalities and that all of the republics in the Soviet
Union bore a common burden in the Second World War. Putin additionally
said that Central Asia and the South Caucasus made “enormous”
contributions in the Second World War. Putin’s efforts to highlight
Russia’s and post-Soviet countries’ diverse population as equal
contributors to the Soviet war effort are part of an effort to promote
an informal state ideology that supports a civic Russian identity and a
multiethnic and religiously diverse population. Putin routinely attempts
to posture Russia as an ethnically diverse and harmonious country in an
attempt to balance among Russian ultranationalist demands for
restrictions against migrants and assimilation of ethnic minorities.[29]
ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is trying to leverage migrants
to offset labor shortages while also disproportionately targeting
migrants and ethnic minorities in Russian military recruitment
efforts.[30] Putin’s choice to promote multiculturalism at Russia’s
largest national holiday demonstrates that Putin continues to support an
informal state ideology that supports Russian civic nationalism. This
manifestation of Russian nationalism is notably at odds with Russian
ultranationalists’ attempts to create an ideology predicated on a
Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians that
defends and platforms Russian Orthodoxy.[31] Putin will likely continue
to struggle to balance Russia’s need to leverage migrants to offset
labor shortages and long-term demographic decline with placating the
increasingly influential pro-war Russian ultranationalist community.
Delegations from 35 countries and the Council of Europe visited Lviv City on May 9 in celebration of Europe Day in Ukraine.[32] Ukrainian
Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that the delegations would hold a
meetings of EU foreign ministers and the Core Group on the Establishment
of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.[33]
The Core Group announced on May 9 the creation of a special tribunal
within the Council of Europe to investigate and prosecute Russian
officials for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.[34]
Ukraine’s European allies continue to support the Ukrainian military and defense industrial base (DIB).
The EU, Denmark, France, and Italy agreed on May 9 to transfer one
billion euros (roughly $1.1 billion) from proceeds from frozen Russian
assets to the European Peace Fund to purchase weapons from the Ukrainian
DIB for the Ukrainian military.[35] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys
Shmyhal announced that the EU also allocated 600 million euros-worth
(roughly $675 million) of artillery and ammunition to Ukraine and more
than 200 million euros (roughly $225 million) to strengthen Ukrainian
air defenses.[36] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha noted on May 9
that the EU has committed to supply Ukraine with over 1.35 million
artillery shells in 2025.[37]
Key Takeaways:
- US
President Donald Trump explicitly called for a longer-term ceasefire in
Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations — a sequence that Ukraine
has consistently supported and that Russia has consistently rejected. - Ukrainian
resistance with Western support has prevented Russian forces from
seizing any of their self-identified objectives in Ukraine over the past
year, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of significant
battlefield successes to celebrate on Victory Day. - The
only recent military operation that Putin featured on Victory Day was
the repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. - Russian
officials highlighted technological adaptations and innovations that
Russian forces have integrated in Ukraine over the last three years
during national and regional Victory Day celebrations. - The
Kremlin seized on Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations to posture
itself as having broad international support three years into its
invasion of Ukraine and especially highlighted Russia’s growing
partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea. - Putin
used the Victory Day holiday to promote the development of a civic
Russian identity at odds with Russian ultranationalist efforts to
promote ethno-religious nationalism predicated on a Russian state mainly
led by and comprised of ethnic Russians. - Delegations from 35 countries and the Council of Europe visited Lviv City on May 9 in celebration of Europe Day in Ukraine.
- Ukraine’s European allies continue to support the Ukrainian military and defense industrial base (DIB).
- Russian
forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and
Velyka Novosilka directions and in Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian
forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Alleged Ceasefire Violation
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian
Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the
international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube
artillery range of Kharkiv City - Russian Subordinate Main Effort
#2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into
eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast - Russian
Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast,
the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly
advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast - Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Alleged Ceasefire Violations
See text below for reported violations.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian
forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast as Russian and Ukrainian
sources accused each other of violating Russia’s unilateral Victory Day
ceasefire on May 9.
Assessed Ukrainian advances:
Geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces
recently advanced in southwestern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[38]
ISW is unable to assess when this advance occurred.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Ukrainian drone company reported on May 9 that Ukrainian
forces maintain positions in central Gornal (south of Sudzha along the
international border).[39] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 8 that
Russian forces regained lost positions in Tetkino.[40]
The
Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s
ceasefire and attacked in undefined areas of Kursk Oblast on May 8 and
9.[41]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 9 that
Ukrainian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by attacking in Kursk
Oblast.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 and 9 that Ukrainian
forces attacked near Tetkino and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino along the
international border) and that fighting continues near Tetkino.[43]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Grom-Kaskad” drone brigade and the
“Storm” detachment of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian
Flotilla) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[44]
The
Russian MoD accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia’s unilateral
Victory Day ceasefire by attacking in Belgorod Oblast on May 9.[45]
Ukrainian
Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko
posted imagery on May 9 from Japanese OSINT analysts showing Russian
decoy S-300 and S-400 air defense systems in an unspecified area of
Russia’s Far East.[46] Kovalenko stated that Russia had roughly 24 S-400
systems and 12 S-300 systems in the Far East but moved an unspecified
number of these air defense assets to western Russia, including to
Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast; Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast;
Savasleyka Air Base in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast; and Moscow Oblast.
Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis
(Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine
along the international border and approach to within tube artillery
range of Sumy City)
Russian milbloggers implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in Sumy Oblast on May 9.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 9 that elements of the
Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA],
Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Marine (east of Sumy City along
the Sumy-Belgorod Oblast border).[47]
The commander of a
Ukrainian drone crew operating in Sumy Oblast reported on May 9 that
Russian forces have intensified artillery and guided glide bomb strikes
along the international border of Sumy and Kursk oblasts and are using
unspecified North Korean weapons.[48] The commander noted that Russian
forces are using all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and between 40 and 50
motorcycles a day during attacks but that Russian assault tactics using
small infantry groups have not changed. The commander stated that
Russian forces are using donkeys and horses to transport ammunition.
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Anvar Spetsnaz” detachment
(possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are
reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[49]
Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Ukrainian sources accused Russian
forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast of violating Russia’s unilateral
Victory Day ceasefire on May 9.
The Ukrainian General
Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s unilateral Victory
Day ceasefire and attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on
May 8 and 9.[50]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian
and Ukrainian sources accused each other of violating Russia’s
unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the Kupyansk direction on May 9.
The
Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s
ceasefire by attacking northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and east of
Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on May 8 and 9.[51]
A Russian
milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia’s ceasefire by
attacking in unspecified areas in the Kupyansk direction, including
across the international border north of Kupyansk near Bereznyky.[52]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian “121st Regiment” (reportedly 68th
Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad
Military District [LMD] are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk
direction.[53]
Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each
other of violating Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the
Borova direction on May 9.
The Ukrainian General Staff
implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire and attacked
northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya;
and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Hrekivka on May 8 and
9.[54]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 9 that
Ukrainian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by attacking near
Novoyehorivka.[55]
Ukrainian and Russian sources accused
each other of violating Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the
Lyman direction on May 9.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian
milblogger claimed on May 9 that Russian forces advanced northeast of
Novomykhailivka, within eastern Kolodyazi (both northeast of Lyman), and
north and northwest of the Kolodyazi.[56]
The Ukrainian General
Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire and
attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Lypove, Zelena Dolyna, and Novyi
Mir; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Novomykhailivka; and east of
Lyman near Torske on May 8 and 9.[57] Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of
Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on May 9 that Russian
forces continue attacks in the Lyman direction.[58] The spokesperson of
a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on May 9
that Russian forces continue to attack in small infantry groups in
violation of Russia’s ceasefire.[59]
The Russian MoD claimed on May 9 that Ukrainian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by attacking near Lypove and Ridkodub.[60]
The
spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction
reported on May 9 that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry
groups with artillery support and occasionally attack in groups of three
to four personnel on motorcycles.[61]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed
territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
The
Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s
unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking in the Siversk direction
near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) and Fedorivka (south of Siversk)
on May 8 and 9.[62]
Ukrainian sources accused
Russian forces in the Chasiv Yar direction of violating Russia’s
unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 9.
The Ukrainian
General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by
attacking near Chasiv Yar itself, south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora,
and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka on May 8 and 9.[63]
Ukrainian
Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro
Zaporozhets reported on May 9 that Russian forces are attacking from
Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar) toward central Chasiv Yar with drone
support.[64]
Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each
other of violating Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the
Toretsk direction on May 9.
The Ukrainian General Staff
implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire and attacked
near Toretsk itself, northeast of Toretsk near Dyliivka, Dachne, and
Krymske, west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, and southwest of Toretsk
near Oleksandropil on May 8 and 9.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that
fighting continues southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka.[66]
The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of violating Russia’s
ceasefire near Toretsk and southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka and
Novoolenivka on May 9.[67]
Zaporozhets reported on May 9 that
Russian forces are intensifying their use of first-person view (FPV) and
fiber-optic drones near Leonidivka (southwest of Toretsk), likely to
support intensified Russian offensive operations near Sukha Balka
(southwest of Toretsk).[68]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that
Russian forces recently advanced into central Zvirove (southwest of
Pokrovsk).[69]
The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian
forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by attacking east of Pokrovsk near
Hrodivka, Promin, and Yelyzavetivka, southeast of Pokrovsk near
Novotorestke, south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, and southwest of
Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyarivka, and Zvirove on May 8 and 9.[70]
Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on May 8 that Russian
forces conducted a motorized assault consisting of 14 motorcycles and
civilian vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction.[71]
The Russian MoD
accused Ukraine of violating Russia’s unilateral ceasefire near
Myrolyubivka and Myrne (both east of Pokrovsk).[72]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 9 indicates that
Russian forces recently advanced in central Kotlyarivka (northeast of
Novopavlivka).[73]
The Ukrainian General Staff implied that
Russian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire and attacked northeast of
Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka and toward Novomykhailivka, east of
Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, and southwest of Novopavlivka near
Preobrazhenka and toward Troitske on May 8 and 9.[74]
The Russian
MoD accused Ukraine of violating Russia’s unilateral ceasefire near
Novooleksandrivka and Troitske (southeast of Novopavlivka).[75]
Russian
forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction as Russian and
Ukrainian sources accused each other of violating Russia’s unilateral
Victory Day ceasefire on May 9.
Assessed Russian
advances: Geolocated footage published on May 9 indicates that Russian
forces recently advanced along Likarniana Street in central Bahatyr
(west of Kurakhove).[76]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources
claimed on May 8 and 9 that Russian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire
by advancing into Bahatyr and Oleksiivka, and near Odradne, and toward
Komar (all west of Kurakhove) on May 8 and 9.[77] Another milblogger
claimed on May 8 that Russian forces advanced east of Bahatyr and near
Odradne (west of Kurakhove) prior to the start of Russia’s ceasefire on
May 8.[78]
The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces
violated Russia’s ceasefire and attacked west of Kurakhove near
Kostyantynopil, Bahatyr, and Odradne, and southwest of Kurakhove near
Rozlyv on May 8 and 9.[79]
The Russian MoD claimed on May 9 that
Ukrainian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by attacking near
Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[80]
Russian forces
recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction before the start of
Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that
Russian forces advanced southeast of Dniproenerhiya (north of Velyka
Novosilka).[81]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on
May 8 and 9 that Russian forces advanced toward Komar (northwest of
Velyka Novosilka) and further north of Dniproenerhiya.[82]
The
Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s
ceasefire and attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske,
Vilne Pole, and Pryvilne; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and
toward Zelene Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil and
Novopil on May 8 and 9.[83]
The Russian MoD accused Ukrainian
forces of violating Russia’s ceasefire on May 9 by attacking near Vesele
(northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[84] A Russian milblogger claimed on
May 8 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Velyka
Novosilka near Vesele and Feodorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) but
did not specify when the counterattacks occurred.[85]
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
(Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas
against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of
Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces recently
marginally advanced in western Zaporizhia before Russia’s unilateral
Victory Day ceasefire as Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces of
violating Russia’s ceasefire on May 9.
Assessed Russian
advances: Geolocated footage published on May 6 indicates that Russian
forces recently marginally advanced in western Stepove (southwest of
Orikhiv).[86]
The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian
forces violated Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking
southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky on
May 8 and 9.[87]
Geolocated footage published on May 8 shows
Ukrainian forces recently striking a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system
near Stepove (southwest of Orikhiv in Russia’s near rear).[88]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-3 “Rodina” Battalion (Russian
Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv
direction.[89] Elements of the Russian BARS-11 “Kuban” detachment
(Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia
Oblast.[90]
Ukrainian
and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia’s unilateral
Victory Day ceasefire in the Kherson direction on May 9.
The
Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s
unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking in the Kherson direction
on May 8 and 9.[91]
Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 and 9
that Ukrainian forces violated Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire
by attacking Russian forces on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River
near the Antonvisky Bridge and striking Russian positions near Nova
Kakhovka (northeast of Kherson City) and on the Kinburn Spit (in
Mykolaiv Oblast).[92]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces did not conduct long-range drone or missile strikes against
Ukraine on the night of May 8 to 9 or during the day on May 9.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114474136794655068
[2]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O0nQrKiZWRs ; https://meduza dot
io/news/2025/05/08/dzhey-di-vens-rossiya-v-peregovorah-po-ukraine-prosit-bolshe-razumnogo-ey-ne-otdadut-territorii-kotorye-ona-dazhe-ne-zavoevala
[3]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024
;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2025;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2025;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-17-2025
[4] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1920818331143074113
[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325
[6] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76879
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar123124
[8]
https://newsukraine.rbc dot
ua/news/russian-army-plans-to-reach-dnipropetrovsk-1746538770.html ;
https://euromaidanpress dot
com/2025/05/05/russias-deadly-innovations-cost-40-of-all-casualties-in-pokrovsk-as-putins-races-to-dnipropetrovsk-border-ahead-of-sacred-holiday/
; https://24tv dot
ua/ru/gde-usilitsja-nastuplenie-rossii-do-9-maja-24-kanal_n2803301;
https://24tv dot
ua/ru/boi-fronte-karta-kakie-goroda-hotjat-zahvatit-rossijane-pered_n2809699
[9]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine
[10]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine
;
Frontline report: Ukraine’s youngest general stabilizes Pokrovsk front
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2025
[11]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2024
; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092424 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2024
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2024
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2024
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024
;
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-strikes-russia-economy-oil/33361997.html
[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment
[13]
https://x.com/clashreport/status/1920757028621819939 ;
https://t.me/tass_agency/314260 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/314262 ;
https://tass dot ru/politika/23899627; https://t.me/tass_agency/314322
[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042625
[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825
[16]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar111224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091924
[17]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar050725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ;
https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1920574295832502372;
https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1920393710593868164;
https://t.me/control_sigma/41614
[18] https://ria dot
ru/20250509/parad-2015972889.html ; https://t.me/milinfolive/147948 ;
https://x.com/RT_com/status/1920759506864132479
[19] https://t.me/rian_ru/293018 ; https://t.me/rian_ru/293022 ; https://x.com/RALee85/status/1920693481447547293
[20] https://t.me/e1_news/183776 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/97546
[21]
http://kremlin dot ru/supplement/6312 ; https://www.themoscowtimes dot
com/2025/05/09/russia-holds-80th-anniversary-victory-day-parade-on-red-square-a89026;
https://novayagazeta dot
eu/articles/2025/05/09/kto-priekhal-v-moskvu-9-maia-v-2025-godu-i-20-let-nazad
[22] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76879
[23] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76879; https://t.me/tass_agency/314211
[24]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2025
; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525
[25] https://iz dot
ru/1883779/2025-05-09/putin-peredal-nailuchshie-pozhelaniia-boitcam-kndr;
https://ria dot ru/20250509/putin-2015981677.html; https://www.gazeta
dot ru/army/news/2025/05/09/25739330.shtml;
https://t.me/tass_agency/314260;https://t.me/tass_agency/314262]
[26]
https://kcnawatch dot
org/newstream/1746781443-192707492/dprk-fm-makes-public-press-release-on-v-day-of-russia-felicitated-by-supreme-leadership-of-state/;
http://www.vok.rep dot kp/index.php/revo_de/getDetail/ien250509008/en;
https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23896877
[27] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76877
[28] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76879
[29]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar121824 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0
;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024
[30]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2023
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2023
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2023
; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121123;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024
[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025
[32] https://suspilne dot media/1013885-u-lvovi-z-vizitom-perebuvaut-kallas-i-golovi-mzs-krain-evrosouzu/
[33] https://suspilne dot media/1013885-u-lvovi-z-vizitom-perebuvaut-kallas-i-golovi-mzs-krain-evrosouzu/
[34]
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/europe-throws-support-behind-ukraine-special-tribunal-prosecute-russia-2025-05-09/
; https://mfa dot
gov.ua/en/news/lvivska-zayava-shchodo-zavershennya-roboti-koaliciyi-derzhav-zi-stvorennya-specialnogo-tribunalu-shchodo-zlochinu-agresiyi-proti-ukrayini
[35]
https://www.ukrinform dot
ua/rubric-ato/3991126-es-domovivsa-spramuvati-1-milard-vid-zamorozenih-aktiviv-rosii-na-zakupivlu-ukrainskoi-zbroi.html
[36] https://x.com/Denys_Shmyhal/status/1920805192901030055
[37]
https://mfa dot
gov.ua/news/andrij-sibiga-za-rezultatami-zustrichi-u-lvovi-derzhavi-yes-vzhe-zobovyazalisya-nadati-ukrayini-shchonajmenshe-135-mln-snaryadiv-do-kincya-roku
[38]
https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1920574295832502372 ;
https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1920393710593868164 ;
https://t.me/control_sigma/41614
[39] https://t.me/rugby_team_army/102
[40] https://t.me/yurasumy/22853
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047
[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448
[43]
https://t.me/motopatriot78/35609; https://t.me/rybar/70249;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91374; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35647;
https://t.me/dva_majors/70840; https://t.me/rusich_army/23284;
https://t.me/wargonzo/26405; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91388;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91403; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28334
[44] https://t.me/wargonzo/26403 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70876
[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448
[46] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9231; https://x.com/AS_22im/status/1920426188918386721
[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91410; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91409; https://t.me/yurasumy/22872
[48]
https://suspilne dot
media/sumy/1013675-intensivnist-stala-silnisa-komandir-ekipazu-pro-situaciu-v-kurskij-oblasti-rf-na-kordoni-z-sumsinou/
[49] https://t.me/epoddubny/23380
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047
[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91414; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91371
[53] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91371
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067;https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047
[55] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448
[56] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31473; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31470
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067;https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047
[58]
https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/1013811-akbi-nihto-ne-ogolosuvav-pro-akes-peremira-mi-b-pro-nogo-ne-znali-recniki-rozpovili-pro-situaciu-na-fronti/
[59]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/05/09/my-z-tamaroyu-hodymo-paroyu-poblyzu-lymana-zhodnyh-oznak-peremyrya-lyshe-shturmy-malymy-grupamy/
[60] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448
[61]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/05/09/ataky-v-styli-kobayasi-maru-poblyzu-lymana-drony-kosyat-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv-na-motoczyklah
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047 ;
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047 n
[64]
https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/1013811-akbi-nihto-ne-ogolosuvav-pro-akes-peremira-mi-b-pro-nogo-ne-znali-recniki-rozpovili-pro-situaciu-na-fronti/
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047
[66] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35607
[67] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448
[68]
https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/1013811-akbi-nihto-ne-ogolosuvav-pro-akes-peremira-mi-b-pro-nogo-ne-znali-recniki-rozpovili-pro-situaciu-na-fronti/
[69] https://t.me/UMBRELLA_32_OMBR/82; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9104; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1920574313255616789
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047
[71] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9611
[72] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448
[73]
https://www.facebook.com/72.black.brigade/videos/695920133418373/?rdid=18K8BFI0wp4vg6LA#;
https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28056 ;
https://x.com/hizzo_jay/status/1920820288989675605
[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047
[75] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448
[76]
https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1920871584543224153 ;
https://t.me/pidrozdilshadowoficial/682 ;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9108
[77] https://t.me/yurasumy/22854; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164121; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164123
[78] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64103
[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047
[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448
[81]
https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1920644970731745334;
https://x.com/RALee85/status/1920226913395626228;
https://www.facebook.com/61573845209927/videos/1215029306922099
[82] https://t.me/yurasumy/22854
[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047
[84] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448
[85] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64103
[86]
https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1920574311150072137;
https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/status/1920501749099450383;
https://t.me/WarArchive_ua
[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049 ;https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047
[88] https://t.me/RUBAK_65/358; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28049
[89] https://t.me/bars3rodina/1432 ; https://t.me/rybar/70272
[90] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91382
[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049;https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047
[92] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28292 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70840